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Abstract 
Incidents involving hydrocarbon fires and explosions present a major hazard to the 
workforce on offshore oil and gas platforms. Following the Piper Alpha Disaster in 1988, 
platform operators for the UK sector are required to submit safety cases for approval by 
the Health and Safety Executive. A key requirement of these safety cases is that the risks 
due to hazards associated with an accidental release of hydrocarbons has been 
demonstrated to be as low as reasonably practicable. 
A methodology has been developed to predict the characteristics of explosions, jet fires 
and pool fires occurring in either an open sided or an enclosed offshore module. The 
expected number of fatalities on offshore platforms due to these ignitions is estimated 
using a Monte Carlo simulation method implemented within the SAROS (Safety and 
Reliability of Offshore Structures) software. The process involves the estimation of the 
frequency and magnitude of jet fires, pool fires and explosions which combined with the 
distribution of the workforce over the platform at the time of the incident is used to 
predict the risk of fatality. 
An analysis, using the existing SAROS software, has been developed to estimate the 
variation in the frequency of ignitions and fatalities on offshore platforms when key input 
parameters are varied. The most influential safety systems have been identified and been 
the subject of an optimisation scheme developed using a Genetic Algorithm. The 
objective of the optimisation is to minimise the frequency of fatalities occurring in open 
or enclosed modules on an offshore oil and gas platform by configuring the safety 
systems. Constraints are placed on the resources available to make design improvements 
and limiting changes to those which are practical in the offshore environment 
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Notation 
4 
, ßg Proportion of gas (by volume) 
C Surface emissive power of a fireball 
y Ratio of specific heats 
A Latent heat of gas 
ADi Spurious failure rate for deluge system type i 
2c; Spurious failure rate for gas detector type i 
Aj Ignition rate 
AL Frequency of the gas leak 
'v; Spurious failure rate for valve type i 
ýWS Failure rate of the deluge system 
Bo; Inspection interval i for deluge systems 
8c; Inspection interval i for gas detectors 
Bv; Inspection interval i for valves 
p Average density of the gas-condensate mixture 
Pa Atmospheric density 
PC Density of condensate 
pg Density of gas 
pg(", ) Density of gas at atmospheric pressure 
Po Density of oil 
po(aq Density of oil at atmospheric pressure 
vg Discharge speed of the gas 
vc Discharge speed of the condensate 
A Cross sectional of a hole 
Af Forced ventilation rate (Enclosed modules) 
Ap Area of an oil pool 
A, Volume ventilation rate due to the wind (Open modules) 
C Constant representing the fraction of LFL at which the 
detector is activated 
Co; Initial cost of deluge system type i 
% 
kWm 2 
Joule 
per year 
per year 
3 
M-3 
per year 
m3 
months 
months 
months 
kgm 3 
kgm 3 
kgm 3 
kgm3 
kgm 3 
kgm'3 
kgm3 
ms'1 
ms'' 
m2 
m3s'' 
m3 
m3s 
' 
units 
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Cc; Initial cost of gas detection system type i units 
CMDI Maintenance cost for deluge system type i 
CMDU Maintenance cost for deluge system type i with an inspection 
interval of Ovi 
CMG; Maintenance cost for gas detector type i 
CA, Glg Maintenance cost for gas detection system type i with an inspection 
interval of OGj 
CMT Total maintenance cost for the safety systems within the module units 
CAM Maintenance cost for valve type i units 
CMVi Maintenance cost for valve type i with an inspection interval of Ovj units 
CT Total initial cost of safety systems within the module units 
CV; Initial cost of isolation/blowdown valve type i units 
cg Concentration of gas within the module % 
cP Specific heat capacity of gas at constant pressure 
cs Stoichiometric concentration of gas % 
cv Specific heat capacity of gas at constant volume 
D, Deluge system type i 
do Assumed minimum detectable gas cloud diameter m 
df Diameter of fireball m 
dP Diameter of an oil pool m 
F(t) Cumulative failure distribution 
FF Fraction of the module occupied by the gas cloud 
fe Frequency of an explosion (per yr) 
f; (v) Probability density function for the ignition source 
F; Flame length of Jet Fire m 
FP Flame length of Pool Fire m 
f", (V) Probability density function for the deluge system 
G; Gas detector type i 
g Acceleration due to gravity ms 2 
h Enthalpy K 
h,,, Height of the module m 
iv 
AHEAD Height of the head of oil above a leak on a vessel m 
I Intensity of thermal radiation of a fireball kWm 2 
LFL Lower Flammability Limit 
M Mass of the gas-condensate mixture kg 
in, Mass of condensate in the section kg 
61776 Mass of condensate blowdown kg 
amce Mass of condensate evaporated kg 
8m'i Mass of condensate leaked kg 
mg Mass of gas in the section kg 
ömgb Mass of gas blowdown kg 
bmg! Mass of gas leaked into the module kg 
ntPj Mass of fuel in the initial gas flame kg 
ND; Number of deluge systems of type i in the module 
ND; q Number of deluge systems of type i in the module with an 
inspection interval of ODJ 
NNj Number of gas detectors of type i in the module 
NG, q Number of gas detectors of type i in the module with an 
inspection interval of OG7 
Nv1 Number of isolation/blowdown valves of type i in the module 
Nv; g Number of isolation/blowdown valves of type i in the module 
with an inspection interval of Ova 
NFL Number of local fatalities 
NFpredf Number of fatalities in the pre-muster phase 
NFPOS, M Number of fatalities in the post-muster phase 
NoEvac Number of people evacuated in one cycle 
OR Remaining oxygen available in the module m3 
Opr Overpressure of an explosion bar 
Opr,,, Maximum possible overpressure of an explosion bar 
P(E) Probability of ignition 
PL Number of people in the local area (i. e. within the module) 
PL-MOD Modified population in the module 
V 
POB Total number of people on board the platform. 
Pa Atmospheric pressure Pa 
Pg Pressure of gas within the leaking section bar 
Psotal Pressure in the leaking section Pa 
qg Volume flowrate of gas into the module M-3 si 
ggmax Maximum volume flowrate of gas into the module M-3 S, I 
q,,, Total volume flowrate into the module m'3s'' 
qo Volume flowrate of oil into the module M"3 S-1 
RB Mass burn rate of oil kgs' 
s Entropy per unit mass of the system JouleK"' 
S, Entropy per unit mass of the condensate JouleK"' 
sg Entropy per unit mass of the gas JouleK"' 
sd 'Stand-off' istance m 
T Temperature of gas K 
T, Time for gas concentration to exceed the LFL s 
Tz Time for gas concentration to exceed the UFL s 
T3 Time for gas concentration to decrease below the LFL s 
T4 Time for gas concentration to decrease below the UFL s 
tbd Time at which blowdown activated s 
tdet Time to detection of a leak s 
tevap Time for condensate to evaporate s 
t; Time to ignition s 
toll Time for release of oil s 
UFL Upper Flammability Limit 
u Wind speed ms"' 
V Volume of the gas-condensate mixture m3 
Vg(a, ) Volume of gas at atmospheric pressure m3 
Vg,,, Volume of gas within the module m3 
V; Isolation/blowdown valve type i 
V,,, Volume of a module m3 
VP Volume of an oil pool m3 
V1 
vi Velocity of discharge of the oil 
W Mass flow rate of the leaking section 
W, Mass flow rate of condensate 
Wpb Mass flow rate of condensate blowdown 
Wg Mass flow rate of gas 
Wbb Mass flow rate of gas blowdown 
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Chapter I Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Processed hydrocarbons such as oil and gas are used globally on both an industrial 
and domestic level. The unrefined fuels are frequently located below sea level in large 
reserves and must be drawn from these deposits, using large offshore structures 
known as `platforms', and processed before they can be utilised. Platforms were first 
installed in the North Sea off the coast of the UK in the 1960's. The industry relied 
heavily on technology from the Gulf of Mexico where platforms had been constructed 
for a number of years. Although these platforms were of a satisfactory design and 
construction for shallower waters, new technology was required when platforms were 
required further North in deeper water fields. This development required larger 
platforms which exceeded the lift limits of the crane barges available at that time and 
the platforms began to be assembled offshore. The platforms were constructed from a 
number of smaller modules, supported on a deck frame and stacked, Figure 1.1 
illustrates construction of a modular platform at sea. This modular construction is still 
the most widely used platform structure to date. 
Figure 1.1 - Construction of a modular platform at sea. 
There are two fundamental types of module, open and closed. Open modules are 
open-sided allowing the module to be ventilated by the wind. Closed modules are 
fully enclosed on all sides and require ventilation to be supplied through a controlled 
ventilation system. 
I 
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Figure 1.2 - Typical Steel Jacketed Platform Layout. 
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The number and configuration of modules making up an individual platform varies 
dependent on the design and construction. Each process module contains the 
pipework, process vessels, storage containers and control systems required depending 
on the function of the individual module. In addition to process modules there will 
also be an accommodation module, a temporary refuge (TR, commonly located within 
the accommodation module) to be used in the event of an emergency, workshops and 
control areas. For a steel jacketed platform a typical platform layout is presented in 
Figure 1.2. 
The reserves are first accessed by drilling from the platform, and a combination of oil, 
gas, condensate and/or water is brought into the `wellhead' module on the platform. 
The fluid is then passed to the `separation' module where the water is drained and 
returned to the sea, the oil is separated from the remaining fluid and transported to 
shore for refining. Scrubbers are used to remove condensate from the gas which is 
repeatedly pressurised and then cooled before final pressurisation of the gas and 
transport to shore within the `compression' module of the platform. A hypothetical 
process (compression) section is shown in Figure 1.3. 
---------------------------------^-----------------------------------i 
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Figure 1.3 -A typical compression module layout. 
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The module consists of a number of individual sections consisting of lengths of 
pipework to and from process equipment. In the example module each section starts 
and ends with an isolation valve, capable of isolating the individual section from the 
remainder of the module. In an actual module there will usually be more than two 
valves to isolate a section. The isolation valves (white in Figure 1.3) are normally 
open and are designed to activate on detection of a leak, closing to prevent other 
sections from contributing to the leak. 
Each section may also contain any number of blowdown valves, normally closed 
(black in Figure 1.3). Blowdown valves are also activated on detection of a leak, 
opening to provide an escape route for the gas thereby depressurising the section and 
reducing the inventory available to leak. Gas is routed from the module to the flare 
tower, a separate construction present on the platform, the purpose of which is to 
safely dispose of contaminated or unwanted gas by burning it at a safe distance from 
the platform. 
The isolation system works to reduce the inventory of gas which can release into the 
module. For example in the event that a leak occurs within the first section of Figure 
1.3, (located between the first isolation valve, ISOL1, and the second isolation valve, 
ISOL2) the isolation valves should ensure that the only gas that can contribute to the 
leak is that from the first compressor, COM1, and the pipework between the isolation 
valves. The gas flow rate from Section 1 into the module is determined by the 
pressure of the gas and the size of the hole. If the Section 1 blowdown valve, BDI, 
operates correctly and opens, the amount of gas in the section that could leak into the 
module is substantially reduced. 
If ISOL2 should fail, gas from the first cooler, COOLERI, and scrubber, SCUT, and 
the pipework up to ISOL3 will also contribute to the gas leaking into the module. 
1.2 Offshore Hazards 
There are a number of hazards associated with the processing techniques on offshore 
platforms. The hazards have the potential to cause injury to personnel, damage to the 
Safety Critical Systems (SCS) and could potentially cause platform collapse. The SCS 
4 
onboard a platform include the list below and are described in more detail in Section 
1.3. 
Hydrocarbon systems 
Isolation and Blowdown systems 
Active Fire Protection 
Fire and Gas Protection 
Emergency Power 
Escape and Evacuation 
Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning systems 
Potential hazards identified in the safety case for the Beryl Alpha platform(], a 
concrete base offshore platform typical of those constructed in the North Sea, are 
presented below. 
1.2.1 Non-Hydrocarbon Fire 
The key areas of an offshore platform identified as potential locations for non- 
hydrocarbon fire are areas within the TR, workshops and electrical equipment areas. 
A common practice is to keep the amount of flammable material outside of the 
accommodation modules minimal and to strictly control ignition sources. 
A fire in the electrical equipment areas would have the potential to affect a number of 
critical safety systems and as a result could cause a platform shutdown. 
The risk of fires within the accommodation modules is minimised by restricting 
smoking to certain communal areas. Flame retardant materials would be used 
throughout a TR in order to minimise the spread of a fire. 
1.2.2 Uncontrolled Release of Non-Process Materials 
Materials identified as presenting potential hazards on a platform are listed below: 
" Gas bottles 
" Chemicals and Paints 
" Battery Hydrogen 
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Each of these items has the potential to cause or escalate an incident. 
1.2.3 Ship Collisions 
The potential for impact from a boat or ship exists on all marine installations. Studies 
carried out for the Safety Case indicated that the likelihood of platform collapse 
following impact from a small vessel such as a fishing boat or a drifting shuttle vessel 
is highly unlikely. However it is possible that the platform could collapse following 
impact from a large passing vessel. 
A potential major consequence is damage to the utility shaft, causing flooding or 
collapse of the platform, due to loss of one of the concrete legs of the platform. In the 
event of collision with the shaft, there is the potential to cause severe cracking in a 
small area of the shaft wall. If the crack originated below sea level it is expected that 
the inflow would be relatively slow. To mitigate against this the shaft is equipped 
with pumps to remove water from the shaft. 
1.2.4 Helicopter Impact 
This risk considers the consequences of a helicopter crash on the platform considering 
risk to personnel on the platform, not the risk to personnel during transport to and 
from a platform. The normal landing surface of the Helideck and the accommodation 
extension roofs are designed to withstand the impact of a helicopter impact. 
The worst case scenario would be an impact into the fuel storage area, causing fires 
on the Helideck. Sufficient safety measures such as foam sprays are in place to 
consider the consequences of such an event low. The platform layout has been 
designed to minimise the risk of severe damage to the platform and the TR and 
therefore any associated escalation potential is low. 
1.2.5 Transportation of Personnel 
This hazard considers transport of personnel to and from the offshore platforms. To 
reduce the risk of helicopter incidents, transport is not permitted when severe weather 
is forecast. 
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1.2.6 Dropped Objects 
A hazard is presented from objects being dropped from various lifting activities 
carried out on the installation utilising cranes located on the platform. The cranes are 
fitted with inherent safety features to minimise the likelihood of a dropped load. 
Amongst these is a visual and audible alarm to prevent the crane operating outside the 
safe operating area or lifting a load not considered safe. 
Use of cranes is restricted in specific areas of offshore platforms identified as 
containing hazards which could cause harm to personnel or the structure if a load 
were to be dropped. Such areas may contain pipework or equipment which is 
exposed. 
A further hazard would be a dropped load overboard impacting on a sub sea pipeline 
or a diver. As such crane facilities are not constructed in areas where a load could 
impact with a pipeline. It is required that all diving operations are suspended when 
crane operations are in use and vice versa to eliminate the risk of diver fatality due to 
a dropped object from a crane. 
1.2.7 Flooding of the Utility Shaft 
The utility shaft on a platform contains process equipment required to operate the 
platform such as pipe work, heating and air conditioning controls, and with a gravity 
based structure is located within one of the legs of the platform. 
The following have been identified as potential origins for flooding of the shaft: 
" Loss of structural integrity of the shaft structure. 
" Failure of pipework or mechanical system components within the shaft. 
" Failure of pipework penetrations through the utility shaft walls. 
" Planned operation of a system within the utility shaft. 
" Abnormal operation of a system within the utility shaft (valve failure, operator 
error etc. ). 
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It is considered very unlikely that flooding of the shaft would result in a fire or 
explosion or in loss of the structural integrity of the platform. In the event of a flood 
in the shaft it would not be considered necessary to remove personnel from the 
platform however if the shaft was severely flooded, the platform would be shutdown 
while the situation was rectified. 
1.2.8 Foundation Failure 
Collapse of the platform due to foundation failure would result in loss of the TR 
however foundation failure by any event other than seismic is expected to be a low 
progressive collapse. In this case there would be sufficient time for evacuation of all 
personnel from the platform. 
1.2.9 Severe Environmental Conditions 
This hazard has the potential to impact on the safe operation of a number of activities 
on the platform. With the exception of some communications, Safety Critical Systems 
should not be affected by extreme environmental conditions until such time as the 
platform would be likely to collapse. Severe conditions causing collapse of the 
platform are considered to result in the loss of the TR. A hazard not resulting in 
platform collapse however is assumed to not affect the TR. 
1.2.10 Seismic Activity 
The UK sector of the North Sea is considered an area of low seismic activity, however 
many older platforms are not designed to withstand seismic activity. 
In the event of significant activity in the immediate area of a platform, the platform 
would be shutdown and a full inspection be carried out before production restarted. 
1.2.11 Occupational Risk 
This section deals with all hazards occurring during routine working practice. Hazard 
management systems are in place on many platforms to reduce the occupational risks 
to personnel. Permits are issued for each task on board the platform and all hazards 
relating to that task are evaluated. 
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1.2.12 Hydrocarbon Fire 
A fire within a module has the potential to cause fatalities on the platform directly, or 
to impact on some other equipment or structure, causing escalation and indirect 
fatalities due to full or partial collapse of the platform. 
Immediate ignition of a high-pressure gas within any module has the potential to 
create a jet fire. A fire within an enclosed module would quickly become oxygen 
dependant, immediate shutdown of the ventilation system on detection of a fire 
accelerates oxygen depletion thereby extinguishing the fire. A fire occurring within an 
open module is not limited by oxygen but by the volume of inventory available. 
Function of the isolation and blowdown valves reduces the duration of the fire. 
Ignition of a liquid hydrocarbon release results in the formation of a pool fire. The fire 
is affected by the same limitations as a jet fire within closed and open modules. 
The safety systems in place for reducing the severity of a fire are discussed in more 
detail in Section 1.3. 
The occurrence of a fire on a platform is discussed within Chapter 2. 
1.2.13 Explosions 
A delayed ignition source occurring during a gas release has the potential to form an 
explosion, the results of which could potentially be failure of part or all of the 
platform structure. Following occurrence of an explosion it is the overpressure, the 
pressure loading caused by the explosion, that is considered in assessing the level of 
damage. 
Measures in place to reduce the risk of an explosion and to minimise the effects 
should the event occur are described in more detail in Section 1.3. 
The occurrence of an explosion is discussed in Chapter 2. 
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1.2.14 Blowout Risk 
A blowout from one of the wells could result in a significant release of well fluids. 
During a well blowout on a platform oil could be expected to cover much of the 
Upper Deck area with residual amounts draining to sea. The likelihood of ignition of 
the oil depends on the well but if ignition should occur the resulting flame could light 
oil on the Upper Deck. 
If the blowout involves a well with a high gas content there is also a potential for 
explosion. 
Due to the high inventory available within the wells, on occurrence of a blowout the 
platform will be evacuated. 
1.3 Safety Critical Systems to Reduce Impact of Fires and Explosions 
The Safety Critical Systems (SCS) on the platform are in place to reduce the risk 
caused by an explosion or fire and consequently reduce the number of potential 
fatalities. 
1.3.1 Blast and Firewall Systems 
In order to prevent escalation of a fire or explosion from within an enclosed module to 
an adjacent module, the module walls will have a level of protection against the event. 
Each wall will have a blast resistance, the maximum blast that can be withstood from 
an explosion and a flame resistance, the maximum time that a flame can impact on the 
wall before it will fail. 
1.3.2 Isolation and Blowdown Systems 
The Isolation and Blowdown systems work together to reduce the potential inventory 
available within the module and have been described briefly in Section 1.1 in 
outlining a typical module. 
The primary function of the isolation valves is to effect isolation of all hydrocarbon 
sources on or connected to the platform in order to minimise the inventory available 
to supply to the leaking section. Following isolation, potential ignition sources will be 
also be shutdown reducing the frequency of ignition. 
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The function of the blowdown system in an emergency is to direct hydrocarbons to 
flare from inventories isolated by the isolation system. 
1.3.3 Deluge System 
The aim of this system is to suppress any fires and mitigate the consequences. The 
system is activated on detection of a leak or a fire in a module and will either be a 
water sprinkler, water or foam deluge, or foam system dependant on the type of 
equipment and flammables present in the area. 
The foam systems are located primarily within oil processing modules as they 
extinguish pool fires by covering the surface area and eliminating the oxygen supply 
to the fire. 
The water systems are used within gas production modules as the water droplets aim 
to reduce the explosion overpressures should ignition occur. 
1.3.4 Fire and Gas Detection 
These systems work to detect a leak or a fire on the platform and activate the deluge 
and isolation/blowdown systems. Each platform has different methods of detection 
dependant on the platform design. 
The gas detection system is designed to detect a gas cloud forming in the module. 
Failure of a gas detection system results in a larger quantity of gas being released into 
the module and therefore increases the risk of an explosion. 
In the case of immediate ignition, there are detectors in place to identify the presence 
of a fire. These involve detection by infra-red and heat. 
1.3.5 Emergency Power 
The emergency power system is designed to keep essential systems operational, the 
fire pumps, emergency lighting and the heating, ventilation and air conditioning 
systems within the TR rely on the emergency power system in the event of loss of 
power from the platform. The remaining essential systems have individual back-up 
power supplies. 
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1.3.6 Escape and Evacuation 
Evacuation of the Beryl Alpha platform is by means of TEMPSC (Totally Enclosed 
Motor Propelled Survival Craft), located externally around the platform. Due to 
Health and Safety reasons, the TEMPSC cannot all be launched at one time. A 
number of people will escape during each wave of evacuations, and there will be a 
short delay between waves. 
1.3.7 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems (HVAC) 
On detection of a leak or a fire the HVAC within an enclosed process module will be 
shut down in order to limit the flow of oxygen to the module. A minimal flow of air 
will be expected to leak into the module following shutdown of the system. 
A system within the TR will continue to operate following detection of a leak in one 
of the process modules to maintain pressurisation in the TR to prevent smoke and gas 
ingress. However if smoke is detected at one of the HVAC inlet points the TR HVAC 
will be shutdown to minimise the likelihood of smoke entering. 
1.4 Offshore Incidents 
To date there have been two major incidents resulting in the loss of production 
platforms in the North Sea. One of these incidents was in the Norwegian sector and 
one in the British, both incidents are briefly described in this section. 
In the Norwegian sector a platform, the Alexander Keilland, collapsed. The incident 
in the British sector involved the Piper Alpha platform. The second event has far more 
relevance to the work contained in this thesis and will be reviewed in more detail. 
1.4.1 Alexander Keilland 
The Alexander Keilland platform was located in the Ekofisk field in the North Sea. 
The platform was a semi-submersible construction and originally designed to locate 
oil reserves under the North Sea. Figure 1.4 shows an image of the platform prior to 
the disaster. 
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Figure 1.4 - The Alexander Keilland Platform. 
Following removal from active service the platform was used by Phillips Petroleum to 
accommodate platform workers. On 27 March 1980, during high winds, the platform 
collapsed. The inquiry found that a weld on one of the platform legs had failed due to 
tatigue. The subsequent instability of the structure caused complete capsize of the 
platform after only 20 minutes. 123 people of the 212 crew on board were killed. 
1.4.? PiperA/pha 
The Piper Alpha platform was located 110 miles off the coast of Aberdeen, Scotland. 
The platform started production in late 1976 and was originally used to export oil to 
I lotta, an oil terminal in the Orkneys. The platform was later modified to allow export 
O1 gas to the manifold compression platform MCP-01 where it then joined the major 
gas Pipeline from the Frigg Field to St Fergus. Figure 1.5 shows an image of Piper 
Alpha prior to the incident. 
A simplified elevation view of the west side of the platform is shown in figure 1.6. 
The production deck consisted of four modules, A to D. Module A was the wellhead 
module, B the oil separation module, C the gas compression module and module D 
was the power generation and utilities module. Fire walls were constructed between 
each of the adjoining modules, however these walls were not designed to withstand an 
explosion. 
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Figure 1.5 - Piper Alpha Platform. West face and pipe 
deck. 
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Figure 1.6 - Simplified elevation of the west side of 
Piper Alpha. 
The control room was in a mezzanine level in the upper part of the D module. There 
were two flares on the South end of the platform, Module A was protected from the 
heat from the flares by a shield. 
Piper Alpha was equipped with a fire and gas detection system, fire water deluge 
system, isolation system, communications and electrical supply systems and 
evacuation and escape facilities. 
14 
Electrical power was supplied by two main generators which would normally run 
from the gas supply but could be run on diesel. The emergency generator was diesel 
powered and an uninterrupted power supply was available for emergency services. 
The fluid from the wells, containing oil, gas, water and condensate passed through the 
wellhead module to the separation module. The gas and condensate were then 
separated from the oil and water. The gas was compressed in Module C, where some 
gas was re-routed to supply the generators. Residual condensate was then removed 
before the gas was compressed again. The gas was then split three ways, either to 
serve as lift gas at the wells, to MCP-O1 as export gas or to the flare. 
The production facilities could be used in two different ways, affecting how the 
condensate was removed from the gas. In normal mode (Phase II), after the first 
compression the gas was dried in the Gas Conservation Module (GCM). The gas was 
then cooled by reducing the pressure allowing the condensate to be isolated, due to 
the expansion of the gas, and drained off. The condensate from this phase and the 
GCM was then passed to the second stage of compressors. 
The production plant could also operate without the GCM (Phase I). The GCM could 
be isolated and gas passed from the first compressor to a valve allowing the 
condensate to be removed due to the Joule-Thomson effect and then passed to the 
second stage of compression as before. 
The condensate was then pumped into the main oil line by a main condensate 
injection pump. A backup pump was available in the event of failure of the main 
pump. Each condensate pump was protected from over pressurisation by a single 
pressure safety valve (PSV). The valves were located in the C module, 68 feet above 
the pumps. 
At the time of the disaster, Piper Alpha was connected to two other platforms in the 
area. Oil from the platform Claymore was piped to the Piper Alpha oil pipe line and 
gas was pumped from Piper Alpha to the gas deficient Claymore platform. Oil from 
the Tartan platform was passed to Claymore to be pumped to Flotta and gas from 
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Tartan was routed through Piper Alpha to MCP-01. Figure 1.7 shows the connections 
to and from Piper Alpha. 
On the 6 July, there was a major programme of work being undertaken on Piper 
Alpha including installation of a new pipeline. Extra accommodation for the 
workforce was being provided by Tharos, a large floating fire-fighting vessel 
anchored near the platform. Also near the platform at the time were the standby 
vessel, the Silver Pit, a pipeline vessel, the Lowland Cavalier and Maersk anchor 
handling vessels for the Tharos. 
Si Fergus 
Aberdeen 
Key: 1f Oil 
f-ý Gas 
Shetland Isles 
IlE: i IMCP-01 
From Fri Gas Field 
Figure 1.7 - Pipeline connections of the Piper Field. 
The `A' condensate pump was down for maintenance, with three individual 
maintenance tasks to be carried out. 
" The pressure safety valve (PSV) required recertification. 
" The pump was due for a full 24 month preventative maintenance (PM) service. 
" The pump coupling required general repair due to a vibration problem. 
In order to carry out the maintenance tasks the pump had been isolated by closing the 
gas operated valves (GOVs) on the suction and delivery lines but slip plates, to 
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prevent gas from flowing into the pump if the valve was activated, were not fitted as 
work on the coupling did not require breaking into the pump. At approximately 16.50 
the duty maintenance manager decided that the 24 month PM service was to be 
delayed and the maintenance restricted to the repair of the pump coupling. 
The PSV associated with condensate pump A was removed for testing by a specialist 
contractor. It was not possible to restore the valve by the end of the shift as planned 
and therefore it was decided that the valve would be replaced at the start of the 
morning shift. The team supervisor reported the change of plan at the end of the shift 
at 18.00 hours. 
At 21.50 that evening the operational condensate pump `B' tripped out and could not 
be restarted. The result of continuing production without a condensate injection pump 
would result in shutdown of the plant within 30 minutes due to a backup of 
condensate. If the gas supply was lost to the main generator and the diesel generator 
failed to start, the wells would have to be shutdown. 
After discussions between the lead operator and maintenance hand it was agreed to 
attempt to restart pump `A'. The electrical supply to the pump would have had to be 
de-isolated in order for the pump to be restarted. The lead operator was witnessed at 
the pump with the intention of restarting it. 
At 21.55 the alarms for the tripping of two of the centrifugal compressors in module C 
followed by a low gas alarm in one of the zones on the C centrifugal compressors. 
The third centrifugal compressor then tripped. Before the operator in the control room 
could take any action three low gas alarms and a high gas alarm were activated in 
module C. At this point personnel in module D recall hearing a loud screeching sound 
lasting for about 30 seconds, followed by the blast of the initial explosion. 
The initial explosion occurred at 22.00 and destroyed most of the firewalls between 
modules B and C and between modules C and D. 
The isolation valve system functioned correctly and isolated the emergency shut-off 
valve (ESV) on the main oil line and blowdown of the gas inventories to flare began. 
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The isolation valves on the gas pipelines were not designed to shutdown automatically 
with operation of the oil isolation valves due to complications with forcing shutdown 
on the connected platforms. The gas lines had to be isolated individually from the 
control room. 
Almost minic(iately after the initial explosion a large fireball emerged from the west 
side of module 13 and a large pool lire began on west end of- the module. These 
incidents were witnessed by personnel on the vessels offthe platform. 
The large pool oil tire gave rise to a dense black cloud of smoke which engulfed the 
pla tlorm from the production deck (at the 841t level) upwards. This cloud can be seen 
in Figure 1.8. 
Figure 1 
.8- 
Piper Alpha before riser rupture. 
At this point a `mayday' signal was sent from the control room and the Tharos took 
up the role of On-Scene Commander. The coast guard and Occidental headquarters 
were informed and rescue helicopters along with a Nimrod aircraft were dispatched 
ith a one hour flight time to the platform. 
The majority of the platform workforce were in an accommodation module, the north 
side of which was showing flames ý, ithin the first minute and was becoming 
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enveloped in the smoke plume from the south. Escape routes to the lifeboats would 
% have been impassable. 
A dive team was working at the 68 ft level, with one man underwater. After surfacing 
the diver and passing through a short decompression they climbed down knotted ropes 
to the 20m level after being unable to reach the lifeboats. 
The wellheads were secured by the drill crew as per procedure before attempting to 
evacuate. 
The oil pool in module B began to spill over onto the 68ft level where a further fire 
began. Drums of flammable material on that level may have contributed to the blaze 
at this point. The fire water system did not operate as the pumps were set to manual 
and therefore the fire continued to burn unmitigated. 
The explosion disabled the communication systems on the platform, preventing Piper 
Alpha from communicating with the other platforms. The other platforms became 
aware of the fire but did not fully appreciate the scale of the incident. They continued 
production and pumping to Piper Alpha, contributing to the leak. 
Twenty minutes after the initial explosion, the gas pipeline to Tartan ruptured due to 
the fire on the 68ft level. This resulted in a massive jet flame which engulfed the 
majority of the platform. 
The planned emergency procedure to be followed in such an incident was for the crew 
to muster by the lifeboats, but in practice personnel would routinely be redirected to 
the dining area on the upper deck of the accommodation module and evacuation 
would take place by helicopter. The escape routes to the lifeboats were blocked 
causing personnel to muster in the dining area. The crew were told that a mayday had 
been sent and they would be rescued by helicopter, however the Helipad would 
already have been inaccessible by this point. 
Thirty three minutes into the incident, Tharos picked up a signal informing it that the 
workforce was mustered in the galley and to come to help. No evacuation procedure 
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by sea had been organised by the senior nmanagenment on board, however as the 
quarters began to IIII vv ith smoke, individuals attcmhted to escape the platform. Some 
climbed knotted ropes to lower levels while sonic attempted to jump 1mm higher. 
Fast rescue crafts (FRC) were launched by the vessels surrounding the Illattilrm in an 
attelllllt to rescue those Who had managed to CSCa1)C to the sea. 
At approximately 22.50, the gas pipeline to MCP-()I ruptured followed by the 
Claymore line at 23.18. The pipedeck on the platform collapsed and the 
accommodation module tipped. By 00.15 on July 7 the North end of the platlörm had 
disappeared. Figure 1.9 shows the plalfý, rni tlýr Iý, IIý, ýý is i>>rniný. ýýnlý nýýululc \_ 
Figure 1.9 - The remains of the wellhead module. 
Sixty two men escaped the incident, but 167 died mainly within the accommodation 
quarters. 
1.4.3 Investigation into the Piper Alpha 
The incident was the worst that had happened on an offshore platform and the 
Department of Energy (DoEn) immediately undertook an investigation into the 
disaster. The public enquiry, headed by Lord Cullen, lasted 13 months and concluded 
with the publication of the Piper Alpha Report in November 1990[2]. The inquiry dealt 
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with two parts, what caused the disaster and what was to be done in the future and 
heard reports from 280 witnesses in 180 days of evidence. 
Lord Cullen's report on the inquiry contained 106 recommendations directed towards 
the improvement of safety on offshore platforms. Fifty seven of the recommendations 
were the responsibility of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) one of which was to 
form an Offshore Safety Division (OSD) which would be responsible for maintaining 
safety standards on offshore installations. 
1.5 Safety Case Production 
A key recommendation from Lord Cullen was a requirement of the operator of each 
installation to submit a safety case to the HSE. This safety case must have 
demonstrated that the company had adequate Safety Management Systems (SMS) in 
place, that they had identified risks and reduced them to As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP), that they had put management controls in place, provided a 
temporary safe refuge and made provisions for safe evacuation and rescue. 
The work contained within this thesis will provide a methodology to model 
fires and 
explosions on offshore platforms as is consistent with the requirements. 
In order to assess and review safety levels, the first stage required is to 
identify risks 
associated with all operations on the platform. Risk assessment techniques were first 
applied to the hydrocarbon process industries in the late 1970's and the application to 
offshore process facilities dates from the early 1980's. The Royal Society 
commissioned a study group to consider risk and the assessment of risk in 1983 
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followed by an updated report in 1992[4]. Both reports stated that there should be an 
upper and lower bound for the acceptable level of risk in any situation. 
Risk occurring below the lower limit -A risk in this region may still 
be a risk but 
warrants no resources to lower it further. 
Risk occurring between the limits -A risk occurring within the tolerable region may 
be acceptable if justification for the risk is sufficient and resources are in place to 
monitor the risk continuously. 
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Risk occurring above the limits -A risk within this region is not to be tolerated under 
any circumstances. 
In 1998 the HSE defined the upper bound as 1 death in 103 years and the lower bound 
as 1 death in 106 years. 
Risk was defined to be: 
The probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of 
time, or results from a particular challenge. 
An adverse event is defined to be an occurrence that produces harm and this 
definition, although not conventional, is attributed to the HSE. 
1.6 Risk Analysis Techniques 
Quantitative risk assessment was defined within the Offshore Installations (safety 
cases) Regulations in 1992 as: 
Quantitative risk assessment means the identification of hazards and evaluation of the 
extent of risk arising therefrom, incorporating calculations based upon the frequency 
and magnitude of hazardous events. 
1.6.1 Hazard Identification Methods 
Identification of hazards in the workplace is a key element in assessing the risks 
involved in processing offshore. Current methods of hazard identification include 
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), rapid ranking, and Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA). 
The HAZOP is the most commonly used method on offshore installations and 
therefore will be described in more detail than the other methods. 
The HAZOP study was introduced by ICI Ltd in order to determine the potential 
ýs1 hazards in a chemical plant. Since then it has become accepted as the most complete 
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qualitative method by the British Chemical Industry Safety Council and is used 
throughout both chemical and other potentially hazardous industries. 
A HAZOP is produced by a team of people who are selected for their knowledge and 
experience in areas relevant to the study. The team review the process or installation 
in question alongside a list of guidewords to determine potential hazards and 
operability problems. Although not required to be familiar with the process in 
question, the study leader must be experienced in the HAZOP process. The study is 
worthwhile at any stage in the development of a production plant, but is most 
beneficial at the design stage. 
The HAZOP study requires a full description of the process in order to apply the 
guidewords to determine what derivations from the original design intent can occur 
and what the causes and consequences of these derivations may be. The guidewords 
used in the study are, NO/NOT, MORE, LESS, AS WELL AS, PART OF, REVERSE 
and OTHER THAN. For example, products A and B are pumped into a component to 
produce product C. If the flow of product B exceeds the flow of product A there is the 
potential for an explosion. Therefore one of the first considerations of the study is the 
transfer of product A to the component. Using the first guideword produces 
NO transfer of product A 
This would be identified as a derivation from intent. Possible causes may be that the 
supply tank of product A is empty or that the supply pipe is damaged. A consequence 
of this occurring would be the potential for an explosion if product B continues to 
flow. The study has now identified a hazard. 
In addition to identifying hazards and operability problems, the study can also 
highlight any information which may require clarification. This could relate to 
equipment required, problems which may occur relevant to specific phases of the 
process, such as start-up and shut-down and any maintenance procedures that require 
further consideration. 
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Rapid ranking [6] is a less time consuming and therefore more cost effective method 
than HAZOP when considering an existing structure. The method involves identifying 
hazards within the system, estimating both the likelihood of the consequences 
occurring and the associated severity. The acceptability of risk is therefore assessed 
against a set of criteria. 
PHA is similar in identifying and analysing hazards to the HAZOP study. The method 
is used to identify possible hazards that could be created by the system being 
designed. The information is then used to reduce the severity of the event or to build 
in safeguards against the effects of the identified hazards. Each identified hazard is 
ranked according to the severity of the effects and addressed as required 
[71. 
Following completion of a qualitative risk assessment and identification of hazards, a 
further assessment can be applied in order to quantify the risks. 
1.6.2 Hazard Analysis Techniques 
A full risk assessment involves the estimation of the frequency and consequences of a 
range of hazard scenarios [81. Figure 1.10 shows the principal elements and the overall 
structure of a risk assessment. 
Techniques to define the hazards have been identified in Section 1.6.1. The hazard 
analysis section takes the remaining steps within the figure. 
The methods used to identify the frequency of the event depend on the nature of the 
event, and it is usual to base the estimate on the historical data. In some cases it is not 
possible to gather data on past events; this can be the case for a complex sequence of 
events. The frequency has to therefore be generated using a tree method. 
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Figure 1.10 The risk assessment process. 
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Event Trees 
An event tree [61 is used to develop the consequences of an event. It is initiated with a 
particular event such as a hydrocarbon leak and developed to map the progression to a 
set of possible outcomes. It can be used to identify the individual outcomes of the 
initial event and also to calculate the frequency, or probability of each outcome. 
The initial event is usually placed on the left and the branches are drawn to the right, 
as illustrated in Figure 1.11, each branch representing a different sequence of events 
and terminating in an outcome. Each branch of the tree represents a particular 
scenario and the tree is used as a means of estimating the frequency of the outcome 
for that scenario. 
Pipe A leaks Leak detected Outcome 
A 
No 
Initiating Event - Impact 
to Pipe A 
B 
Yes 
C 
Figure 1.11 - Sample Event Tree. 
In constructing an event tree the components usually have one of two states, success 
or failure. However should the component have the capability of residing in more 
than one state, the number of paths in the tree becomes greater. 
Figure 1.11 represents a sample event tree for the initiating event, `Impact to Pipe A'. 
There are two paths available from the initiating event dependant on whether the 
impact causes the pipe to leak or not. If the pipe does not leak then the outcome of the 
incident is A. If pipe A does leak, there are two further branches to the tree, dependant 
on whether the leak from pipe A is detected or not. If the leak is not detected, the 
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outcome is B, if the leak is detected the outcome is C. Specific values for the 
probability and frequency of occurrence would be calculated for each outcome. 
The probabilities of the events occurring are assigned to the branches of the tree and 
the outcome frequencies of the tree are obtained by multiplying the initial event 
frequency by the outcome branch probabilities. The outcome probabilities should sum 
to unity and the outcome frequencies to that of the initial event. 
Fault Trees 
A fault tree is a structure by which a particular system failure mode can be expressed 
in terms of combinations of component failure modes and operator actions 
[61. 
A fault tree logic system is oriented towards failures within a system, the undesired 
event is considered and the causes are developed. A component within a fault tree has 
two binary states; it is either in the failed state or the working state and in a logic 
sense the tree is a representation of the sets of states of the system which are 
consistent with the top event at a particular point in time. In practice, a fault tree is 
generally used to represent a system state which has developed over a finite period of 
time. 
The basic elements of a fault tree may be classed as the top undesired event, basic 
events (events which require no further development), immediate events which occur 
between the basic and top events and logic gates. 
The two principal logic gates are the AND and OR gates. The output of the AND gate 
occurs provided that all the input events to the gate occur. The output or the OR gate 
exists given that at least one input event occurs. An example fault tree is shown in 
Figure 1.12. In order for the top event to occur in this example, either basic event B or 
C must occur, for the output of the OR gate to exist, and basic event A must also 
occur. 
27 
Top Event 
A 
Tl\ 
AND Gate -All 
Inputs must 
occur 
11) 
OR Gate-At 
least one input 
must occur 
Basic 
Event A 
cr 0 
Figure 1.12 -Example Fault Tree. 
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Following construction, a fault tree may then be analysed qualitatively in order to 
produce the minimal cut sets. A cut set is a set of primary events which can give rise 
to the top event, the minimal cut sets are a list of component failures which are 
necessary and sufficient to cause the system failure mode (top event). The complete 
set of minimum cut sets is the set of principal fault modes for the top event. 
Quantitative analysis of a fault tree requires values to be assigned to the frequency or 
probability of the primary events. This, together with the minimal cut sets is used in 
the quantification of the top event parameters. 
Quantification using the minima[ cut sets 
The probability of the top event, T, can be evaluated from the probabilities of the 
minimal cut sets, C;, using Equation 1.1, where the fault tree has n minimal cut sets. 
P[T] = P[C1 +Cz +... +Cn] (1.1) 
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This can be expanded giving 
n j-I n j-I k-I 
P[T] P[C11-1EP[C1'Cjl+l: l: l: P[Cr'Cj'Ckl-... +(-1)nP[CI "C2 "... "Cnl 1=I j=2 i=I j=3 k=2 i=1 
(1.2) 
This is known as the inclusion-exclusion expansion. This expansion requires 
approximation which can be evaluated by 
P[T ] =1- fJ [1- P(C)] 
i-I 
(1.3) 
1.7 Aims and Objectives of this Thesis 
This thesis is intended to develop a methodology to estimate the workforce fatality 
rates on Offshore Oil and Gas Platforms due to uncontrolled hydrocarbon releases and 
predict the optimum configuration of key safety critical systems using a combination 
of sensitivity analyses and optimisation methods. 
A review of past research into fire and explosion modelling has been conducted. 
Combining information generated by this research with platform data provided by 
Mobil North Sea Limited led to the development of a computer simulation, SAROS 
(Safety and Reliability of Offshore Structures), using the Monte Carlo simulation 
method, capable of modelling fatalities in open and closed sided modules. 
The model involves estimation of the frequency and magnitude of jet fires, pool fires 
and explosions. This is combined with the distribution of the workforce over the 
platform at the time of the incident to predict the risk of fatality. 
This was done primarily through a combination of modelling the outcome of 
accidental hydrocarbon releases and estimating the distribution of the workforce at the 
time of the incident. 
A method to develop the optimum configuration of safety systems has been identified 
and developed in order to minimise the number of fatalities that result from a 
hydrocarbon release. 
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Chapter 2 Fires and Explosions on Offshore Platforms 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to review and summarise existing research into fire and explosion 
modelling for offshore installations and summarise the information relevant to this 
thesis. 
Combustion of a flammable gas-air mixture occurs if the composition of the mixture 
lies in a flammable range and the required conditions exist for ignition, 8 . Ignition of 
an oil release will result in a pool fire while immediate ignition of a gas leak will 
result in a jet fire. Delayed ignition of a gas release will produce an explosion. 
The following sections will discuss data held on releases and fatalities offshore and 
fire and explosion modelling. 
2.2 Hydrocarbon releases 
Occurrences resulting in a hydrocarbon release on an offshore platform are required to 
be declared to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and are included in the 
Hydrocarbon Release System (HCR)E' '1. This system contains detailed information on 
the offshore hydrocarbon release incidents and the annual report based on this 
database is reviewed within this section. 
The report provides the following information for each release: 
2.2.1 Type of Hydrocarbon 
Releases of both process and non-process hydrocarbons are recorded and reported. Of 
the process releases, the hydrocarbons are categorised as oil, gas, two-phase (oil and 
gas) or condensate. 
2.2.2 Severity of Releases 
The report defines releases as major, significant or minor. These criteria were 
introduced in 1997 and refined in 1999 to include release rates. 
Major - "Potential to quickly impact beyond the local area e. g. affect the TR, escape 
routes, escalate to other areas of the platform causing serious injuries or fatalities. " If 
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ignited a major leak would likely be of a size to cause multiple casualties or rapid 
escalation. 
A major gas release was considered to be either a mass release rate of greater than 
lkgs" for over five minutes or a total quantity released of over 300kg. This could 
result in a jet fire of over ten metres in length capable of causing significant escalation 
after five minutes duration, or an explosion. 
A major oil release was considered to consist of either a total release of 9000kg or a 
release at a rate of over 10kgs" for greater than fifteen minutes. This could result in a 
pool fire over ten metres in diameter, filling a module or cutting off a deck, hindering 
escape and affecting more than one person directly if lasting for greater than fifteen 
minutes. 
Significant - "Potential to cause serious injury or fatality to personnel within the local 
area and to escalate within that local area e. g. by causing structural damage, 
secondary leaks or damage to safety systems. " A significant leak, if ignited, might 
have the potential to cause an event severe enough to be of a size leading to 
significant escalation within the immediate area or module. 
A significant release of gas was considered to be capable of producing a jet fire of 
between 5 and 10 metres lasting for between 2 and 5 minutes or release rates between 
0.1 to 1.0kgs" lasting 2 to 5 minutes giving explosive clouds of between 10 and 
3000m3 in size. 
A significant release of oil was considered capable of producing a pool fire between 2 
and 10 metres in diameter lasting for between 5 and 15 minutes. 
Minor - "Potential to cause serious injury to personnel in the immediate vicinity but 
no potential to escalate or cause multiple fatalities. " Ignition of a minor leak would 
not be expected to cause a multiple fatality event or significant escalation but could 
cause serious injuries or a fatality local to the leak site. 
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A minor gas release is classed as a release rate of less than 0.1kgs'1 for less than two 
minutes or a total quantity released of less than lkg. 
A minor release of oil is considered to consist of a release rate of less than 0.2kgs'l 
and duration of less than five minutes. The total quantity of oil released is than 60kg. 
2.2.3 Type and Location of Installation 
Installations are categorised as either fixed, mobile or subsea. The location of the 
installation on the UK continental shelf is logged as one of three areas. Northern; 
above 59° Latitude, Central; 56° to 59° Latitude and Southern; below 56° Latitude. 
Southern platforms include those located in the Irish Sea and the English Channel. 
2.2.4 Year of Occurrence 
Year of occurrences run over a 12 month period from 1 s` April to 31 
"March. 
2.2.5 Statistics 
The most recent HCR report available was released in 200211 
t]. A total of 2312 
hydrocarbon release incident reports were received between the start of the database 
in October 1992 and 31 March 2002 inclusive. 
`Gas only' constituted the largest proportion of releases, 54.8%. The remaining 
releases consisted of oil; 17.4%, non-process; 11.6%, 2-phase; 8.9% and condensate; 
7.3%. 
Equipment faults were reported to be responsible for 66.3% of all incidents. 49.1% of 
releases were during normal production rather than during intervention work such as 
maintenance. 
The majority of releases constituting of gas only can be attributed to the higher 
proportion of installations handling only gas, only 37% of installations contributing to 
the HCR handle liquids. There are also greater issues with containment of gas due to 
higher pressures and temperatures. 
32 
Of all releases reported, 6.4% were reported as major, 55.5% significant and 38.1% 
were minor. The total number of releases per year is represented graphically in Figure 
2.1. The releases are categorised as major, minor and significant. 
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Figure 2.1 - Total number of releases per year. 
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Releases during 1992/1993 are lower due to introduction of reporting of incidents part 
way through the year, and fluctuations throughout the initial years are likely to be due 
to familiarisation with the system and improvements of reporting procedures. A 
substantial drop in incidents was recorded in 1995/1996, due to introduction of the 
new safety case regime and improved safety management systems. 
The number of major releases is consistently the lowest each year and becomes 
progressively lower. 
The number of significant releases increases slightly in 1997/1998 and then reduces 
over the remaining years. Minor releases increase over the years and in 2000/2001 
exceed the number of significant releases. 
The number of major, significant and minor releases for gas, oil and 2-phase are 
represented in graphical form in Figures 2.2,2.3 and 2.4 respectively. 
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Figure 2.2 - Number of gas releases per year. 
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Figure 2.3 - Number of oil releases per year. 
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Figure 2.4 - Number of 2-phase releases per year. 
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For gas releases the number of major releases was lower than the number of 
significant or minor releases each year, although the numbers are seen to fluctuate. 
After 1996/1997 the number of significant releases rises until 1998/1999 after which 
the numbers drop. Following the figures recorded in 1996/1997 the number of minor 
releases increases each year until a fall in 2001/2002. 
Very few major oil releases, Figure 2.3, were recorded, with none being reported in 
the period 1999/2002. The number of minor and significant releases fluctuates, more 
erratically for minor releases. Significant releases begin to decrease towards the end 
of the period whereas minor increases substantially in 2000/2001. 
In comparison to independent gas and oil releases the number of 2-phase releases is 
minimal. Significant releases are consistently the highest recorded. Minor and major 
releases fluctuate and while major releases decrease towards the end or the period, 
minor releases increase. 
A breakdown by installation type shows that 96.4% of incidents occurred on fixed 
installations and the remaining on mobile drilling and accommodation installations. 
This is expected due to the constant exposure to hydrocarbons on fixed installations. 
Fixed installations with the highest reported leak frequency were located in the North 
Sea. 
Of the releases reported, 6.2% (143) were reported to have been ignited, none of 
which were classed as major. There were 42 gas ignitions (29.4% of all ignitions), of 
which 17 were classed as significant and 25 as minor. 101 oil releases were reported 
to have been ignited (69.5% of all ignitions) of which 24 were classified as significant 
releases and 77 as minor. There had been no ignitions of 2-phase releases reported. 
The higher ignition rates reported in the case of minor releases and liquid releases in 
particular, are considered to be due to the fact that reports of unignited minor releases 
cover only those reportable under the definitions set by the HSE, whereas all ignitions 
are reported no matter how minor. 
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There were 2471 triggering of detection systems connected with the total 2312 
reported releases, more than one system being effective on some releases. Automatic 
gas detection systems detected 41.6% of all releases (75.9% of gas releases). 
2.2.6 Offshore Fatality Data 
During the period between April 1994 and March 2004 there has been 2825 reported 
incidents resulting in injury to platform personnel. Of these, 23 have resulted in a 
fatality either from the effects of a hydrocarbon release or otherwise. 
2.3 Fire Modelling 
Fire, or combustion, is a chemical reaction in which a substance combines with 
oxygen and heat is released E81. There are three conditions essential for a fire: fuel, 
oxygen and heat often represented as the `fire triangle' shown in Figure 2.5. If one of 
the conditions is missing, fire cannot initiate and if during a fire one is removed the 
fire is extinguished. 
Heat 
Figure 2.5 - The fire triangle. 
This sections reviews modelling of jet and pool fires and methods of fire mitigation. 
2.3.1 Jet Fire Modelling 
Ejection of a flammable liquid or gas from a vessel, pipe or pipe flange can give rise 
to a jet flame if the material ignites immediately. The number of possible scenarios to 
be considered when modelling a jet fire are much greater than for a pool fire. The 
most common model is a vertical flame on an upwardly pointing jet, in calm 
conditions or in wind. Further cases are when the flame points upwards but not 
vertically and a horizontal flame. 
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Earlier work into jet flame shapes has considered a cone, a cylinder and a frustrum, 
Figure 2.6. 
ýý 
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Figure 2.6 - Flame geometries. 
Research into this work has shown that there is no one generally acceptable view and 
that modelling has to be developed for each particular geometry. The most important 
geometric parameter is the flame lengthl121. Predictions of flame length tend to be one 
of two types. Certain models base the prediction on stoichiometric and momentum 
considerations and others use correlations based on fuel or momentum flow. 
Experiments carried out into the stability of jet fires 
X13] showed that a stable flame 
cannot be maintained by certain drive pressures when the release is from a hole size 
of less than 30mm. Time has also been spent studying the ignitability (ignition 
resulting in light-back of the flame to the source) of jet fires. The work 
[13,14] showed 
that consideration of the mean gas concentration level within the dispersing plume is 
not very informative when assessing the likelihood of ignition of a release resulting in 
a stable flame. One set of research showed that in order for ignition of the flame along 
the release axis to result in light-back the concentration had to be within the region 
bounded by the lower flammability limit (LFL) and the upper flammability limit 
(UFL). Other research concluded that light-back could occur at concentrations outside 
the flammability limits when the ignition source was off the release axis. 
There are two types of stable jet fires, free and impacting. Free jet fires are flames that 
do not impact with solid objects and as such are unlikely to occur on offshore 
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platforms due to the high concentration of pipework and process vessels in the 
modules. The main hazard generated by this type of flame is thermal radiation. 
More likely to occur on offshore platforms is an impacting jet fire. Flame 
characteristics are altered following impact on objects, previously unstable flames 
may be stabilised due to turbulence and recirculation effects. In addition to this, the 
turbulence may also give rise to further mixing of air-fuel mixtures. 
Experimental work conducted on jet fires in enclosed spaces[81 and recreating 
conditions similar to those experienced on an offshore module identified that in 
addition to heat effects on the walls and contents of the space, other hazards noted in 
this environment were the thermal radiation from the flame and the generation of 
smoke and carbon monoxide. 
2.3.2 Pool Fires 
A pool fire occurs when a flammable liquid spills onto the ground and is ignited. A 
pool fire burns with a flame which is often taken to be a cylinder with a height twice 
the diameter [81. In still air the flame is vertical however in the presence of wind or a 
ventilation system it is assumed to tilt. 
The modelling of pool fires considers flame geometry, liquid burning rate, flame 
characteristics and heat radiated. As shown in Figure 2.7, the geometry of the flame is 
assumed to be an upright cylinder where Dp is the diameter of the pool and Lp is the 
length of the pool flame. 
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Figure 2.7 -A typical pool fire flame. 
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An important consideration of pool fires is the direction and strength of the wind. A 
significant wind will result in a tilt of the pool fire flame and the base of the flame to 
be dragged downwind of the pool, increasing it's size [15 . 
The liquid burning rate is the rate at which the released fuel decreases due to the 
burning effects of the flame. The liquid burning rate increases with diameter until for 
very large diameters it reaches a fixed value. An alternative method is to calculate the 
heat radiation intensity, or emissive power, of the flame surface. 
Important characteristics regarding the pool fire flame are the nature of the flame, its 
temperature and its emissivity, a measure of the level of radiation emitted from the 
fire. These are characterised by the fuel forming the fire. Fuels generating a smoky 
flame also had a higher flame temperature and a more enhanced emmisivity. 
The heat radiated from the flame may be determined by one of three methods. The 
heat radiated can be estimated by calculating the heat evolved from the fire using the 
liquid burning rate. The heat radiated is then a fraction of this value. A second 
method is to use the heat radiation intensity, or emissive power, of the flame surface. 
This value varies depending on the smokiness of the flame and therefore the type of 
hydrocarbon being combusted. The third method is to determine the heat radiated 
from the temperature and emissivity of the flame. 
2.3.3 Fire Mitigation 
Research has shown that depletion of oxygen by the fire in an enclosed space is an 
important contributing mechanism in the extinction of flammable liquid firesý161. Both 
jet and pool fires in enclosed areas are oxygen limited and will self-extinguish when 
the oxygen available has reduced below the level required for combustion. 
Within a oxygen limited enclosure, deluge systems have been shown to effectively 
extinguish fires. However the same deluge system operating within an area where 
oxygen depletion cannot take place has a much reduced, if any, result on the 
suppressing and extinguishing the fire. 
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The mechanisms of fire suppression through the use of a deluge system may include 
gas phase cooling (thermal effect), oxygen displacement through steam, wetting of the 
['7 fuel surface and reduction in radiative heat transfer ý181. 
Research has shown that optimum extinguishment of a fire is when the deluge 
initiates from above the fire. Deluge injection through the side walls, the front and 
rear walls and through the floor were found to be less efficient than the top injection 
(191 configuration. 
2.4 Explosion Modelling 
An explosion is defined as a sudden and violent release of energy, the violence of the 
explosion being dependent on the rate at which energy is released [8]. A leak of 
flammable gas has the potential to create a flammable atmosphere and give rise to an 
explosion following occurrence of an ignition source assuming the concentration of 
gas in air is between a set of flammability limits. 
2.4.1 Detonation and Deflagration 
Explosions from flammable gas can take two forms, deflagration and detonation. 
Within deflagration the gas burns relatively slowly, typical speeds for hydrocarbon-air 
mixtures would be 1 ms'. In detonation the flame front reaches a velocity equal to the 
velocity of sound in the unburnt mixture. For hydrocarbon-air mixtures this would be 
expected to be in the range 2000-3000 ms". As expected the severity of detonation is 
greater than deflagration, with explosions producing peak pressures of 20 and 8 bar 
respectively. 
In order for a deflagration to occur, the concentration of the gas mixture must be 
between a set of flammable limits and an ignition source must be present. In order for 
detonation to occur the flammability must be between a set of detonability limits, 
which generally has a smaller range than flammable limits, and a strong source of 
ignition must occur. If a strong ignition source is not present it is possible for 
deflagration to undergo transition into a detonation. However this is unlikely to occur 
within the process vessels of an offshore platform. 
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2.4.2 Ignition Sources 
Ignition of a flammable gas mixture can occur either by heating the mixture to it's 
auto-ignition temperature, or by occurrence of an external ignition source. Such 
sources include flames and hot surfaces, sparks, static electricity and compression. 
Following detection of a leak of hydrocarbons on a platform, potential ignition 
sources are minimised as far as reasonably practicable by, for example, isolating 
electrical equipment in the area. 
2.4.3 Explosions Offshore 
A typical offshore platform module is expected to have a large floor area and contain 
a high number of obstructions in the form of vessels and pipework. The overpressure 
generated in combustion of a vapour cloud is due to two effects(191. The `volume 
production', an overpressure generated from the production of a large quantity of 
burned gas can be up to 8bar. The second effect is due to the acceleration of the flame 
from the ignition point which can generate an overpressure up to the value associated 
with a detonation. 
The arrangement of process pipework, vessels and the level of confinement within the 
module and the location of the ignition location can both have a significant influence 
on the overpressures generated in a gas explosion 
(20]. Experiments by British Gas on 
the location of the ignition source within a three sided module, Figure 2.8 
demonstrates why an ignition occurring within the centre of the module reduced the 
overpressure generated by an ignition at the rear wall of the module by a factor of 
four. 
* Ignition location Perimeter confinement 
Figure 2.8 - Effect of ignition location. 
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The reduction is due to the shorter distance over which the flame can accelerate. For 
central ignition the flame accelerates for half the length of the perimeter before 
venting occurs, whereas for rear wall ignition, flame acceleration covers the full 
perimeter. 
A reduction in the degree of confinement on a module reduced the magnitude of the 
overpressures generated by an explosion. In addition to a reduction in the maximum 
overpressure generated a reduction in the duration of the overpressure was detected. 
Congestion caused by pipework and vessels within the module was found to increase 
the severity of an explosion. This was due to the increase in turbulence generated in 
the flow ahead of the flame. 
2.4.4 Gas concentration 
Experimental work carried out by British Gas and Mobil North Sea Ltd1201 
investigated the dependence of explosion overpressures on fuel concentration. The 
work varied the concentration of gas in air before ignition and determined the 
overpressure generated by the resulting explosion. Figure 2.9 shows the plot of 
normalised overpressures against the equivalence ratio, defined as the ratio of the 
concentration of the gas in the hydrocarbon-air mixture used in the test against the 
ratio of the gas concentration in the hydrocarbon-air mixture at stoichiometric 
concentration. The overpressures have been normalised against the peak of a curve fit 
to the data. 
The figure demonstrates that the concentrations of fuel significantly above or below 
the stoichiometric value, the burning velocity of the flame is lower than that at 
stoichiometric and therefore the overpressure is reduced. 
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Equivalence ratio 
Figure 2.9 - Effect of concentration of gas on explosion overpressures. 
2.4.5 Explosion Effects 
One of the principal effects of an explosion is the creation of a blast wave containing 
much of the energy of the explosion [8 . This blast wave generates the overpressures 
which can cause damage to the platform structure and personnel. 
The expansion of the hot gases at extremely high pressures in the fireball causes a 
shock wave to form, moving away from the source at a high velocity. The main 
characteristic of this wave is that the pressure rises very sharply at the moving front 
[211 and falls off towards the interior region of the explosion. 
As the blast wave travels away from the source of the explosion, the overpressure at 
the front decreases and the pressure behind the front falls at a steady rate. After a 
short time, when the shock front has travelled a certain distance from the fireball the 
pressure behind the front drops below that of the surrounding atmosphere and a 
`negative phase' of the blast wave forms. 
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During the negative overpressure phase, a partial vacuum is created, drawing air into 
the explosive region rather than pushing it away. At the end of the negative phase the 
pressure has returned to ambient. The maximum values of the negative overpressure 
are small in comparison with the peak positive overpressures. As distance from the 
explosion increases, both peak values decrease, the positive more rapidly than the 
negative. Equality is reached when the peak pressures have decayed to a very low 
level. 
2.4.6 Explosion Mitigation 
Blast walls, strongly constructed module walls, are often installed in order to contain 
an explosion within a single area, thus limiting the effects of an explosion on the 
overall facility. 
British Gas and Mobil North Sea 
[201 have carried out experiments to demonstrate that 
the spray produced by fire deluge systems on offshore platforms can significantly 
reduce explosion overpressures within a module which is only partially confined. 
Figure 2.10 illustrates the explosion overpressure against concentration curves for a 
number of deluge pressures 
[221. The highest overpressure is recorded when the 
explosion occurs without deluge present. 
Within very confined modules, where flame speeds are lower, the deluge systems are 
not an effective means of explosion mitigation. 
The mitigation effect is due to the size reduction of the water droplets in the spray into 
much smaller droplets resulting from the acceleration in the high speed flow of gases 
ahead of the flame [231. Reduction of the size of the droplets creates a greater overall 
surface area allowing a more rapid extraction of heat from the flame. The lower flame 
speed and subsequently lower droplet accelerations of a confined explosion are 
insufficient to cause droplet break-up. 
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Figure 2.10 Variation of overpressure with concentration. 
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2.4.7 Explosion Simulation 
There are three key types of theoretical model used for predicting explosion 
overpressures[201. 
" Empirical 
" Phenomenological Models 
" Computational Fluid Dynamics 
Empirical models use correlations of experimental data always at a much smaller 
scale and with geometries unlike offshore modules. 
Phenomenological (integral) models reproduce the physical processes involved 
allowing extrapolation beyond the original experimental validation with more 
confidence. No attempt is made to model the actual geometry. Development of 
integral models can progress as more experimental data becomes available and 
therefore an improvement in accuracy can be expected. 
Computational fluid dynamics model the physical processes most accurately by 
generating numerical solutions to partial differential equations governing the 
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combustion process. The equations concern the conservation of mass, energy and 
momentum. Although conceptually simple, there are great practical difficulties in 
solving them. Numerical solution methods require than the calculation `domain' be 
split into a number of small volumes with boundary conditions. Similarly time is split 
into small steps. Solving the equations iteratively for all volumes and time steps is 
computationally demanding and approximations can be used to simplify the model 
[231 and reduce therefore the amount of computer resources required. 
Existing models in each of these types contain a number of simplifications and 
assumptions limiting their ability to used as reliable predictive tools outside of their 
range of validation against test criteria. Only advanced CFD models are in principle 
(251 capable of being true predictive tools outside their range of validation. 
Empirical Models 
TNT Equivalency method - This method is based on the assumption that gas 
explosions resemble those of high charge explosives. However there are substantial 
differences. The local pressure is much less for gas explosions than for TNT and the 
pressure decay from TNT is more rapid than for gas explosions. 
TNO method - Assumes the whole gas cloud contributes to the overpressure rather 
than just the portion in the region of the explosion1261. This method has been 
superseded by the Multienergy method described below. 
Multienergy method - Simulates a blast wave, from a centrally ignited spherical 
cloud, with constant velocity flames to estimate the overpressure from a gas 
explosion. This method assumes that only the part of the cloud which is confined or 
obstructed will contribute to the blast. Due to the assumption that unconfined vapour 
clouds give rise to only small overpressures if ignited, the overpressure increases with 
increasing confnementt273. Although the method is fast and allows conservative 
approximation it relies on the assuming a number of factors such as the ignition 
strength and size. 
Baker-Strehlow method 128,291 - The methodology consists of a number of steps to 
assess the flame speed, fuel reactivity and confinement etc by walking through the 
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plant identifying potential explosion sites, estimating the dimensions of the confined 
areas and performing calculations to estimate the flame speed and burning velocity. 
Although the method is easy to use and takes into account some geometrical details 
the method has been found to be overly conservative. 
Congestion Assessment Method (CAM) - Devised around a decision tree procedure 
as guidance for estimating source pressure, taking into account the layout of the plant 
and the type of fuel involvedt301. The pressure is estimated at varying distances from 
the ignition location, assuming a simple decay law inversely proportional to the 
distance. Later enhancements to the original model generated pressure decay curves 
by fitting polynomials to detailed computations [311. 
Phenomenological Models 
Shell Code for Overpressure Prediction in gas Explosions (SCOPE)[321- Models gas 
explosions by solving a series of differential equations. The model is one-dimensional 
box based on the idealised geometry of a vented vessel containing a series of 
obstacles generating turbulence. The vented gas is assumed to form a mushroom- 
shaped jet and the overpressure calculated by considering the ventilation flow when 
the flame has traversed 70% of the box. 
Confined Linked Chamber Explosion (CLICHE) - models semi-confined areas 
congested with pipework and process vessels. The explosion model was formed by 
applying the conservation laws to the unburnt and burnt gas volumes within each 
semi-confined area, assuming that the properties of the gas within each section is 
uniform and any momentum changes occur only at the perimeter of these sections. 
The burning velocity is assigned the value of the maximum of the laminar and 
turbulent burning velocities. Ignition results in laminar flame propagation until the 
flame intersects an obstacle, at which point the flame becomes turbulent. Combustion 
in the semi-confined region causes unburnt gas ahead of the flame to be expelled 
through perimeter vents, triggering external explosions. 
CFD Models 
EXSIM -A system of non-linear algebraic equations is solved by applying a tri- 
diagonal matrix algorithm in three coordinate directions. The SIMPLE algorithmE331 is 
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used to solve the pressure/velocity/density coupling of the momentum equations and 
the mass balance. The method introduces a pressure correction, to ensure that the 
necessary corrections are made to velocity, pressure and density to model mass 
conservation at the next time step. The model allows the code to specify the location 
and features of obstacles and can be applied to congested geometries. 
Flame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) - The combustion model is based on the 
correlations of turbulent burning velocities with turbulence parameters1341. The model 
assumes that the flame propagates at a constant burning velocity and has a specified 
constant flame thickness. Congested geometries can be modelled, as can external 
explosions and a water deluge model. 
AutoReaGas - The code integrates the features of a gas explosion simulator (Reagas) 
and BLAST, a blast wave propagation simulator. The SIMPLE algorithm is 
implemented for pressure correction. The code allows for `blow-out panels' to be 
included in a simulation and incorporates a water deluge model. Scenario geometry 
may be supplied to the code by defining a combination of objects such as boxes and 
cylinders. 
PLATO - Simulates hydrocarbon leakage and 
ignition on an offshore installation[351 
Explosions, jet fires and pool fires are modelled. Jet fires are modelled as upward 
vertical flames and the flame height calculated. Pool fires are assumed to be conical 
with the oil pool diameter the diameter of the pool flame. The diameter of a fireball is 
estimated and the overpressure limits within a module assumed to be exceeded if the 
volume of the fireball exceeds the volume of the module. 
Consequence and Hazard Assessment of Offshore Structures (CHAOS) - predicts the 
[361 
consequences of fires and explosions on offshore installations. 
2.5 Summary 
The following key points have been identified within this chapter. 
"A release of hydrocarbons followed by an ignition source can result in either a 
pool fire, jet fire or explosion. 
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" In order for combustion to occur the concentration of gas in the atmosphere 
must be between a set of flammable limits. 
" Typical ignition sources can include flames, hot surfaces and static electricity. 
9 Fuel, oxygen and heat are required for continued combustion. 
" Deluge systems extinguish fires in enclosed modules and minimise the 
severity of explosions in open modules by reducing the heat and limiting the 
oxygen available. 
" Blast walls between offshore modules limit the effects of an explosion on the 
overall facility. 
" Only advanced CFD models have been identified as capable of being used as 
predictive tools. 
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Chapter 3 Development of the SAROS Coding - Analytical Model 
3.1 Introduction 
SAROS, Safety and Reliability of Offshore Structures, is a computer program 
originally developed as an analytical model to predict the frequency of explosions 
from an accidental release of gas in open sided modules on an offshore platform. This 
section describes the analytical model, built originally by Andrews, Smith and 
[37] and later modified by Foster and Andrews [38,39] Gregory 
The analytical method combines established fault and event tree analysis with fluid 
flow modelling. Fault and event tree methods are used to determine the frequencies of 
occurrence of all possible scenarios resulting from a gas leak. Each scenario evolves 
from an initial leak on a process section which could be isolated. The event tree 
branch points determine whether the gas detection system and the relevant isolation 
and blowdown valves function and the deluge system activates. A distribution of hole 
sizes is considered and using fluid flow modelling the gas release rate is computed, 
allowing the variation of the module gas concentration with time to be calculated. The 
frequency of an explosion is calculated by combining the time that the concentration 
is between the flammable limits with the predicted ignition rate. The severity of the 
overpressures generated from the explosion are calculated based on an empirical 
1ao1 relationship derived by British Gas 
3.2 Safety Systems 
Isolation and blowdown valves form an integral part of the safety system in the 
module. These are assumed to operate automatically should the gas leak be detected, 
otherwise manual operation of the valves is required. The gas detection system is 
designed to activate at a level of 20% of the lower flammable limit of the gas and 
dictates the response of the other safety systems. Once the gas is released it forms a 
cloud of gas which, following occurrence of an ignition source, produces an 
explosion. Ventilation in the module is provided by the wind since the modules on the 
platform are open sided. For the purposes of the methodology the natural ventilation 
effect of the wind is described by the number of air changes per hour. 
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Overpressures, generated during an explosion, have the potential to damage the 
integrity of the structure. Water deluge is included in the model as a method of 
reducing the overpressure should ignition occur and is initiated following detection of 
the gas release. A short delay is encountered whilst the water fills the dry pipework 
following system activation. 
3.3 Input Data 
The predicted frequency of an explosion is dependent on input of a number of factors 
including the availability and reliability of the safety systems within the module. 
For a leak occurring on a process section an event tree was used to determine all 
resulting possible sequences. The tree incorporated the response of the gas detection 
system, the process isolation system, the blowdown system and the deluge system to 
the initiating event. For example, consider three isolatable sections A, B and C linked 
in series (Figure 3.1), each containing process equipment and having different gas 
inventories as specified by parameters of volume, temperature and pressure. 
Section A Section B Section C 
Figure 3.1 - An example process section 
Consider a leak on section B, Figure 3.1. This section features isolation valves Isoll 
and Isol2 and blowdown valve BDB. BDA and BDC are blowdown valves on 
sections either side of section B which become relevant should isolation fail. The 
event tree representing the possible outcomes following a leak on section B is shown 
in Figure 3.2. 
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Following a significant gas leak on the section, it is assumed that the detection system 
would identify the occurrence of the undesired event and activate the safety systems 
accordingly. 
If the detection system failed it is assumed that none of the safety systems would be 
activated, represented in Figure 3.2 by the lowest branch for the second event; gas 
detection system failure (Outcome 55). This situation allows an unlimited volume of 
gas to be leaked into the module until manual isolation is achieved. 
The upper branch point for this event represents the detection system success 
following the gas leak. All paths through the event tree, following successful 
detection, result in different gas concentration/time histories. For example the path 
which leads through the event tree to the outcome labelled `1' represents the situation 
where following a gas leak on section B, the isolation, blowdown and deluge systems 
all function as intended. 
In the event that either of the isolation valves fail to close then the inventory of gas 
which could escape into the module would include that contained within section A 
and/or C. If Isoll (Figure 3.1) fails to close the inventories from section A and B 
combine. The gas escape rate would then depend on which, if any, of the relevant 
section blowdown valves open. The functioning of the blowdown valve for section A 
is only considered when Isoll has failed and is represented within the fourth column 
heading on the event tree. 
This situation is repeated when considering the success of valve Isol2 which isolates 
sections B and C. The action of the blowdown valve on section C was only modelled 
in the tree when isolation between sections B and C failed (column 6 in Figure 3.2). 
For each of the outcomes in the event tree, a summary of the blowdown valves 
activated and the total number of sections whose inventory combines with that of the 
leaking section is provided on the far right of the event tree diagram. 
The typical section considered in this example only featured the two sections on either 
side of the leaking section. These event scenarios therefore only consider the isolation 
failures which can combine at most three sections. 
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The combination of more than three sections due to independent component failures 
was considered unlikely and believed to provide only a minor contribution to the 
overall explosion probability. The most likely cause of three or more section 
inventories being released into the module is the failure of the detection system in 
which case none of the isolation features would function. This event was included on 
the event tree diagram. In the usual event that other sections also connect to the 
section of interest, then the isolation and blowdown of the extra sections would need 
to be modelled and the event tree updated and expanded as appropriate. 
The final two events considered in the tree were the activation and subsequent 
maintenance of the deluge system. Activation of the deluge system was only 
considered if the gas detection system had functioned correctly. The continued 
functioning of the deluge system was only considered if the system had operated 
correctly initially. 
A frequency of occurrence of each outcome event from the sequence of events 
identified on the event tree was calculated. This was obtained from the initiating event 
frequency and the probability of each event represented by a branch in the sequence. 
For the event frequency used in the explosion probability calculations, the event 
probabilities for failure of the detection system, isolation system and blowdown 
system were needed. This required the construction of fault trees to represent the 
causes of the failure of each isolation and blowdown valve in the system together with 
those representing the failure of the detection and deluge systems. 
Since these were safety critical systems and therefore failsafe, most component 
failures were assumed to cause spurious activation of the safety systems. The fault 
trees developed for the events described on the event tree featured dormant 
component failure modes and the probabilities of the components being failed was a 
function of the component failure rate (for the failure mode which appeared in the 
fault tree), the mean time to component repair and the maintenance test interval. 
In the initial analytical model, data for the fault trees was obtained from generic data 
bases (411 and offshore specific data bases such as OREDA[42]. The information 
provided by the event tree was generated by a front-end program called DAVROS 
and was contained within the topology file used by SAROS. 
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SAROS also required data relating to the inventory of isolatable sections which 
directly or through isolation failure would leak into the module. The inventory file 
contains details of each section of the platform, including the volume, density, 
pressure and temperature of gas, condensate and oil it contains. The inventory file 
also identified the module being analysed and provided its conditions and dimensions, 
the hole size distribution with associated frequency of occurrence along with the 
overpressure distribution data. 
3.4 Ilolesize and Ventilation Rate 
Gas leaks on an offshore platform are expected to develop from failures on the 
pipework or vessels in the module, from holes with diameters given by a distribution 
depending on the equipment within the modules [401. The range of holesizes possible 
due to failures on the process vessels or pipework were grouped into three discrete 
ranges and the average size of each group calculated. This value was used as the hole 
size for all members of that group. 
The ventilation rate was estimated from measurements of wind speed on a typical 
platform. 
3.5 Gas Release Rate 
Analytical SAROS models the discharge rate of the gas and/or condensate into the 
module as a function of time. Oil is neglected in terms of leak and blowdown flow 
and only serves to reduce the volume of the container. 
Two methods for modelling the release are considered. The first model, developed by 
Andrews and Smith(373 assumes that there is no heat input to the system therefore the 
temperature of the system changes throughout the duration of the leak. The second 
model assumes that there is sufficient heat transfer into the system to keep the 
t381 temperature and pressure constant during the initial stages of the release. 
A number of key assumptions are relevant to both models: 
1. Although the vessel/pipework may contain a mixture of gas, condensate and 
oil, only gas and condensate. contribute to the leak. 
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2. Gas and condensate leak in the same proportions as they exist in the vessel. 
3. Gas and condensate have different release speeds, this gives the correct 
interpolation as the gas or condensate left within the vessel approaches zero. 
4. The condensate evaporates immediately on contact with the atmosphere. 
5. The gas and air mixes perfectly and instantaneously on release providing 
uniform concentration. 
6. The leak is considered to occur into a fixed specified volume. 
The gas discharge rate is calculated using the laws of gas dynamics and the 
condensate discharge rate is calculated by assuming that there is a reservoir of ideal 
incompressible fluid [401. The average density of the gas-condensate mixture is 
calculated using Equation 3.1 where ßg is the proportion of the gas (by volume) and pg 
and p, are the densities of the gas and condensate respectively. 
p=Ngpg+(1.0-, 
8g)pc (3.1) 
The mass of the gas-condensate mixture is M= pV and the rate of mass discharge is 
dm 
=V 
dp 
where volume, V, is constant due to there being no contraction or dt dt 
expansion of the vessel walls. Using assumptions 1,2 and 3, the total mass flow rate, 
W, of the leaking mixture is calculated using Equation 3.2. 
W= 6g Wg + (1.0 - /3g )W, (3.2) 
Wg and WW are the mass flow rates of the gas and condensate respectively, which are 
obtained from the continuity equation. 
Wg = pgvgAH W, = pýv, AH (3.3.1/3.3.2) 
where vg and v, are the discharge speeds of the gas and condensate respectively and 
Ay is the cross-sectional area of the leak hole. 
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The discharge speed of the condensate is obtained using Bernoulli's equation. 
Equation 3.4 represents isentropic flow where p is the pressure in the leaking section. 
z p v` 
=constant 
p, 2 
(3.4) 
Within the module the atmospheric pressure is pQ and the discharge speed is v, At the 
point of release the speed is zero and the pressure is p, giving the constant term in the 
equation. 
Pa + 
VC, 
=P 
Pc 2 PC 
(3.5) 
Manipulation of this equation gives the discharge speed of the condensate, Equation 
3.6. 
I 
v= 2P 
pa 2 
c PC 
(3.6) 
Hence the mass flow of the condensate is calculated by Equation 3.7. This equation 
also applies to the mass flow rate of any oil. 
Wc =AH(2(P-Pa)Pc)2 (3.7) 
The discharge speed of the gas is obtained by using the laws of gas dynamics, 
Equation 3.8, where K is a constant and y is the ratio of specific heats c//c, where cp is 
the specific heat capacity of the gas at constant pressure and c, is the specific heat at 
constant volume. The gas is assumed to be a perfect gas. 
P 
=K ' Pa 
(3.8) 
Bernoulli's equation in compressible flow is used to determine the discharge speed of 
the gas, Equation 3.9, which leads to the gas flow rate when the flow is unchoked, 
Equation 3.10. 
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zYP v8 =2Y 
-1.0 PA 
Wg = 
i 
r 
1.0- p° 
P 
I 1.0-r 
2A 2Y JKTPa r 
p° 
-1.0 (3.10) 0py y-1. 
However, if the gas reaches its maximum speed, the speed of sound, the flow 
becomes choked. The critical pressure ratio is used to determine whether the flow is 
choked or unchoked. For unchoked flow this is: 
py+1.0 Y 
Pa 2 
If the flow is choked, the ratio pip has a maximum value of. 
-, 
r, 
l. o+y 
(3.9) 
I 
Ili 
J 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
Substituting this maximum value into Equation 3.9 gives the maximum discharge 
speed of the gas as: 
I 
1.0+y 
2M 
+Y)Pg 
which is used to give a flow rate for choked flow in Equation 3.14. 
Wg =AH 
-gmax I (1.0 
-f-Apg 
1) = 
y-1.0) pg 
/ 
i. v t 
\1 
TJO.. Y 
., s" 11n, -- 
IA+y 
2 y-1. o 
l. o+y 
7-1.0 1 
i 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
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The gas flow rate for choked flow is considered to be dependent on the density of the 
gas, which is assumed to vary during the leak. The flow rate was re-expressed to 
eliminate dependencies on pg by introducing a to represent a product of constant 
terms such that: 
yVg = Vg 
ýrg 
=AH lýPg 
)z 
a where a= 
I 
1ý (,. Y-1-0 
Y( 
2 ri. o 
l. o+y 
2 
The change in density of gas with time is: 
111.0+y 
dpg 
_ 
A (ppg )Za A KZ pg ia 
dt Vg Vg 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
Integrating to find the gas density and substituting this into the gas flow rate equation 
gives the flow rate of the gas independent of the change in gas density in Equation 
3.17. 
i 
TV 
g 
K2a 
"O-y AKZat 1r 
g -- y2 yg 
j+ pg2 
i. o+y 
1. Ö-y-y 
(3.17) 
The discharging condensate is assumed to evaporate immediately on contact with the 
atmosphere. 
The volume outflow of gas into the module, qg, is given in Equation 3.18 where pa is 
the atmospheric density. 
qg = 
w11 
g 
Pa 
i 
(3.18) 
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The volume concentration of gas within the module is calculated by considering the 
change of gas volume in the module. 
d Vg,,, 
dt = qg - cg 
(qg +A,, ) (3.19) 
where cg is the volume concentration of gas and Aw is the volume ventilation rate due 
to the wind. Dividing by the total volume of the module, Vm, gives: 
dcg Wv +Af_+ TK 
dt cg 
(3.20) 
3.5.1 Changing Temperature Model - No Heat Input 
This section gives an overview of the calculations performed in the model designed 
by Andrews, Smith and Gregory [371. This model assumed that as a leak occurred the 
temperature of the leaking vessel reduced due to no heat transfer within the system. 
As temperature reduced the pressure also reduced. The ratio of condensate to gas 
changed as the leak occurred due to evaporation of the condensate as the pressure 
reduced. The gas did not behave adiabatically due to a change in heat entropy 
between the gas and condensate phases. By assuming there was no heat input into the 
system the total entropy per unit mass was constant. The entropy per unit mass 
between the gas and condensate phases when in equilibrium is given by Equation 3.21 
where ? is the latent heat and T is the temperature. 
A 
S_ -S_ _- xý T 
(3.21) 
The total entropy in the system, s, is 
mgsg + mcsc = Ms 
where M =mg + m,. Manipulating Equations 3.21 and 3.22 led to: 
(3.22) 
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ý sggT 
pý (1.0 - pg ) +S 
g 
For a two phase mixture the Clausius-Clapyron equation is applied: 
dT Tlpg p, 
dp A11 
dT T Pg P, 
(3.23) 
(3.24) 
The gas is assumed to be a perfect gas 
p= pgRT (3.25) 
sg -Sc 
P= pgre ` (3.26) 
The change in pressure with respect to time, differentiating Equation 3.25, is 
dp 
= 
dpg 
RT + Rpg 
dT 
dt dt dt 
(3.27) 
This is substituted into Equation 3.24 to eliminate the temperature which leads to an 
equation for the average density change. 
p dpg 
dp pg dt 
dt p11 1.0-- --- 
,I Pg Pr 
(3.28) 
Assuming that ds = 0, as the change of entropy was negligible due to no heat input, 
the entropy was eliminated to obtain a relationship between the changes of gas density 
and mixture density. Differentiating Equation 3.26 leads to: 
dp 
_ 
YP dPg PAP, dl3 Pr PA dP PjPA dT 
dt pg dt cvTp dt c, Tp2 
(1-0-16) 
dt - cvT Zp 
(1-0-16) 
dt 
(3.29) 
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Using thermodynamics, entropy is defined as: 
Tds=dh-dp 
p 
where h is the enthalpy. But ds =0 and dh = cpdT giving: 
dp 
cvrp = dT 
Manipulation of the governing equations leads to: 
dp A11 dpg 
7t-- 
Pg p, dt 
P 1.0 -P 
Pg ý p8 
_ 
C,, YP 
_ 
Aßg PC 
Pg T Pg - Pj 
Pc I(1. Oßgf 
p Ps 
(3.30) 
(3.31) 
1 
P' 
(3.32) 
Solving these equations numerically provides new proportions and flow rates at 
incremented time steps. 
3.5.2 Constant Temperature - total heat input 
In the second model, heat input into the system keeps the temperature and pressure 
constant whilst condensate remains. Once the condensate has been exhausted through 
leakage blowdown and evaporation, the pressure in the leaking section is assumed to 
fall. The leak is assumed to consist of gas and/or condensate only. 
Due to the heat input the entropy of the system, s, changes and therefore the Clausius- 
Clapyron equation is no longer sufficient. The mixture is assumed to be in 2-phase 
equilibrium, for the temperature and pressure to remain constant whilst there is a gas 
leak there must also be a condensate leak to maintain equilibrium. Once all the 
condensate has been evaporated there is no longer a 2-phase release and the pressure 
within the section begins to decrease. 
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Two situations are presented in the modelling. The first is a gas only release when 
condensate is present in the section. The second is a gas and condensate release. 
When there is no condensate within the section the temperature can not be kept 
constant hence the modelling does not change in this case. 
Gas only leak 
If the leak is gas only whilst there is condensate present in the section, the discharge 
mass flow rate is W= Wg. This is a constant flow rate until the condensate evaporates. 
The time at which all condensate has evaporated is calculated by considering the 
changes in the volume and mass of gas within the vessel. The new volume of gas after 
a small time, St, is represented by the original volume of gas plus the volume created 
from the evaporation of condensate where (Smce is the mass of condensate evaporated. 
(5171, 
Vg = V8 + 
PC 
The new mass of gas after at is 
mg=mg-Sing, -5' gb+SmCe 
(3.33) 
(3.34) 
where bmg! is the mass of gas leaked and Smgb is the mass of gas blown down. As pg is 
constant whilst liquid remained dividing Equation 3.34 by Equation 3.33 and 
rearranging leads to the rate of evaporation: 
dntgr dmgb 
dm + 
ce __ 
dt dt 
dt 
1.0- Pg 
PC 
Equation 3.35 is only true if the blowdown is activated otherwise: 
dmg, 
dmCe 
- 
dt 
dt 
1.0- 
pg 
Pc 
(3.35) 
(3.36) 
63 
dmg, 
_ dt 
=-W, dt 
dmgb 
where Wb is the blowdown flow rate. 
If tbd is the time at which the blowdown activates then the rates of evaporation are: 
t< tbd 
dd" 
=W (3.37) 
1.0- s 
Pc 
t>tbd 
dmCe 
--W-Wb dt 
1.0- tog 
Pl, 
(3.38) 
Integrating Equation 3.38 with respect to time under the condition that the time of 
evaporation occurs when the mass of the condensate is zero gives the time of 
evaporation to be: 
levap 
in, (0) 1.0 - 
Pg 
+W 
PC ntea 
W+ Wb 
(3.39) 
After this time the pressure and the density of the gas decreases. A differential 
equation is used to give the concentration of gas within the module. 
dcg Wv + W. Wv 
dt + cg V. V. 
(3.40) 
Before the condensate evaporates Equation 3.40 can be solved analytically to give: 
((w+wQr 
c=W1.0 - (3.41) gW+ Wa 
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Rearranging gives the time for any given concentration: 
t=V. In 
yV" 
W. +Wv W,, -cg(WY +Wo) 
(3.42) 
so if t< tevap, the upper and lower flammable limits are therefore converted into 
volume concentrations and substituted into Equation 3.42 to determine the time at 
which these limits are reached. To determine whether t< te1, ap then the maximum 
concentration is calculated. 
CS 
max 
W+Wa 
lýýP 
=W 
W"W 
1.0 - (3.43) 
"a 
Once the condensate has evaporated Wv is no longer constant and so Equation 3.40 is 
solved numerically. 
Two-Phase Leak - Gas and Condensate 
Consideration of the two-phase discharge is more complex. If the discharging volume 
is isolated, the ratio of liquid gas to gas within the discharging volume changes as the 
blowdown and leakage occurs. As the overpressure is reduced, liquid evaporates 
increasing the gas/condensate ratio and cooling takes place if there is no heat input. 
The gas does not behave adiabatically as there is an exchange of entropy between the 
gaseous and condensate phases. The model assumes that there is no heat input during 
the discharge so that the total entropy per unit mass in the volume is constant. This is 
an approximation because the calculations show that although there is a substantial 
cooling effect, in practice it would be mitigated by heat input from the surroundings. 
The assumption is also made that any gas condensate immediately evaporates on 
leaking into the module. 
Whilst there is condensate in the section the flow rates of the gas and liquid are 
constant due to the constant density. However, due to the evaporation of the 
condensate, /3 is assumed to increase with time. This time dependence is determined 
by considering the changes in the volume and mass of gas. The new volume of gas 
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after time 6t where 6m, i is the mass of the condensate leaked and ömb is the mass of 
the condensate blown down. 
Vý = V_ + 
Sm,, 
+ 
BinCe 
+ 
8inc6 
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The new mass of gas after at 
Pc Pý Pý 
mg = ing - 
Smg, 
- 
Smgb 
- gin 
(3.44) 
(3.45) 
Equations 3.44 and 3.45 only apply if the blowdown has activated, i. e., t> tbd. Due to 
the density of the gas remaining constant, Equations 3.44 and 3.45 are used to 
determine the rate of evaporation. 
" Before blowdown is activated, t< tbd 
dmCe 
= 
Pg (1-, ßg )W, + pt, 
8gWg 
dt (P, - Pg ) 
" After blowdown is activated, t> tbd 
dmCe 
= 
Pg(1-Qg)(Wc +Wcb)+Pc/g(Wg +Wgb) 
dt 
(PC 
- Pg ) 
where Wcn is the blowdown rate of the condensate 
(3.46) 
(3.47) 
To determine the dependence ofßg on time the original definition of ßg is considered. 
volume of gas Vg ßg 
total volume V 
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Using Equations 3.46 and 3.47 the following equations are obtained. 
"t< tbd 
dpg 
- 
/3gWg + (1-, ßg ) W, 
dt V(p, - pg ) 
ý1 >tbd 
dßg 
- 
Ng(Wg +Wgb)+(1- 
6g )(W, +Wcb) 
dtV (Pe - Pg ) 
Solving Equations 3.48 and 3.49 gives 
t: 5 tbd 
ßg (t) = ßg (0) +wc exp VIvg 
W` 
t 
y+c 
W W g 
Wý (Pý - Pg) Wg , 
"tý tbd 
(3.48) 
(3.49) 
(3.50) 
fig (t) 
-8g 
(tbd )+W 
-I 
Wc 
+ ýcb 
-W 
Jexp[ Wg 
gb - 
Wc - Wcb (tbd - t) 
g gb ý cn (Pý, - Pg ) 
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(3.51) 
From Equations 3.50 and 3.51 the proportions are calculated at a number of time steps 
and the flow rates predicted. 
These are substituted into the mass flow rate, which is not constant, hence a time 
stepping process is necessary to calculate the concentration of gas in the module. 
The change in volume of gas in the module is 
d Vgm 
= Wv cg (W, + Wa ) dt 
(3.52) 
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This calculates the new volume of gas in the module which allows the calculation of 
the concentration. As soon as there is only gas remaining in the section the pressure 
and densities decrease. The flow rate is therefore modelled by Equation 3.17 or 3.10 
dependent on the flow being choked or unchoked. As the flow is not constant, 
calculations are again required over a number of time intervals. 
3.6 Modelling the Gas Concentration 
The assumption in the modelling is that once released the gas is evenly distributed 
through the module due to perfect mixing. The cloud concentration increases as the 
gas release continues. Once condensate has been released, it evaporates on contact 
with the atmosphere, contributing to the gas cloud. The gas concentration within the 
fixed volume is uniform throughout. Initially the concentration profile is dominated 
by the release, at the peak of the profile, when the discharge rate has decreased below 
the ventilation rate, the ventilation is assumed to take precedence and in the latter 
stages of the tail, the change is solely due to the ventilation. 
Three basic scenarios could be achieved by modelling the concentration of the gas 
within the module with time: 
1. No explosive gas concentration - the gas concentration never reaches the 
lower flammable limit (LFL) and therefore no explosion occurs (Figure 3.3). 
Gas Concentration 
UFL 
LFL -7 
Tune after release 
Figure 3.3 - Scenario 1 
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2. Gas concentration exceeds the LFL but is below the upper flammable limit 
(UFL) - the gas release begins at time t=0 and reaches the LFL at time Ti. 
When the gas release is exhausted, the module concentration begins to 
decrease and passes the LFL at T4. There is the potential for a explosion 
between the times of T, and T4 when the concentration is between the 
flammable limits (Figure 3.4). 
Gas Concentration 
UFL 
LFL 
14 
Figure 3.4 - Scenario 2 
10 Time after release 
3. Gas concentration exceeds the UFL - the concentration reaches the lower 
flammable limit at Ti, continuing to increase in concentration past the UFL at 
T2. Following the full release the module concentration decreases and returns 
through the UFL and LFL at times T3 and T4 respectively. This situation 
creates two time periods where the potential for an explosion is present, 
between time T, and T2, and between times T3 and T4 (Figure 3.5). For the 
majority of releases the driving pressure was found to send the concentration 
above the UFL very quickly. When the release is finished and the 
concentration is diluted by natural ventilation the period between T3 and T4 
could be of significant duration and provides the major contribution towards 
the risk of an explosion. 
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Cu Concentration 
UFL 
LFL 
41 
/ 
/ 
T, T, T3 
Figure 3.5 - Scenario 3 
ý 
T4 
Tuna after release 
Development of the model by Foster and Andrews (391 assumes a worst case situation 
where the gas does not mix perfectly with the air in the module following release and 
that a gas cloud of uniform stoichiometric concentration will form which will expand 
until it fills the module. Under these conditions, ignition will produce the maximum 
overpressures. In order for an explosion to occur the concentration of the cloud is still 
required to lie between the lower and upper flammable limit. Due to the open sides of 
the module it is assumed that the concentration of a gas cloud will not exceed the 
UFL. The method determines the explosion probability dependent on the volume 
fraction of gas within the module and the likelihood of encountering an ignition 
source. This method is described in more detail in Section 3.7. 
3.7 Ignition Frequency 
It is assumed that an ignition will only occur at time t if it has not occurred previously 
while a gas cloud within the explosive range existed i. e. a previous explosion has not 
occurred. In order to calculate the frequency of occurrence of an explosion, it is 
necessary to calculate the frequency of occurrence of an ignition source. 
When calculating the overpressure distribution resulting from an explosion, the 
explosive range between the flammable limits was split into bands. This allowed the 
frequency of an explosion at a certain concentration of gas to be determined. There 
was a time to enter and a time to leave each concentration band, denoted by t/"', t2m, 
tam and tom if the upper limit of the concentration band was exceeded. If the 
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concentration began to fall while in the band, there was only tim and tom where m 
refers to the specific concentration band. 
Ignition could generate either a mitigated or unmitigated explosion, dependent on the 
availability of the deluge system. Mitigated explosions occur when the deluge system 
is active and consider the following situations: 
" The deluge system is initiated and fails and an ignition source occurs prior to 
failure. 
" The deluge system functions throught the critical time period and an ignition 
occurs. 
Unmitigated explosions occurred when: 
" The deluge system failed to activate and an ignition occurred. 
" The deluge system was activated following detection but ignition occurred 
during the delay to activation. 
" The deluge is activated and functions but then fails followed by an ignition. 
The ignition model, developed by Foster and Andrews [39] allows the explosion 
probability to be calculated dependent on the concentration of gas within the module 
and the likelihood of encountering an ignition source. 
The method models the gas cloud over time, the greater the volume of the cloud the 
larger the chance of encountering an ignition source. The concentration contours as 
the gas enters the module changes position and shape with time. The volume encased 
within each concentration band changes with respect to time, as shown in Figure 3.6 
for a specific concentration band. The exact form of this graph changes for every 
scenario. In the example given, the volume builds up rapidly at first due to a high 
release rate. Once the leak has exhausted, the volume reduces as determined by the 
ventilation rate. 
71 
Volume 
Time 
Figure 3.6 Example of the expected growth and decay of the volume within a 
concentration band, using the log-normal function. 
The variation can be represented using a skewed function such as a log-normal 
function of the form 
V (t) =l e( Z[ýcý-ý, 
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(at JJ (3.53) 
where cp and ß are the function parameters. Such a function is capable of representing 
the increase in volume as the gas is released and the decrease as ventilation dominates 
and the gas is exhausted. 
In method two the probability of ignition is dependent on the ignition density rather 
than the ignition rate and the dispersion rate and concentration of the gas cloud. For a 
specific concentration band, m, the volume of gas follows a function V (t). The 
ignition rate is therefore 
A, V. (t) (3.54) 
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This leads to a probability density function for the ignition source occurrence times of 
f, (t) = A, V. (t) exp[- A, I Vm (u)du] (3.55) 
The modelling provides the times at which each concentration band develops and then 
disappears and how the volume within each band varies with time. It is assumed that 
the lowest concentration band is the first to be reached and the last to be left, and that 
the highest is the last to be reached and the first to be left. Therefore, if tEm is the time 
that band m is entered and tLr is the time that band m is left, the following is applied 
tEl<tE2<... <tL2<tLl (3.56) 
This is illustrated in Figure 3.7 where variation in the volume with time for each band 
is assumed not to intersect. 
tgl tE2 tE7 tE4 tLl 
Time 
Figure 3.7 - Representation of the volume variation for each 
concentration band over time. 
The probability of a gas cloud ignition at time v where n is the number of 
concentration bands, P(E) is the probability of ignition when the concentration is in 
band m and fj is the probability density function for the ignition source for band j is 
given in Equation 3.57. 
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The first term considers the intervals between the times for entering each 
concentration band. As the gas release develops and higher concentration bands are 
entered, more terms are added to account for the ignition density functions of the 
higher bands. The second term considers the time interval between entering and 
leaving the last band within the flammable limits. The final term accounts for the time 
intervals between the exit of each band which reduces the number of density functions 
which need to be considered. 
To evaluate the proportions of ignitions which are unmitigated, the situation where 
ignition occurs prior to activation of the deluge system is required. Equation 3.57 is 
used for this with the limits changed to account for the time in the release at which the 
deluge activated. 
Probability of ignition occurring after the failure of the activated deluge system 
depends on the activation time and the failure rate of the deluge system. The deluge 
failure rate is assumed to be a constant, leading to a failure time density function of 
. 
f,, 
s 
(u) = A, tise(-A-u) 
(3.58) 
The activation time with respect to the limiting times of each concentration band is 
considered. 
For the case when td < tEm, the probability of ignition in band m at time v is: 
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(3.59) 
For all other intervals, Equation 3.59 is used with a change of integration limits. 
Similarly, for ignition occurring when the deluge system is active, the probability of 
ignition when td < tE,,, is given by Equation 3.60. 
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(3.60) 
3.8 Estimating the frequency and severity of an explosion 
The frequency of an explosion, f,, is calculated after the characteristics of the leak, gas 
cloud build up and likelihood of ignition have been estimated. The frequency of 
explosions took one of two forms dependent on the availability of the deluge system. 
fe = P(S)/Z. LP(E)P(DSFA) 
or 
fe = P(S)ALP(E)[1- P(DSFA)] 
(3.61) 
(3.62) 
where P(S) is the probability of the event sequence represented by each event tree 
outcome, AL is the frequency of the gas leak, P(E) is the probability of ignition and 
P(DSFA) is the probability that the deluge system fails to activate. 
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The concentration at which ignition occurs was used in conjunction with an empirical 
relationship derived by British Gas to determine the resulting overpressures as shown 
[23) in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8 Variation in the overpressure as a function of concentration. 
3.9 Discussion 
This chapter has summarised the analytical version of SAROS and the adaptations 
made prior to this thesis. 
The initial model assumes that a gas, condensate and oil release occurred with 
changing temperature, implying a negligible change in entropy. The model was 
adapted assuming a release occurred at a constant temperature, and modelled both gas 
only and gas and condensate together release. The assumption that the leaking section 
remains at a constant temperature as the condensate evaporated led to higher release 
rates, explosion frequency and frequency of overpressures generated. 
The original model assumed perfect mixing of the gas within the module. 
Calculations were developed to model a non-uniform concentration build-up. 
However experimental work carried out by British Gas plc showed that for high 
release rates, the assumption of immediate and uniform mixing of gas in air was valid. 
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Chapter 4 Extension of the Open sided SAROS model using 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
4.1 Introduction 
SAROS has been enhanced from estimating offshore platform risks using an 
analytical model to running simulations using the Monte Carlo Simulation method. 
Expansion of the capabilities of SAROS has led to the ability to model both fires and 
explosions on an offshore platform. A release followed by ignition can result in a pool 
fire (liquid releases), jet fire (immediate ignition of a gas release) or explosion 
(delayed ignition of a gas release). 
In order for an explosion or a fire to occur on a platform there must initially be a 
release of hydrocarbons which can take one of three forms; liquid only release, gas 
only release or combined liquid and gaseous release. 
Immediate ignition of a high pressure gas release within a module will create a jet 
fire. The amount of oxygen available to a fire within an open module is not limited 
and therefore the fire will be extinguished only when the volume of inventory 
available has been reduced sufficiently to no longer support a flame. 
A delay between commencement of a gaseous release and occurrence of an ignition 
will result in an explosion. Prior to ignition the gaseous fuel will form a cloud within 
the module, which will ignite causing an accelerating flame-front to propagate 
through the cloud. 
Ignition of an oil pool will form a pool fire. As for jet fires, the sustainability of the 
fire in an open module is dependant on the availability of leaking hydrocarbons. 
The magnitude of an explosion will be specified by the overpressures it produces. For 
a fire the heat generated and radiated to the platform structure and process vessels is 
of concern. Flame length and fire duration are used to indicate the magnitude of the 
heat radiated to the platform structure and process vessels. 
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4.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
The method used to model the risks on offshore platforms in SAROS is the Monte 
Carlo Simulation method. Monte Carlo analysis is conducted as an experiment on a 
computer. The method uses random samples from distributions which govern the 
physical parameters and times to occurrence of events in the process. For this 
particular model each run starts with the release and monitors the actions of the safety 
systems and the occurrence of an ignition through to the consequences. The results of 
a great number of simulations are then used to determine the probability distributions 
for the magnitude of the resulting fires and explosions and the consequential fatalities. 
The method requires the use of a random number generator to create the random 
sample in variables during each simulation. Initially the leaking section will be 
selected according to the relative likelihood of a leak on each particular section. The 
size of the hole is selected as a random sample from the hole size distribution. 
The occurrence of many events in the simulation are specified by a constant rate of 
occurrence. The ignition rate and failure rates of various systems such as the deluge 
system are examples. In this case, the cumulative failure distribution, F(t), for an 
exponential distribution with mean 
I is given by: 
F(t) =1- e-"` 
(4.1) 
A random sample can be taken by generating a random number, X in the range 0 to 1, 
and equating to F(t) since both quantities have the same properties. The time to 
failure, t, is given by: 
t=-i 1nX 
ý 
(4.2) 
Specific events, such as the availability of an isolation valve, are determined by 
sampling a fixed probability event. A random number is compared to the probability 
of an event being available, if the random number is greater than this probability the 
system is assumed to be unavailable. 
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It is assumed the module is ventilated naturally by the wind. The ventilation rate for 
each simulation is determined by taking a random sample from between zero and a 
maximum value for the wind speed. 
4.3 Initial Hydrocarbon Release Rates 
The section on which the leak occurs is selected according to the relative likelihood of 
a leak occurring on each section. The cross sectional area of the hole, AH, is then 
obtained by randomly sampling from the section hole size distribution. Whether the 
leak is oil, gas or condensate is determined by the specific inventory of the section 
and the location of the hole. Prior to detection and isolation it is assumed that the 
release rate of hydrocarbons is calculated assuming the inventory available to the leak 
is infinite and the driving pressure in the sections remains constant. 
4.3.1 Gaseous Releases 
Prior to detection, the initial release rate of hydrocarbons is calculated assuming that 
the inventory available to the leak is infinite and the driving pressure in the leaking 
section will remain constant. 
The gas and condensate discharge rates are calculated using the assumptions stated for 
the analytical model. Equations 3.10 and 3.14 are used to model the rate of choked 
and unchoked flows of gas. 
It is again assumed that the condensate and gas leak in the same proportions that they 
exist in the section and that the condensate vaporises immediately on contact with the 
atmosphere. Consequently the condensate is not considered further. 
It is assumed that the gaseous discharge continues until the internal pressure of the 
leaking section drops to the atmospheric pressure. 
4.3.2 Oil Releases 
Potentially an oil leak can occur both pre and post separation. If the leak occurs in the 
pipework before the separator, then it is assumed that water will be present in the 
leaking fluid, and the mass flowrate of oil, W0, will be modelled by Equation 4.3 
using the principle Wo = v, AH and Bernoulli's equation to calculate the velocity of 
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discharge of the oil, vv, giving Wo in terms of the pressure and density of the oil and 
the cross-sectional area of the hole. 
1 W. = 
(2A112 (P8 
- Pa lPo z (4.3) 
The flowrate of water can be calculated by substituting the density of water into 
Equation 4.3. It is assumed that once released the water need not be considered 
further. 
If the leak occurs in the separation section then the rate of release of oil is dependent 
on the location of the leak. The height of oil in the vessel, ho, is determined as a 
proportion of the total height of the vessel, hv. 
` ......................... ý 
gas 
hv 
oil 
ho 
/...... 
Figure 4.1 - Example separation vessel 
A number is randomly generated and if it is less than the proportion hJh,,, it is 
assumed that the leak occurs above the level of the oil and the release is purely gas 
and concentrate. 
If a hole occurs below ho, the release is oil only until ho has been reduced to the level 
of the leak. The rate of discharge of the oil is similar to Equation 4.3 but includes the 
additional pressure due to the oil above the leak on the vessel. The head of oil, hHEAD, 
is calculated by subtracting the height of the hole from the height of the oil and is then 
used in Equation 4.3 to calculate the oil mass flow rate, where g is the acceleration 
due to gravity. 
zl W. = 
(2AH 
Po (P - Pa + S'PohHEAD )2 
I 
(4.4) 
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The leak will consist of gas and condensate only if the release continues after the 
height of the oil has decreased below the height of the leak. 
4.4 Detection of Gaseous Releases 
The methodology accounts for one type of detection system on the platform, relying 
on detection of a gas cloud. The time to detection, tder, for this instrument is calculated 
using Equation 4.5 where h,  is the height of the module, qg is the volumetric release 
rate of gas and C is a constant representing the concentration of gas at which the 
detection system is activated. The equation is based on the time taken for a gas cloud 
to reach a detector. 
; rh-3C 
tdet _M -ý 
6qg 
(4.5) 
The failure probability of each detector system is also taken into account and if the 
system were to become unavailable the leak would be detected manually after a 
specified period of time. 
4.5 Modelling of the Isolation and Blowdown Systems 
Once a gas leak is detected the safety systems should activate. This includes the 
isolation and blowdown systems designed to limit the magnitude of the leak. Random 
sampling is used to determine the availability of each isolation and blowdown valve 
associated with the module. If the valves are available it is assumed that they are 
activated a short delay after the leak is detected. 
If an isolation valve on the leaking section is unavailable it is assumed that the 
inventory from the adjoining section will also contribute to the leak. The inventory of 
the sections combine to produce one larger section. 
4.6 Modelling of the Deluge System 
On fire or gas detection the deluge system is also activated. Two parameters need to 
be specified in the failure model for the system. It has a probability of failing to start 
and a failure rate once active. The availability of the deluge system is determined by 
sampling of a random number as for the isolation and blowdown systems. If the 
system is available it is assumed to activate following a short delay after detection. It 
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is possible that after an active period the system could fail. This time to failure is 
generated using Equation 4.2. The characteristics of the explosion or fire are affected 
by whether ignition occurs during the active deluge period or after failure. 
4.7 Hydrocarbon Release Rate following Isolation 
Following isolation it is assumed that the inventory is no longer infinite. Equations 
4.3 to 4.4 remain valid in calculating the release rates however the amount of 
inventory in the section will now decrease over time. The subsequent decrease in the 
pressure, density of gas and head of oil will lead to a reduction in the release rates. 
4.8 Gas Cloud Build-up and Dispersion 
Gas released into the module will form a cloud which will change in size and gas 
concentration. A conservative approach is again taken to the cloud model. As a worst 
case the gas cloud is assumed to grow in the centre of a module at a uniform 
stoichiometric concentration. This being the concentration of gas in air which would 
cause the highest overpressures should ignition occur. The estimation of the cloud 
volume at atmospheric pressure, Vg(ay, uses M the mass of gas released into the 
module and pg(at) the density of the gas at atmospheric pressure. 
Vg(at) = 
mg 
Pg(at) 
(4.6) 
When the cloud has expanded to fill the module, then the concentration can increase 
up to the UFL. Due to the open sides of the module, it is assumed that the cloud 
volume cannot exceed the module volume. 
Following detection and isolation, the release rate of the gas decreases. If the 
ventilation rate is greater than the release rate of the gas, the cloud is assumed to 
uniformly decrease in concentration until it reaches zero. The concentration of the gas 
cloud is calculated using Equation 4.7. 
dcg Wg + Aw 
+ 
Wg 
dt cg V. V. 
(4.7) 
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4.9 Oil Pool Build-up and Reduction 
It is assumed that oil released and not ignited will form a pool assumed to grow with 
uniform depth. Prior to ignition the growth of the pool is proportional to the release 
rate of the oil. The area of the pool, AP, is calculated over a number of time steps 
using Equation 4.8 where Wo is the mass flow rate of oil, to; / is the time for the release 
of oil, po is the density of oil and dp is the depth of the pool. 
to 
f Wo (t)dt 
AP (t) _° (4.8) 
PodP 
Due to the open sides of the module it is assumed that the pool area cannot exceed the 
module area and the depth of the pool cannot increase. 
Following ignition, the area of the pool is assumed to increase only if the rate of 
release exceeds the mass bum rate, otherwise the pool area will decrease until it 
reaches zero. Equation 4.9 is used to calculate the pool area when RB is the mass bum 
rate of the oil. 
1+i 
RB $A(t)dt 
AP(t+1) _' 
Podp 
(4.9) 
4.10 Ignition Model 
Three parameters are used to specify the ignition model, the probability of immediate 
ignition and rate of occurrence of ignition sources both pre and post isolation. Post 
isolation, the probability of occurrence of an ignition is reduced due to shutdown of 
potential sources in the module. 
4.11 Modelling Overpressures 
It is assumed that a delayed ignition occurring following a gas leak will result in an 
explosion. The overpressure of the explosion, Opr (Pa), is calculated using Equation 
4.10 where Opr,,, is the maximum value the overpressure can be, A and B are 
constants dependant on the ignition location and availability of deluge, cg is the 
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concentration of the gas, cs is the stoichiometric concentration and Fc is the fraction of 
the module occupied by the gas cloud. 
Opr = Oprn, ax exp 
A 
Cg 
- 2B +1 
Cg 
-1 F, (4.10) Cs Cs 
The concentration level at which an ignition occurs is important when determining the 
overpressure distribution. As for the analytical model the maximum overpressure is 
produced when the deluge is inactive. As the strength of the deluge increases the 
maximum overpressure reached is reduced. 
4.12 Modelling Fires 
It is assumed that an ignition being present at the time of a release of gas (or oil at 
high pressure) will generate a jet fire. A jet fire will also result if gas continues to be 
released following an explosion. The length of the flame, FF, is calculated using 
Equation 4.11, developed using the work by ThomasE431. If the initial length is below 
2m it is assumed that the fire has not become established and is disregarded. 
Fj = 15(Wg)o. ai (4.11) 
The length of the flame is recalculated over a number of time intervals. When the 
length has decreased to below 2m it is assumed that the fire has been extinguished. A 
decrease in length would be expected after isolation, when the release rate of the gas 
has decreased, or due to effects of the deluge system. 
An ignition occurring during or following a release of oil is assumed to result in a 
pool fire, with the diameter of the oil pool forming the base of a conical flame. The 
flame length, Lp, is calculated using Equation 4.12 derived by Moorhouse(1982) to 
model the flame height of cylindrical pool fire flames. If the initial length is below 2m 
it is assumed that the fire has not become established and is disregarded. 
0.254 
LP = 6.2[u]-0.044 DP 
RB 
I 
(4.12) 
Po(o, ) igDp)2 
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where Dp is the pool diameter, u is the wind speed, RB is the mass burn rate of the oil 
and po(aq is the density of the oil at atmospheric pressure. 
As for jet fires the length is recalculated at intervals until the flame decreases below 
2m. 
4.13 Modelling a Gaseous release following a liquid release 
Following exhaustion of an oil only release it is assumed that a section containing gas 
could have the potential for an explosion or jet fire. If the pool fire is burning when 
the leak begins the gas will ignite causing a jet fire. If the pool fire has been 
extinguished before the gas begins to leak, a gas cloud will form and the potential for 
an explosion exists. 
4.14 Discussion 
The majority of work in this chapter had been completed prior to commencing this 
thesis. However a few minor alterations were made following the literature review 
and initial review of the model. This primarily involved updating of equations in line 
with recent research. 
86 
Chapter 5 Development of the SAROS Model for 
Open Sided Modules 
5.1 Introduction 
As part of the research presented in this thesis the simulation version of the SAROS 
model was reviewed, evaluated and updated. The original coding, utilising Fortran 77 
was upgraded to the Fortran 95 standard. In addition to this the modelling capability 
of the code was enhanced to incorporate additional features. 
This chapter describes the changes made to the model and provides a sample output. 
5.2 Modifications to the effect of the deluge system on the ventilation rate 
Activation of the deluge system on the platform was not previously considered to 
impact on the ventilation rate within a module. More recent research has 
demonstrated that in the majority of cases the presence of water deluge during a fire 
reduces the natural ventilation rate through an open sided module (81. This is due to 
vaporisation of the water into steam, blanketing the fire and reducing the oxygen 
available for combustion. 
From the limited data produced, it can be assumed that for the purposes of the model, 
the ventilation rate will be reduced by 30% following successful activation of the 
deluge system. This value is specific to the research conducted by Mobil NS Ltd and 
therefore future applications of SAROS to other platforms may require amendment. 
5.3 Modifications to the effect of the deluge system on explosion mitigation 
In the existing version of SAROS the correlations provided for water mitigation of 
explosion overpressures are applied across the range of gas concentrations and cloud 
sizes. Mobil NS Ltd indicated that in some cases it is likely that this will 
underestimate the mitigated explosion overpressure. Such cases will occur where the 
gas cloud is too small to allow sufficient time for flame speeds to reach the critical 
value for the onset of water droplet break-up and thus the mitigation to take effect. 
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When the deluge is operational before the ignition occurs the mitigated explosion 
overpressure is calculated as before but is subject to a set of minimum limits as shown 
in Table 5.1, provided by Mobil NS Ltd. The limits are applied after the overpressure 
is calculated within the original method. 
Gas Concentration Overpressure limit 
UFL ->1.1*stoic concentration Not less than 0.1 bar 
(1.1->0.9)*stoic concentration Not less than 0.2 bar 
0.9*stoic concentration ->LFL Not less than 0.3 bar 
Table 5.1 - Overpressure limits dependant on gas concentration 
5.4 Improvement of the calculation of settle-out pressures 
Within the original simulation model, the unavailability of isolation valves between 
sections has resulted in the inventories of the connecting sections combining to 
produce one larger inventory. The resulting pressure of the section was termed the 
`settle-out pressure. ' 
A more accurate method of calculating the settle-out pressures and combination of 
inventories has been developed. The model classifies any section contributing to the 
leak as having higher or lower pressure than the leaking section. Higher and lower 
pressure sections are then combined independently from the leaking section. This 
simplifies the maximum number of sections that can potentially contribute to a leak as 
three, Figure 5.1. The SAROS model has been developed to handle three independent 
sections at differing pressures. 
Figure 5.1 - Representation of combined sections 
Where Stow is the low pressure section. 
Steak is the leaking section. 
Shigh is the high pressure section. 
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A number of assumptions are made in calculating the characteristics of the combined 
sections. The mass of gas, condensate, water and oil within each isolatable section 
remain constant and the masses of the low and high pressure sections are calculated 
by summing the masses of the original sections, for example, Equation 5.1 is used to 
calculate the mass of gas within the new section, where mg, is the total mass within the 
new section, mgi is the mass of gas within section i and n is the number of sections 
combining. 
Mgt =E 
(mg, ) 
1=1 
(5.1) 
The temperature of the gas within the new sections was calculated by summing the 
heat constant associated with each of the combining sections and dividing by the total 
mass of gas in that section. The average density of gas was determined by dividing the 
total mass of each new section by the total volume. The gas pressure, pg, was then 
calculated using Equation 5.2, where pg is the density of gas, R is the gas constant and 
Tg is the temperature of gas in the section. 
pg = pgRTg (5.2) 
Following identification of a leak and combination of any sections, the model 
determines which, if either, of the higher or lower pressure sections has been 
generated. If no higher or lower pressure sections have been established, the leak is 
assumed to occur only from the original section and any which are linked by a failed 
isolation valve and have the same pressure. 
If a higher pressure section, Sh, gh, exists, the inventory of the leak is formed 
from the 
contents of Shigh initially. This continues until reduction of the inventory of Shigh has 
resulted in the pressure reducing to the level of the leaking section. The sections are 
then assumed to combine and the leak then continues formed from the inventory of 
the new combined section. If a lower pressure section, Slow, exists at this point the leak 
continues until the pressure of the leaking section equals the plow. The two sections 
then combine and the leak continues until the inventory of the lower pressure and 
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leaking section are exhausted. If a lower pressure section does not exist the leak will 
continue from the leaking section until the inventory is exhausted. 
If no higher pressure section exists but a lower pressure section is present, inventory 
will leak from Sneak until the pressures are equal. The sections will then combine to 
produce one section and the leak continues from this new section until the inventory is 
exhausted. 
5.5 Treatment of Non-Return Valves. 
The inclusion of a Non-Return Valve (NRV) within a system limits the direction of 
flow to one particular direction. Although present on platforms, NRVs have not up 
until now been considered a safety feature. 
Section 
Figure 5.2 - Non return valve 
Section 2 
In Figure 5.2 above, the normal direction of flow is from Section 1 (Si) to Section 2 
(S2)" 
If a leak occurs on S2, the inventory of S, can contribute to the leak. Originally in the 
coding, as NRVs were not considered, a leak on S2 could in turn contribute to a leak 
on S1. Inclusion of the NRV prohibits this, providing that the valve is not in a failed 
state. 
If the NRV is in series with an isolation valve, the following case must also be 
considered (Figure 5.3). 
Section NJ Section 2 
Figure 5.3 - Non return valve in series with an isolation valve 
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In this case, each possibility of failure of success must be considered (Table 5.2, 
where 0 is unavailable and 1 available). 
Flow from Flow to NRV 
Availability? 
Isolation Valve 
Availability? 
Inventories 
combined? 
S1. S2 0 0 YES 
S1 S2 0 1 NO 
S1 S2 1 0 YES 
S1 S2 1 1 NO 
S2 S1. 0 0 YES 
S2 S1 0 1 NO 
S2 S1 1 0 NO 
S2 S1 1 1 NO 
Table 5.2 - Table of succeses and failures 
In order for the calculations to be included in the coding, the following information is 
specified for each NRV: 
" NRV name. 
" Section numbers for sections connected by valve. 
" Availability of NRV. 
" Availability of any Isolation valve in series. 
" Direction of flow through the NRV 
The information, provided by Mobil NS Ltd is included in the input file and used by 
the model in determining the layout of the platform. Following identification of the 
leaking section, the model verifies whether any NRVs are attached to the section. If 
so, and the valve has not failed, the system checks the direction of the valve and if 
inventory can flow from one section into the leaking section it does so. If an isolation 
valve is combined in series with the NRV the model uses Table 5.2 above to 
determine whether or not the sections can combine. 
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5.6 Liquid Level Control Valves 
Liquid level control valves (LLCV) are used to control the flow of liquid between 
sections and are not strictly a safety feature. However, in the event that a LLCV fails 
it will automatically shutdown and fail in the closed position. Therefore a failed valve 
occuring simultaneously with a leak will limit the severity of the leak. If the valve is 
available then it is assumed that there is no change to the leak inventory from 
including the LLCV in the model. 
In order for the valves to be considered in the coding, the following information 
provided by Mobil NS Ltd is specified for each LLCV: 
" LLCV name. 
" Section numbers for sections connected by valve. 
" Availability of LLCV. 
The data is included in the input file and following determination of a leaking section, 
the program checks for the presence of a LLCV. If one is present it then tests the 
availability. If the valve is available, the calculations continue as before, however if 
the valve has failed it is assumed that the flow will be zero. 
5.7 Maximum Allowable Pressure in an Isolatable Inventory 
Each section containing gas in a module is fitted with a maximum pressure relief 
valve (PRV). These are safety features designed to vent gas from a section once a 
maximum pressure has been reached and have not been considered previously in 
SAROS. 
In the event that a leaking section combines with a section with a pressure higher than 
that of the maximum, the flow will still continue from the higher pressure section to 
the leaking section. However the amount of flow will be lost from the system through 
the PRV not leaked into the module. 
In order for the change to be included in the programming, the maximum pressure 
associated with each PRV must be provided for each section. This information is 
supplied by Mobil NS Ltd. 
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5.8 Manual Detection of Leaks 
The original SAROS it was assumed that it would take 15 minutes to manually detect 
a gas leak, irrespective of the number of people in the module or the rate at which the 
gas escaped. The number of people in the module at the time of the leak is now input 
to the model and is used, along with the gas leakage rate, to determine a more 
accurate estimate of the manual detection time. 
It is assumed that there is a linear relationship between the time to detect a leak and 
the rate at which the leak occurs. 
If the leak rate is equal to or less than 0.007 kgs'' the manual detection time is 
assumed to be 900s, if it is equal to or greater than 5.0 kgs'' the time is assumed to be 
10s. If the leak rate lies between these two values, the time is calculated to be between 
lOs and 900s assuming a linear relationship, Figure 5.4. The data for this assumption 
is provided by Mobil NS Ltd. 
Leak rate 
(kgs') 
Time (s) 
Figure 5.4 - Leakrate vs time 
The time to detection is calculated as above assuming that there are up to two people 
present in the module at the time of release. It is estimated that the higher the number 
of personnel in the module, the sooner it is that the leak will be detected, assuming 
that the workforce is evenly distributed throughout the module. The following factors 
are used to scale the time to detection. 
If the population is greater than 0 and less than or equal to 2, the time to detection 
remains as calculated. 
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If the population is greater than 2 and less than or equal to 4, the time to detection is 
multiplied by a factor of 0.8. 
If the population is greater than 4 and less than or equal to 6, the time to detection is 
multiplied by a factor of 0.6. 
If the population is greater than 6 and less than or equal to 8, the time to detection is 
multiplied by a factor of 0.4. 
If the population is greater than 8 and less than or equal to 10, the time to detection is 
multiplied by a factor of 0.2. 
If the population is greater than 10, the time to detection is multiplied by a factor of 
0.1. 
This distribution was provided by Mobil NS Ltd taking into account an even 
distribution of workforce across the module. 
5.9 Automatic Detection of Leaks 
Each time a leak is identified, the model identifies the availability of each detection 
system. If all systems are unavailable, the leak is detected manually as above. If one 
or more of the systems are available, the time for each of the systems to detect the 
leak is calculated. These times are then compared and the shortest time selected as the 
time to leak detection. 
Previously one detection method was considered for automatic detection of leaks. In 
reality a combination of up to three detection methods is used on the platform. This 
assumption and the data used for each detector is valid only for specific Mobil NS Ltd 
platforms. 
5.9.1 Point Gas and Beam Detectors 
Both systems detect the gas concentration in the module and are triggered at certain 
preset levels. The formula used to calculate the time to detection for each detector is 
presented in Equation 5.1 where tdet is the time to detection, de is the assumed 
minimum detectable gas cloud diameter (dependant on the threshold gas 
concentration, C, assumed to be 20% of the LFL) and qg is the volume gas release rate 
over the time to detect. 
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ra_. = 
ýrdý3 C 
ucL 6qg (5.1) 
The variation in calculations between for the two detectors is h, the minimum cloud 
diameter. For point gas detectors h assumes a value of 10m, and for beam detectors a 
value of 8m is assumed. 
5.9.2 Sonic Detectors 
Sonic detectors identify the sound of the gas escaping from the section. If the release 
rate is greater than 0.5kgs" it is assumed the leak will be detected by the sonic 
detectors and the time to detection will be zero. 
5.10 Input Data 
Data is provided to SAROS through two files. The topology file contains data 
regarding the valves and the inventory file contains section inventories and data 
required in the model. 
The data input into the model is included in Appendix A and described briefly in the 
following sections. 
5.10.1 Topology File 
This file contains data on the number of isolation, blowdown, wellhead, non-return, 
liquid level control and maximum pressure relief valves modelled on the example 
open sided module platform. In addition to the data described below, each valve has a 
specific name which is included in the topology file. 
For each of the isolation valves, the two sections connected by the valve and the 
unavailability of the valve is presented. The unavailability is also presented for the 
blowdown valves, however in this case the valve does not connect two sections, it 
releases gas from one section only to the flare. Also included is the diameter of the 
blowdown, used in calculating the rate at which gas is removed from the section when 
the valve is opened. 
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For the wellhead valves, as for isolation valves, the two sections linked by the valve 
and the unavailability of the valve is specified. 
The number of non-return valves, NRV, which do and do not occur in series with an 
isolation valve are specified. For each of the valves, the two sections connected by the 
valve, the order in which these sections are listed indicates the direction of flow 
through the valve and the unavailability are presented. Also included, if necessary is 
the unavailability of the isolation valve. 
As for the non-return valves, a liquid level control valve, LLCV, may occur in series 
with an isolation valve. Again, the two sections connected by the valve, the 
unavailability of the liquid level control valve and the unavailability of the isolation 
valve, if required, are specified. 
The last data in the file represents the maximum pressure relief valves. The section 
which the valve is linked to and the maximum allowable pressure within the section is 
detailed. 
The topology file is the same for each module on a platform as it represents all valves 
on the platform at any one time. 
5.10.2 Inventory File 
This file contains the data required to form the model, including inventory data and 
parameters specific to each module. The separation module file is presented in the 
Appendix. 
A certain amount of data about the environmental conditions is required to form the 
model, the maximum windspeed, density of air and atmospheric pressure are included 
in the inventory file. 
Data is required in order to model the ignitability of a gas cloud. The upper and lower 
flammability limits, the limits at which the gas concentration is required to be within 
at the time of ignition, are specified along with the proportion of the lower 
flammability limit which is required for detection. 
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Certain data is required when analysing the inventories of the sections, the specific 
heat capacity of the gas at constant volume and at constant pressure and latent heat of 
vaporisation of the gas are specified. 
In order to determine the type of ignition, the probability that an ignition source 
occurs simultaneously with a release of gas or oil is required, along with the 
frequency that an ignition occurs pre and post isolation are presented in the file. 
The safety systems on the platform have parameters used in calculating whether the 
system functions as required and the effect of a system on a release. The 
unavailability of each of the three gas detection systems and the fire detection system 
are specified. The initial unavailability of the deluge system and the frequency of 
failure of the system once activated is included, along with the factor by which the 
ventilation is reduced when the deluge system is activated. The time delay between 
detection the activation of the deluge and isolation and blowdown systems is 
included. 
Once a release has been ignited, certain parameters are required to determine the 
severity of the explosion or fire. A set of distribution data is required in calculating 
the overpressure of an explosion dependent on the ignition location. The name of each 
location, maximum overpressure, stoichiometric concentration and constants A, B, 
Equation 4.10, are presented for when the deluge system is active and inactive. The 
minimum overpressure required to fail a blast wall or to fail the platform structure are 
listed. 
To determine the severity of a fire, the minimum sustainable flame length of a fire, 
the time required to fail a vessel and the time required to fail the platform structure is 
included for both jet and pool fires. 
Each section on the platform is included in the inventory file. The file specifies the 
number of sections, and sub-sections within each of these sections. The name of each 
sub-section is specified along with the section volume, temperature and pressure. The 
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density and proportion by mass of gas, condensate, oil and water within each of the 
sub-sections is also included. 
Each of the wells also requires an amount of input data. The number of wells on the 
platform, well number and leakrate per year in addition to the time to manually isolate 
a well are specified. 
Certain parameters contained within the inventory file are specific to the module 
being analysed, and each module has a different inventory file. The name of the 
module and it's height, width and length are specified in metres. Only a certain 
number of sections specified in the file are contained within the module, and further 
information is provided about these sections. The number of the section, relating to 
the data included earlier in the file, the frequency of leaks per year and the time 
required to blowdown gas from the module are specified. 
5.11 Results 
The model was run through one million simulations for an example platform and 
estimates for the frequency of explosions, jet fires and pool fires were generated. The 
results are presented for each of three process modules; separation, compression and 
wellhead, and each section within that module. 
The combination of these results predicted that 3.93 x10'2 explosions, 1.11 x10"1 jet 
fires and 8.40x 10"3 pool fires would occur per year on the example platform. 
5.11.1 Separation module 
This module separates the oil, gas and water components from the mixture pumped 
from the seabed. The atmospheric separators remove the oil and water from the mix, 
disposing of the water and piping the oil to a storage facility. The gas is pressurised 
slightly before being passed to the Compression module. A test separator, provided 
for well testing, runs in parallel with the inlet separator. 
The separation module is divided into seven isolatable sections, linked both to each 
other and sections outside the module. Figure 5.5 illustrates the layout of the sections 
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and the locations of the isolation, blowdown, non-return and liquid level control 
valves within the module. 
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Section 5 
BDOt 
Two of the sections, labelled 13 and 21, contain only gas while sections labelled 32 
and 33 are very small sections which contain only oil. The remaining three sections in 
the module, 1,2 and 3, contain gas, oil and water. 
The separation module was estimated to generate approximately 29% of all 
explosions and fires on the platform. 67% of ignitions within the module resulted in 
explosions, 15% in jet fires and the remainder in pool fires. 
Overall the module generated 18% of the explosions on the platform, 28% of the jet 
fires and 99.96% of the pool fires. 
Explosions 
The total frequency of occurrence of explosions estimated in the separation module is 
6.911x10"3 per year, accounting for 15% of the total ignitions within the module. The 
frequency of occurrence of explosions originating from each section, and the 
proportion each section contributes to the total frequency of explosions within the 
module, is presented in Table 5.3. 
Section Frequency Proportion of total 
(per year) explosions (%) 
1 2.818 x10" 40.7760 
2 7.938 x10'4 11.4861 
3 1.738 x10"3 25.1486 
13 1.253 x10"3 18.1307 
21 3.079 x10-4 4.4553 
32 0 0.0000 
33 2.343 x10"7 0.0034 
Table 5.3 - Explosion frequencies from leaks in sections of 
the separation module (per year). 
The lowest frequency of explosions occurs in Section 33 which contains no gas. An 
explosion in Section 33 can only occur following failure of an isolation valve between 
itself and Section 1, and release of the gas within Section 1. 
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Section 1 was predicted to contribute the greatest to the frequency of explosions 
within the module. This section had a large volume of gas at high pressure. 
The frequencies of the explosions, with regard to the overpressure generated, are 
presented in Table 5.4. 
Overpressure (bar) Frequency Proportion 
to from (per year) (%) 
016.872 x10" 99.7789 
124.920 x10"06 0.0714 
233.281 x10"06 0.0476 
341.874 x 10-06 0.0272 
452.812 x 10"06 0.0408 
561.874 x 10"06 0.0272 
672.343 x10"07 0.0034 
7800 
8+2.343 x10"07 0.0034 
Table 5.4 - Explosion frequencies within the separation module (per year) 
The majority of explosions occur with an overpressure between 0 and 1 bar. Due to 
the effectiveness of the safety systems within the module, the amount of gas released 
into the module is minimised sufficiently to limit the majority of overpressures to 
below one bar. 
The frequency of an explosion occurring with sufficient overpressure to fail an 
internal safety wall, 0.6 bar, is 1.851x10"5 per year which accounts for 0.269% of the 
total explosions within the module. The frequency of explosions occurring with 
sufficient overpressure to fail the platform, 1.6 bar, is 1.336x10"5 per year, 
approximately 0.194% of the explosions within the module. 
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Within open sided modules, activation of the deluge prior to ignition of a gas cloud 
results in a mitigated explosion. In the separation modules, only five percent of 
explosions occur in combination with failure of the deluge system, and an additional 
2.5% when the deluge functions initially but then fails at a later stage. 
Failure of the isolation or blowdown valves during a delayed ignition gas release will 
result in an increase in the size and/or concentration of a gas cloud. Approximately 
4% of explosions within the separation module occur when isolation has failed and 
5% when the blowdown on the section fails to open. Within the separation module, 
98.3% of gas clouds are less than 10% of the module volume at the time of ignition. 
The largest cloud size reached is between 50 and 60% of the total module volume. 
Jet Fires 
The total jet fire frequency within the module is 3.086x10"2 per year, approximately 
67% of the total ignitions within the module. The frequency of occurrence of 
immediate ignition jet fires occurring following immediate ignition of a leak within 
the module is predicted to be 1.575x10"2,51.3% of the jet fires within the module. 
The frequency of immediate ignition jet fires within each section, and the proportion 
each section contributes to the total frequency of immediate ignition jet fires within 
the module, is detailed in Table 5.5. 
Section Frequency Proportion of jet 
fires (%) 
1 4.427 x10' 28.1078 
2 1.812 x10'3 11.5047 
3 2.907 x10"3 18.4570 
13 1.198 x10'3 7.6063 
21 7.561 x10-4 4.8006 
32 2.598 x10"3 16.4951 
33 2.052 x10'3 13.0285 
Table 5.5 - Immediate ignition jet fire frequencies from leaks in 
the separation module (per year). 
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The frequencies of jet fires occurring following an explosion or a pool fire within the 
separation module is 1.502x10"2. The frequency of delayed ignition jet fires within 
each section, and the proportion each section contributes to the total frequency of 
delayed ignition jet fires within the module are presented in Table 5.6. 
Section Frequency Proportion of jet 
fires (%) 
1 4.592 x10' 30.3975 
2 7.929 x10"4 5.2487 
3 1.714 x10'3 11.3461 
13 1.253 x10'3 8.2944 
21 3.076 x10-4 2.0362 
32 3.625 x10'3 23.9963 
33 2.822 x10"3 18.6807 
Table 5.6 - Frequencies of delayed ignition jet fires following occurring from 
leaks in the separation module (per year). 
Jet fires were recorded initiating from leaks on all seven sections within the module, 
both from immediate ignition and following an explosion or pool fire (see next 
section). A comparison with the results for explosions and pool fires suggests that the 
majority of explosions and pool fires are followed by a jet fire. 
SAROS predicts that the majority of jet fires will occur with a duration of between 0 
and 3.6 minutes, Table 5.7, and a flame length of between 0 and 10 metres (Table 
5.8). 
The percentage of jet fires occurring over a sufficient duration to cause escalation by 
failure of a vessel or pipework, 15 mins, is 6% whilst the percentage occurring with 
sufficient duration to fail the platform, 120 mins, is less than 1%. 
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Fire Duration Frequency Proportion 
(mins) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 3.6 2.779 x10' 90.0624 
3.6 7.2 00 
7.2 10.8 4.960 x104 1.6073 
10.8 18 1.360 x10"3 4.4072 
18 36 1.199 x10'3 3.8851 
36 72 7.028 x10'6 0.0228 
72 144 3.983 x10'6 0.0129 
144 216 4.690 x 10'7 0.0015 
216 288 00 
288+ 2.340 x10'7 0.0008 
Table 5.7 - Separation module jet fire duration 
Flame Frequency Proportion 
Length (m) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 10 2.725 x10" 88.2923 
10 20 1.715 x10"3 5.5574 
20 30 6.520 x10'4 2.1128 
30 40 3.969 x104 1.2861 
40 50 1.799 x10-4 0.5830 
50 60 1.249 x10-4 0.4047 
60 70 9.090 x10"5 0.2946 
70 80 7.150 x10'5 0.2317 
80 90 5.670 x10"5 0.1837 
90+ 3.252 x10'4 1.0538 
Table 5.8 - Separation module jet fire initial flame length 
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Pool Fires 
The total frequency of pool fires occurring within the Separation module was 
8.39x10"3 per year, accounting for approximately 18 percent of ignitions within the 
module. The frequency of occurrence of pool fires originating from a leak on each 
section of the module is presented in Table 5.9. 
Section Frequency Proportion of pool 
fires (%) 
1 1.828xlO'3 21.7775 
200 
300 
13 00 
21 00 
32 3.693x10'3 43.9957 
33 2.873x10'3 34.2268 
Table 5.9 - Pool fire frequencies from leaks in the 
separation module (per year). 
No pool fires occurred within sections 2,3,13 and 21 and section 1 had the lowest 
frequency. The highest frequencies occurred within sections 32 and 33, sections that 
contained only oil . 
The majority of pool fires occurred with a duration of less than 3.6 minutes, Table 
5.10, and with an initial flame length of less than 1 metre, Table 5.11. No fires 
occurred with a duration of greater than 36 minutes or had a flame length greater than 
9 metres. 
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Fire Duration Frequency Proportion 
(mins) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 3.6 6.514x10" 99.9928 
3.6 36 4.686 x10'7 0.0072 
36+ 00 
Table 5.10 - Separation module pool fire duration 
Flame Length Frequency Proportion 
(m) (per year) (%) 
From To 
015.066x10" 60.3563 
121.410x10"3 16.7987 
236.380x10"4 7.6011 
342.455x10 2.9249 
451.174x10 1.3987 
567.547x10 8.9915 
671.579x10 1.8812 
783.749x1 0-6 0.0447 
892.343x10"7 0.0028 
9+ 00 
Table 5.11 - Separation module pool fire initial flame length 
Due to an assumption that a pool fire cannot occur if the deluge system is functioning, 
as it will be extinguished before it can be established, all the pool fires occurring 
within the module coincide with an unavailability of the deluge system. 
Table 5.12 shows the fractions of pool fires resulting from a hole with a particular 
diameter and a time to detection. 
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Time to Detection (mins) 
Holesize (cm) Immediate 0- 1- 2- 3- 4- 5+ 
To From Detection 12345 
010.885 0.046 0.032 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 
120.020 000000 
230.012 000000 
340.001 000000 
450.001 000000 
5+ 0000000 
Table 5.12 - Proportions of pool fires occurring with holesize against 
time to detection. 
The majority of pool fires occurred with a holesize of between 0 and lcm diameter 
and no fires were recorded to be ignited from a release through a hole greater than 
5cm in diameter. 
All pool fires occurring from a leak through a hole with diameter less than 1 cm were 
detected in 5 minutes or under, the majority, 88.5%, were detected immediately. All 
pool fires resulting from oil releases through holes greater than 1 cm in diameter were 
detected immediately. 
No pool fire resulted in the failure of an internal safety wall or the platform. 
5.11.2 Compression Module 
Only gas is passed from the separation module to the compression module. The gas 
passes through a series of compression units, which compresses the gas and increases 
the pressure. This generates condensate, which is removed by `drying' the gas through 
a dehydrator. 
The compression module contains the largest number of sections. Seven of the 
thirteen sections; 5,8,9,10,11,13,21, contain only gas, section 12 contains gas and 
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condensate, sections 4 and 6 contain gas, condensate and water and the remaining 
three sections, 1,2 and 3, contain gas, oil and water. 
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Some of these sections contain oil and were also listed as located within the 
separation module. However only a small part of these sections, i. e. pipework, is 
located within the compression module and this is reflected in the leak frequency of 
the section. 
The layout of the sections and valves is presented in Figure 5.6. 
The compression module was estimated to generate 44% of all fires and explosions on 
the platform. 
Explosions 
The total frequency of occurrence of explosions estimated in the compression module 
is 1.77 x10'2 per year, accounting for 25% of the total ignitions within the module. 
The frequency of occurrence of explosions originating from a leak on each section is 
presented in Table 5.13. 
Section Frequency Proportion of 
(per year) explosions(%) 
1 7.897 x10" 0.0447 
2 1.732 x10-4 0.9802 
3 1.446 x10"4 0.8183 
4 2.140 x 10'3 12.1109 
5 1.116 x10"3 6.3158 
6 1.392 x10'3 7.8778 
8 7.055 x10"3 39.9265 
9 1.214 X10-3 6.8704 
10 3.159 x10"5 0.1788 
11 2.562 x10"3 14.4992 
12 7.572 x10-4 4.2852 
13 3.100 x104 1.7544 
21 7.665 x104 4.3379 
Table 5.13 - Explosion frequencies from leaks in sections of the 
compression module (per year). 
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Every section within the compression module contains gas and contributed to the total 
frequency of explosions within the module. The greatest contribution was from 
section 8 which contained only gas at a very high pressure. The sections also located 
within the separation module only made minor contributions to the frequency of 
explosions within the compression module. 
The frequencies of the explosions within the module, with regards to the overpressure 
are presented in Table 5.14. 
Overpressure (bar) Frequency Proportion 
to from (per year) (%) 
011.762 x10" 99.7960 
122.468 x10'5 0.1398 
231.036 x10'5 0.0587 
349.872 x10'7 0.0056 
4+ 00 
Table 5.14 - Explosion frequencies and proportions within the 
compression module (per year). 
Explosions within the compression module are less severe but more frequent than 
within the separation module. The frequency of an explosion occurring with sufficient 
overpressure to fail an internal safety wall, 0.6 bar, is 4.94 x10"5 per year, 0.27% of 
explosions in the module, whilst the frequency occurring with sufficient overpressure 
to fail the platform, 1.6 bar, is 1.63 x105 per year, 0.09% of explosions within the 
module. 
Only 5% of explosions within the compression module occur when deluge is not 
functioning, and a further 5% when the deluge fails once activated resulting in the 
remaining 90% of explosions mitigated by the deluge system. 
Approximately 3% of explosions result from releases when an isolation valve has 
failed and less than one percent when a blowdown valve has failed. 
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Jet Fires 
The total jet fire frequency within the module was 5.23 x10"2 per year, approximately 
75% of the total ignitions within the module. The frequency of occurrence of jet fires 
resulting from an immediately ignited release on each section within the module is 
presented in Table 5.15. 
Section Frequency Proportion of jet 
(per year) fires (%) 
1 1.530 x10" 0.0442 
2 3.282 x10-4 0.9483 
3 2.063 x10-4 0.5961 
4 6.558 x10"3 18.9494 
5 4.378 x10'3 12.6502 
6 5.369 x10'3 15.5137 
8 4.456 x10'3 12.8756 
9 2.205 x10'3 6.3714 
10 3.554 x10'5 0.1027 
11 6.510 X 10'3 18.8107 
12 2.515 x10"3 7.2671 
13 2.127 x10-4 0.6146 
21 1.819 x10'3 5.2560 
Table 5.15 - Immediate ignition jet fire frequencies from leaks in the 
compression module (per year). 
All sections within the module contributed to the total frequency of immediate 
ignition jet fires. The total frequency of immediate ignition jet fires was 3.46 x10'2 
accounting for 66% of jet fires within the module. The remaining jet fires occurred 
following an explosion or a pool fire, Table 5.16. 
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Section Frequency Proportion of jet 
(per year) fires (%) 
1 1.086 x10 0.0615 
2 1.732 x10-4 0.9807 
3 1.422 x10-4 0.8052 
4 2.140 x10"3 12.1177 
5 1.114 x10"3 6.3080 
6 1.392 x10'3 7.8822 
8 7.053 x10"3 39.9376 
9 1.213 x10"3 6.8686 
10 3.110 x10"5 0.1761 
11 2.558 x10"3 14.4847 
12 7.572 x10-4 4.2876 
13 3.095 x 10-4 1.7525 
21 7.660 x10-4 4.3375 
Table 5.16 - Frequencies of jet fires following explosions occurring 
from leaks in the compression module (per year). 
Comparison of the results suggest that a jet fire follows nearly all explosions and pool 
fires in the compression module. As for the explosions the sections with the greatest 
contribution to the total frequency of delayed ignition jet fires were sections 4,8 and 
11. 
The majority of jet fires lasted less than 3.6 minutes, Table 5.17, and had an initial 
flame length of less than 10 metres, Table 5.18. 
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Fire Duration Frequency Proportion 
(mins) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 3.6 3.862 x10' 73.8856 
3.6 7.2 00 
7.2 10.8 3.240 x10'3 6.1986 
10.8 18 3.616 x10"3 6.9179 
18 36 5.907 x10'3 11.3009 
36 72 8.411 x10-4 1.6091 
72 144 2.566 x10'5 0.0491 
144 216 5.430 x10"6 0.0104 
216 288 2.470 x10'6 0.0047 
288+ 1.234 x10 0.0236 
Table 5.17 - Compression module jet fire duration 
Flame Frequency Proportion 
Length (m) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 10 3.401 x10' 65.0660 
10 20 8.377 x 10'3 16.0264 
20 30 4.184 x10"3 8.0046 
30 40 1.294 x10"3 2.4756 
40 50 7.210 x104 1.3794 
50 60 5.970 x104 1.1421 
60 70 4.900 x104 0.9374 
70 80 3.280 x104 0.6275 
80 90 2.880 x104 0.5510 
90+ 1.981 x10"3 3.7899 
Table 5.18 - Compression module jet fire initial flame length 
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The model predicts that jet fires within the compression module are far more severe 
than fires within the separation module. Only 65% of fires have a flame length of less 
than 10m, compared to 88% within the separation module, and only 74% with a 
duration of less than 3.6 minutes compared to 90%. 
The frequency of a jet fire occurring with sufficient duration to cause escalation due 
to failure of a process vessel or pipework, 15 mins, is 8.671 x10'3 per year, 
approximately 16% of the total jet fires within the module. The frequency occurring 
with sufficient duration to fail the platform, 120 mins, is 2.221 x10'5 per year, 
approximately 4%. 
Pool Fires 
The total frequency of pool fires occurring within the compression module was 
2.961x10-6 per year, accounting for less than 1 percent of events within the module. 
All fires are predicted to occur with a duration of less than 3.6 minutes and an initial 
flame length of less than two metres. Of the three sections containing oil, only section 
1 resulted in the generation of pool fires. 
No fires resulted from leaks with a hole size greater than 5cm in diameter and all fires 
were detected immediately, Table 5.19. 
Time to Detection (mins) 
Holesize (cm) Immediate 
To From Detection 
0- 1- 2- 3- 4- 5+ 
12345 
010.833 000000 
120.072 000000 
230.061 000000 
340.033 000000 
450.001 000000 
5+ 0000000 
Table 5.19 - Proportions of pool fires occurring with holesize 
against time to detection. 
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The low frequency and severity of pool fires within the module is due to the small 
amount of oil available for release into the module, only sections of pipework from 
the separation module have the potential to generate an oil release and these must 
occur in conjunction with failure of the deluge system in order for a pool fire to be 
established. No pool fires resulted in failure of an internal wall or of the platform. 
5.11.3 Wellhead Module 
A number of `wells' are drilled into the seabed from the platform. The wellhead 
module sits directly on top of these wells and collects the oil, gas and water mixture 
and pumps it to the Separation module. 
The wellhead module has the smallest number of sections of the three modules 
modelled, containing only six sections. Three of the sections (8,10 and 21) contain 
gas only and the remaining three (2,3 and 31) contain gas, oil and water. 27% of fires 
and explosions on the platform are predicted to occur within the wellhead module. 
As within the compression module, some of the sections listed also occur within the 
separation module. 
The layout of the sections and valves is presented in Figure 5.7. 
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Flare 
Section 13 
Explosions 
The total frequency of occurrence of explosions estimated in the wellhead module is 
1.469 x10"2 per year, accounting for 35% of the total ignitions within the module. The 
frequency of occurrence of explosions originating from each section is presented in 
Table 5.20. 
Section Frequency Proportion of 
(per year) explosions (%) 
2 9.034 x10' 0.6150 
3 3.337 x10'3 22.7158 
8 1.014 x10'2 69.0254 
10 2.419 x104 1.6467 
21 2.845 x10'4 1.9367 
31 5.965 x104 4.0605 
Table 5.20 - Explosion frequencies from leaks in sections 
of the wellhead module (per year). 
All sections within the wellhead module contain gas and are therefore capable of 
generating explosions. Section 8, which contains only gas at a very high pressure. 
Table 5.21 presents the frequencies of the explosions within the module with regards 
to the magnitude of the explosion. 
Less than 0.2% of the explosions within the wellhead module occur with an 
overpressure greater than 1 bar. 
The frequency of an explosion occurring with sufficient overpressure to fail an 
internal safety wall, 0.6 bar, is 3.662 x10"5 per year approximately 0.25% of the total 
frequency of explosions within the module and the frequency occurring with 
sufficient overpressure to fail the platform, 1.6 bar, is 1.690x10"5 per year, 0.12% of 
the explosions within the module. 
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Overpressure (bar) Frequency Proportion 
to from (per year) (%) 
011.463 x10" 99.8283 
121.484 x10"5 0.1012 
235.823 x10"6 0.0397 
342.817 x 10"6 0.0192 
4+ 1.690 x 10"6 0.0115 
Table 5.21 - Explosion frequencies and proportions within 
the wellhead module (per year). 
Two percent of explosions within the wellhead module are unmitigated due to 
unavailability of the deluge system, a further 7% are unmitigated due to failure of the 
deluge system once activated. 7% of explosions are generated when an isolation valve 
has failed and less than one percent when blowdown has failed. 
Jet Fires 
The total jet fire frequency within the module was 2.78x10"2 per year, approximately 
65% of the total events within the module. The frequency of occurrence of jet fires 
occurring following immediate ignition of a leak for each section within the wellhead 
module is detailed in Table 5.22. 
Section Frequency Proportion 
(per year) (%) 
2 1.848 x10 1.4108 
3 4.430 x10'3 33.8186 
8 6.241 x10'3 47.6438 
10 3.180 x104 2.4276 
21 6.545 x 10-4 4.9965 
31 1.271 x10'3 9.7028 
Table 5.22 - Immediate ignition jet fire frequencies from leaks 
in the wellhead module (per year). 
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The frequencies of jet fires occurring following an explosion are presented in Table 
5.23. 
Section Frequency Proportion 
(per year) (%) 
2 9.034 x10'3 0.6166 
3 3.299 x 10'3 22.5166 
8 1.014 x10'2 69.2082 
10 2.415 x10-4 1.6483 
21 2.843 x 10" 1.9404 
31 5.963 x 10'4 4.0699 
Table 5.23 - Frequencies of jet fires following explosions occurring from 
leaks in the wellhead module (per year). 
Jet fires occurred in all sections within the module both from immediate ignition and 
delayed ignition following a pool fire or explosion. Comparison of the results shows 
that a jet fire follows most explosions within the wellhead module. As for explosions, 
sections 3 and 8 contribute the greatest to the proportions of immediate ignition jet 
fires within the module 
Over 50% of the jet fires are predicted to occur with a duration of less than 3.6 
minutes and very few with a duration of over 36 minutes, Table 5.24. The majority of 
fires are predicted to occur with an initial flame length of less than 30 metres, Table 
5.25. 
The frequency of a jet fire occurring with sufficient duration to cause escalation by 
failure of a process vessel or pipework, 15 mins, is predicted as 7.18 x10"3 per year, 
25% of the jet fires within the module and the frequency occurring with sufficient 
duration to fail the platform, 120 mins, is 4.08 x10"5 per year, 15% of the total jet fires 
within the wellhead module. 
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Fire Duration Frequency Proportion 
(mins) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 3.6 1.489 x10" 53.6577 
3.6 7.2 2.921 x10"3 10.5261 
7.2 10.8 1.325 x10"3 4.7748 
10.8 18 2.951 x 10"3 10.6342 
18 36 4.933 x10"3 17.7751 
36 72 6.594 x10-4 2.3763 
72 144 3.737 x10"5 0.1347 
144 216 1.334 x10'5 0.0481 
216 288 6.380 x10"6 0.0230 
288+ 1.390 x10"5 0.0501 
Table 5.24 - Wellhead module jet fire duration 
Flame Frequency Proportion 
Length (m) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 10 9.490 x10" 34.1982 
10 20 8.377 x10'3 30.1874 
20 30 4.184 x10"3 15.0775 
30 40 1.294 x10"3 4.6631 
40 50 7.210 x10-4 2.5982 
50 60 5.970 x10-4 2.1514 
60 70 4.900 x 10-4 1.7658 
70 80 3.280 x10-' 1.1820 
80 90 2.880 x10-4 1.0378 
9o+ 1.981 x10'3 7.1387 
Table 5.25 - Wellhead module jet fire initial flame length 
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Pool Fires 
There were no pool fires recorded occurring in the wellhead module. 
5.12 Discussion 
This chapter has presented the results from the current open sided version of SAROS. 
The model predicts an overall frequency of 3.93 x10"2 per year for explosions, 
1.11x10"1 for jet fires and 8.40 x10"3 for pool fires. 
The majority of explosions and jet fires were predicted to occur within the 
compression module, which contains sections with an inventory of high pressure gas. 
The only module to contribute significantly to the frequency of pool fires on the 
platform was the separation module, being the module that removes the oil and water 
from the hydrocarbon mixture prior to transferring the gas to the compression module. 
The frequency that the platform would fail due to either explosion or jet fire was 
estimated to be 1.13 x10-4 per year. Over 50% of these ignitions initiated from leaks 
within the wellhead module, mainly due to jet fires. However almost all of these 
ignitions were from two sections in particular, section 3 and section 8, which are 
sections predominantly contained within the separation and compression modules but 
have pipework located in the wellhead module. Overall it was predicted that the 
wellhead module contributed the least to the total frequency of ignitions on the 
platform. 
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Chapter 6 Development of the SAROS model for Enclosed Modules 
on Offshore Platforms 
6.1 Introduction 
The versions of SAROS that existed prior to this chapter modelled ignitions in open 
sided modules only. This chapter describes the key factors identified in modelling 
enclosed modules and how these changes were incorporated to expand the capabilities 
of the program. 
The significant difference between open and closed modules is the presence of 
module walls. Closed modules are totally enclosed, isolating them from the effects of 
the wind. Ventilation within the module is therefore not dependent on the external 
windspeed and is provided by a forced, controllable ventilation system. In the event of 
failure or intended shutdown of the ventilation system the natural ventilation provided 
by the wind would be minimal (assumed to be one air change per hour). 
On detection of a gas leak the ventilation system will be shutdown, reducing the 
oxygen available. Combustion of a release will therefore be oxygen limited, as 
opposed to fuel limited combustion in the open module model. 
6.2 Safety Systems 
Enclosed modules contain the same safety equipment as open modules, however the 
nature of the module is such that the effect of some systems on specific events differ. 
Valves within the module, for example; isolation and blowdown, continue to function 
in the same way as in open modules. 
Following detection of a leak, the ventilation rate within the module will shutdown 
automatically. This assumption is made considering that with no ventilation and with 
a continuing release of gas, a gas cloud will exceed the UFL and become 
incombustible. 
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The deluge system in an enclosed module will be activated on detection of a fire or a 
leak. Experimental evidence has suggested that if deluge is present before or shortly 
after ignition of a fire in an enclosed module, it will be extinguished. This is due to 
the reduction of both oxygen and fuel partial pressures to levels where combustion 
can no longer be supported [441. From the data available a time of five minutes is 
assumed to extinguish the fire. 
Explosions within enclosed modules are considered as totally confined explosions and 
no consideration of flame acceleration is made, therefore the presence of deluge will 
not be considered to have an effect on explosions. 
6.3 Initial Hydrocarbon Release Rates 
The initial release rates for oil and gaseous releases are calculated in the same manner 
as for open modules, assuming an infinite inventory prior to isolation. 
6.4 Detection of Gaseous Releases 
The times to manually and automatically detect releases are calculated using the same 
assumptions as for open modules. Automatic detection will either be through sonic, 
point gas or beam detectors while manual detection will depend upon the leak rate and 
the number of people within the module. 
Following detection of a leak, the isolation and blowdown systems are activated. 
6.5 Release Rate Following Isolation 
As in open modules, it is assumed that the inventory is no longer infinite following 
isolation and that failure of an isolation valve can lead to inventory from adjacent 
sections combining. 
The calculations for the initial release rates remain valid in modelling the continuing 
release however the inventory will decrease over time, leading to a reduction in the 
release rates. 
6.6 Gas Cloud Build-up and Dispersion 
Gas released into an enclosed module will form a cloud which expands at 
stoichiometric concentration to fill the module. In enclosed modules there is no upper 
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limit on the concentration of gas within the module and due to the limited ventilation 
it is assumed that when the module volume has been filled the concentration can 
increase above the Upper Flammable Limit (UFL) and become incombustible. 
If the ventilation rate exceeds the release rate the cloud will begin to disperse and the 
concentration of the gas cloud is assumed to decrease to zero while the volume 
remains equal to the module volume. 
The calculations for the dispersion rate are the same as those used in the open module 
coding. 
6.7 Oil Pool Build Up and Dispersion 
An oil release in an enclosed module is assumed to form a pool which expands at a 
uniform depth of 1.3cm until the pool area equals the floor area. Due to the closed 
sides of the module, oil cannot be `lost', as in the open module model, and as the 
release continues the pool depth will increase. 
Following ignition of the oil, the pool volume is considered to increase further only if 
the rate of release, x0, exceeds the liquid bum rate, RB, determined by the product of 
the module floor area and a constant, k as within Equation 6.1, provided by Mobil NS 
Ltd. Otherwise the pool will reduce in height until the minimum depth of 1.3cm 
assumed within open sided modules is achieved, followed by a decrease in the pool 
area. 
RB = kAp (6.1) 
Data required to model oil pool build up and dispersion was provided by Mobil NS 
Ltd. 
6.8 Ignition Model 
Ignition of a release in an enclosed module is modelled as for open modules, using a 
probability of immediate ignition and a rate of occurrence of an ignition source pre - 
and post-isolation. 
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6.9 Modelling Jet Fires 
The calculations for estimating a jet fire flame length and duration remains unchanged 
from open module calculations. The flame length is calculated over a number of time 
intervals and is assumed to have extinguished when the length decreases below 2m. 
Based on the molecular formula for Methane, the mass ratio of oxygen to fuel 
required for combustion is 4: 1. Under steady state fire conditions there will be a 
maximum rate of release which can be fully combusted, qgm, for any given 
ventilation rate. In SAROS, the maximum fuel release rate which can be combusted is 
given by Equation 6.2 where V,,, is the module volume and Af is the ventilation rate 
[8,45] 
qgmax - (1.981 X 10-5)V,,, A f 
(6.2) 
If the actual release rate exceeds the maximum release rate the concentration of 
oxygen to fuel will be greater than 4: 1, full combustion cannot take place and the fire 
is assumed to self extinguish [8,451. The maximum gaseous release rate, qgm., is 
calculated after the initial release rate, qg, has been established. If the leak rate is 
greater than the maximum value, the time for the fire to extinguish, tar, is calculated 
using Equation 6.3. 
text " 0.08825 
Vm 
qg 
(6.3) 
If the deluge system is functioning prior to ignition, no fire will be established. 
Deluge occurring after ignition will extinguish the fire within five minutes. 
6.10 Modelling Overpressures 
As for explosions in open modules, the concentration of gas in the module must be 
between the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) and the UFL. The maximum overpressure 
possible resulting from an explosion in an enclosed module is considered to be 
independent of the ignition location, therefore unlike in open modules only one 
maximum overpressure is required, assumed to be 8 bar, representing the 
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overpressure generated by ignition of a perfectly mixed module full of gas and air at 
stoichiometric concentration. 
The gas cloud growth and dispersion is modelled as a number of stages. 
Stage 1- The leak has begun and gas is leaking into the module. In this stage the 
cloud builds at stoichiometric concentration until the cloud volume equals the module 
volume. 
The variation of overpressure with concentration is linear up to the stoichiometric 
concentration, above stoichiometric concentration up to the upper flammable limit the 
overpressure is constant at the maximum, 8 bar, represented in Figure 6.1. 
Overpressure 
(bar) 
8 ý ýý ýý ýý ý ýý ýý ýý ýý ýý 
LFL Stoic UFL Concentration (%) 
Figure 6.1 - Variation of overpressure with concentration 
The variation of overpressure with cloudsize is linear until the module is filled. 
Opr = gm OPrmax 
V. 
(6.4) 
Stage 2- The cloud has equalled the module volume. The cloud increases in 
concentration past the stoichiometric concentration. Figure 6.1 shows the relationship 
between concentration and overpressure. The overpressure of all explosions occurring 
within this section is 8 bar. 
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If the concentration exceeds the UFL at the time of ignition there will be no 
explosion. 
Stage 3- Leak rate is sufficiently low that the concentration of the cloud begins to 
decrease. In this stage the cloud volume is still equals that of the module volume and 
the concentration is still greater or equal to the stoichiometric concentration. The 
overpressure of all explosions within this section are 8 bar. 
Stage 4- The concentration within the module continues to decrease below the 
stoichiometric concentration. The cloud volume still equals the module volume. The 
overpressure generated by an explosion with concentration less than stoichiometric 
can be estimated using the following equation. 
Opr = 
cg OprmaX 
cs 
6.11 Modelling Jet Fires Following Explosions 
If the explosion overpressure does not cause failure of a module wall and the gaseous 
leak continues, a jet fire will follow. 
In enclosed modules, unlike in open modules, oxygen is a limiting factor, and the 
amount available following an explosion determines whether or not there is a 
subsequent jet fire. 
The remaining available oxygen level within the module, OR, is given by Equation 6.6 
where Fc is the gas cloud volume as a fraction of the module volume and cg is the 
concentration of the gas cloud. 
[as] 
OR= (0.2851Vm)-(0.04FcVmcg) (6.6) 
(6.5) 
The maximum fuel release rate, qg,,,, which would be completely combusted given 
the remaining level of oxygen is given by 
ggmax = 
OR 
(6.7) 4 
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If the fuel release rate is greater than this maximum value then no jet fire can follow 
the explosion, as the available oxygen will be exhausted before the fire is established. 
A fuel release rate lower than the maximum can support a jet flame, however the 
duration of the fire cannot exceed the time taken to exhaust the remaining oxygen, text. 
text _ 
qg max (6.8) 
4 
The oxygen level within the module is calculated after the explosion has ended. The 
maximum fuel release rate and time taken to exhaust the oxygen are calculated using 
this value. 
The flame length calculations used in the enclosed module model are the same as in 
open modules. 
6.12 Pool Fire Modelling 
The model for calculating the pool fire flame length remains unchanged from open 
modules. The calculations for the change in volume of the pool following ignition for 
enclosed modules, Equation 6.9, considers the additional depth of oil, where Vp(t+1) 
is the volume of the pool at time (t+1). 
r+1 r+1 
f Wo (t)dt RB $v(t)dt 
Vp(t+1)=VP(t)+ r-` 
Po Po 
(6.9) 
The mass burn rate per unit of the pool, RB, may, in enclosed modules, be affected by 
back-radiation from surrounding hot surfaces. However no data exists to enable this to 
be determined. Thus the assumption made for the parameter used in open modules 
will also be correct for enclosed modules. 
If the liquid bum rate of fuel calculated is lower than the release rate of oil following 
ignition, it is assumed that the fire will self extinguish after five minutes. 
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Deluge is assumed to extinguish pool fires in enclosed modules. If deluge is active 
prior to ignition no pool fire will establish. If deluge activates following ignition of 
the pool the fire will be extinguished in five minutes. 
6.13 Results 
In order to compare results between open and enclosed modules, the same layout of 
equipment and inventory has been modelled within the enclosed model as was in 
Chapter 5 for open sided platforms. 
6.13.1 Input data 
Data is provided to enclosed module SAROS through two files as within the open 
module. The topology file contains data regarding the valves and remains unchanged 
and the inventory file contains section inventories and data required in the model. 
Changes to the inventory file are presented in Appendix A and summarised below. 
Within the enclosed module there is no data provided for the maximum windspeed, 
instead values are required to determine the forced ventilation rate within the module 
and the ventilation rate following detection. There is also no data to represent the 
reduction in the ventilation rate during deluge activating as it is assumed that the fire 
will extinguish within five minutes. 
Within the open sided modules, the location of the leak influenced the overpressure of 
an explosion. Within enclosed modules the location of the leak within the module is 
irrelevant. The same values for maximum overpressure and stoichiometric 
concentration are used for all ignitions. The remaining data remains unchanged from 
the open sided module. 
6.13.2 Separation Module 
As for the open sided platform model, the separation module contains seven sections, 
two of which contain only gas (13 and 21), two contain only oil (32 and 33) and the 
remaining three contain gas, oil and water. 
The separation module was estimated to generate approximately 27% of total 
ignitions occurring on the platform. 
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Explosions 
The total frequency of occurrence of explosions estimated to occur in the separation 
module is 2.048 x10"2 per year, accounting for approximately 32% of all ignitions 
within the module. The frequency of occurrence of explosions originating from each 
section is presented in Table 6.1. 
Section Frequency Proportion of 
(per year) explosions (%) 
1 1.124 x10" 54.8681 
2 2.392 x104 11.6766 
3 4.518 x1013 22.0546 
13 1.765 x10'3 8.6354 
21 5.665 x10-4 2.7654 
32 00 
33 00 
Table 6.1 - Explosion frequencies from leaks in sections of the 
separation module (per year). 
No explosions were recorded in sections 32 and 33, the sections containing only oil. 
As for open modules, the section estimated to initiate the most explosions was Section 
1. The frequency of occurrence for explosions within the enclosed separation module 
is greater than within the open module. The magnitudes of the explosions within the 
module are presented in Table 6.2. 
Over 95% of all explosions predicted to occur within the separation module generate 
an overpressure of less than one bar. The overpressures generated by an explosion is 
greater within an enclosed separation module than was predicted within an open 
separation module. This increase in severity of explosions is due to the assumptions 
that certain ignition locations no longer impose a lower maximum overpressure and 
that all explosions are now unmitigated. 
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Overpressure (bar) Frequency Proportion 
to from (per year) (%) 
016.897 x10'3 95.7028 
121.300 x10-0 1.8038 
235.250 x10"5 0.7285 
343.512 x10"5 0.4873 
452.340 x106 0.0325 
566.800 x 10-6 0.0944 
674.920 x10"6 0.0683 
783.280 x10"6 0.0455 
8+7.474 x105 1.0370 
Table 6.2 - Explosion Frequencies within the separation module (per year) 
The frequency of explosions occurring with sufficient overpressure to fail an internal 
safety wall, 0.6 bar, is 5.09 x104, accounting for 7% of explosions within the module. 
The frequency occurring with sufficient overpressure to fail the platform, 1.6 bar, is 
2.191 x10-4,3% of explosions within the separation module. These values are much 
higher than the values predicted in the open sided module. 
Jet Fires 
The total jet fire frequency within the module is 2.844 x102, approximately 78% of 
the ignitions within the separation module. This is almost double the frequency of jet 
fires predicted within the separation module of an open sided module. The frequency 
of occurrence of jet fires following immediate ignition of a leak within an enclosed 
module was predicted to be 1.567 x10"2 per year and delayed ignition predicted to be 
1.277 x10'2 per year. The distribution of these fires across the sections is presented 
within Tables 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. 
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Section Frequency Proportion of jet 
(per year) fires (%) 
1 4.410 x10" 27.6727 
2 1.772 x 10"3 11.1193 
3 2.944 x10"3 18.4735 
13 1.193 x10'3 7.4861 
21 7.343 x 10-4 4.6077 
32 2.583 x10'3 16.2083 
33 2.030 x10"3 14.4325 
Table 6.3 - Immediate ignition jet fire frequencies from leaks in sections of the 
separation module (per year). 
Jet fires were recorded initiating from leaks on all seven sections within the module, 
both from immediate and delayed ignition. Comparing results for explosions and pool 
fires with the results for delayed ignition jet fires suggests that the majority of 
explosions and pool fires are followed by a jet fire. 
Section Frequency Proportion of jet 
(per year) fires (%) 
1 3.831x103 " 29.9915 
2 7.790 x10-4 6.0985 
3 1.846 x10-3 14.4517 
13 1.494 x10"3 11.6960 
21 2.526 x104 1.9775 
32 2.542 x10"3 19.9004 
33 2.029 x10'3 15.8843 
Table 6.4 - Delayed ignition jet fire frequencies from leaks in sections of the 
separation module (per year). 
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Although the frequency of jet fires per year is predicted to be slightly lower than in 
open modules, the trend in the distribution of immediate and delayed ignition fires 
between the sections is very similar. 
The model demonstrates that the majority of jet fires are predicted to occur with a 
duration of between 0 and 3.6 minutes (Table 6.5) and an initial flame length of 
between 0 and 10 metres (Table 6.6). 
The frequency of jet fires occurring with a duration sufficient to fail an internal safety 
wall, 15 minutes, is 5.219 x10'5 per year accounting for less than 2% of the total jet 
fires within the module. No fires were predicted to cause failure of the platform. 
Fire Duration Frequency Proportion 
(mins) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 3.6 2.746 x10' 96.5386 
3.6 18 6.065 x10-4 2.1324 
18 36 2.362 x10-4 0.8306 
36 54 9.530 x10'5 0.3351 
54 72 4.644 x10'5 0.1633 
72+ 00 
Table 6.5 - Separation module jet fire duration 
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Flame Frequency Proportion 
Length (m) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 10 2.601 x10' 91.4624 
10 20 1.147 x10'3 4.0329 
20 30 4.324 x10-4 1.5205 
30 40 2.374 x10-4 0.8348 
40 50 1.613 x10' 0.5672 
50 60 6.061 x10'5 0.2131 
60 70 5.190 x10'5 0.1825 
70 80 4.218 x10'5 0.1483 
80 90 3.418 x10'5 0.1202 
90+ 2.611 x10'4 0.9181 
Table 6.6 - Separation module jet fire initial flame length. 
Pool Fires 
The total frequency of pool fires occurring within the separation module was 8.981 
x10-4, accounting for 2.5% of ignitions within the separation module. The frequency 
of occurrence of pool fires originating from each section of the module is presented in 
Table 6.7. 
Section Frequency 
(per year) 
1 1.856 x10 
20 
30 
13 0 
21 0 
32 4.034 x104 
33 3.090 x104 
Table 6.7 - Pool fire frequencies from leaks in sections of the 
separation module (per year). 
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No pool fires are predicted within sections 2,3,13 and 21 and section 1 has the 
lowest frequency. The highest frequencies occur within sections 32 and 33, the 
sections containing only oil. 
Far fewer pool fires are predicted within the enclosed module separation module than 
in the open sided module. However the frequencies of pool fires are negligible, and 
therefore variation due to the Monte Carlo simulation method could account for this. 
The majority of fires occurred with a duration of less than 3.6 minutes, Table 6.8, and 
with an initial flame length of less than 1 metre, Table 6.9. No fires were predicted to 
occur with a duration greater than 288 minutes or initial flame length of greater than 6 
metres. 
Fire Duration Frequency Proportion 
(mins) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 3.6 8.683 x10" 96.6602 
3.6 18 9.370 x10"7 0.1044 
18 36 00 
36 54 9.374 x10"7 0.1044 
54 72 5.389 x10"6 0.6000 
72 90 2.341 x10"7 0.0261 
90 108 7.029 x10"7 0.0783 
108 144 00 
144 180 2.341 x10"7 0.0261 
180 216 2.162 x10"5 2.4006 
216 252 8.683 x10" 96.6602 
252 288 9.372 x10"7 0.1044 
288+ 00 
Table 6.8 - Separation module pool fire duration 
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Flame Frequency Proportion 
Length (m) (per year) (%) 
From To 
017.366 x10 82.0240 
128.365 x10"5 9.3148 
232.741 x10"5 3.0522 
341.218 x10"5 1.3563 
451.218 x10'5 1.3563 
562.601 x10'5 2.8963 
6+ 00 
Table 6.9 - Separation module pool fire initial flame length. 
Although fewer pool fires are predicted than in the separation module, the severity of 
the fires has increased. Table 6.10 presents the fractions of pool fires resulting from a 
hole with a particular diameter and a time to detection within the categories. 
Time to Detection (mins) 
Holesize (cm) Immediate 
To From Detection 
0- 1- 2- 3- 4- 5+ 
12345 
010.780 0.081 0.069 0.007 0.008 0.004 0 
120.021 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 
230.009 000000 
340.007 0.001 00000 
450.008 000000 
5+ 0000000 
Table 6.10 - Proportions of pool fires occurring with holesize against 
time to detection. 
The majority of pool fires occurred with a holesize of between 0 and lcm diameter 
and no fires occurred from a leak through a hole with a diameter greater than 5 cm. 
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Due to the increased severity of the pool fires in the enclosed module, the frequency 
of a pool fire occurring with sufficient duration to cause escalation due to failure of 
process pipework or vessels was 3.28 x10"6 per year, approximately 0.37% of the total 
pool fires within the module. It was predicted that a pool fire will occur of sufficient 
severity to cause platform failure 2.34 x10"7 per year, 0.03% of the pool fires 
predicted within the enclosed separation module. 
6.13.3 Compression Module 
The compression module modelled within the enclosed platform contains the same 
thirteen sections modelled in Chapter 5 for open modules. Within the enclosed 
platform model, the compression module was estimated to generate approximately 
47% of total ignitions occurring on the platform. 
Explosions 
The total frequency of occurrence of explosions estimated to occur in the compression 
module is 1.554 x10"2 per year, accounting for 24% of all ignitions within the module. 
The frequency of occurrence of explosions originating from each section is presented 
in Table 6.11. 
As for open sided modules, all sections within the compression module contain gas 
and are therefore capable of producing an explosion. The largest frequency of 
explosions are predicted to occur within Sections 4,8 and 13, as within the open sided 
compression module. 
The frequencies of the explosions, with respect to the overpressure generated by the 
explosion, are presented in Table 6.12. 
Over 95% of all explosions predicted to occur within the module generate an 
overpressure of less than one bar. As within the separation module, the explosions 
within the enclosed compression module are more severe than within the open sided 
module. 
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Section Frequency Proportion of 
(per year) explosions (%) 
1 9.872 x10' 0.0635 
2 1.510 X10-4 0.9720 
3 1.565 x104 1.0070 
4 1.958 x10'3 12.6013 
5 9.181 x10-4 5.9083 
6 1.043 x10'3 6.7152 
8 6.812 X10-3 43.8423 
9 1.055 x10"3 6.7882 
10 2.024 x10'3 0.1302 
11 2.053 x10'3 13.2111 
12 4.837 x104 3.1130 
13 3.060 x10'4 1.9694 
21 5.716 x10'4 3.6784 
Table 6.11 - Explosion frequencies from leaks in sections of the 
compression module (per year). 
Overpressure (bar) Frequency Proportion 
to from (per year) (%) 
011.490 X10-2 95.9253 
123.707 x10"4 2.3870 
239.080 x10'5 0.5847 
343.750 x10'5 0.2415 
454.000 x10'6 0.0258 
561.180 X10-5 0.0760 
676.500 x10'6 0.0419 
781.180 x10'5 0.0760 
8+ 9.970 X10,5 0.6420 
Table 6.12 - Explosion Frequencies within the compression module (per year) 
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The frequency of explosions occurring with sufficient overpressure to fail an internal 
safety wall, 0.6 bar, is 1.14 x10"3 , accounting for 3% of the total explosions within 
the module, Two percent of explosions are predicted to exceed 1.6 bar and cause 
platform failure. 
Jet Fires 
The total jet fire frequency within the module is 4.960 x10'2, approximately 76% of 
the total ignitions within the compression module. The frequency of occurrence of jet 
fires following immediate ignition of a leak within the module is predicted to be 70% 
of the total jet fires within the module. The frequency and proportion of immediate 
ignition jet fires occurring within each section is presented in Table 6.13. 
Section Frequency Proportion of jet 
(per year) fires (%) 
1 1.481 XIO-5 0.0429 
2 3.450 x104 0.9987 
3 1.742 x104 0.5044 
4 6.562 x10"3 18.9939 
5 4.398 x10"3 12.7316 
6 5.221 x10"3 15.1134 
8 4.499 x 10"3 13.0231 
9 2.185 x10'3 6.3251 
10 3.060 x10"5 0.0886 
11 6.470 x10'3 18.7281 
12 2.596 x10.3 7.5138 
13 2.117 x104 0.6129 
21 1.839 x10"3 5.3235 
Table 6.13 - Immediate ignition jet fire frequencies from leaks in sections of the 
compression module (per year). 
The frequencies of delayed ignition jet fires occurring following an explosion or a 
pool fire are presented in Table 6.14. 
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Section Frequency Proportion of jet 
(per year) fires (%) 
1 1.185 x10' 0.0787 
2 1.481 x104 0.9837 
3 1.461 x10-4 0.9706 
4 1.946 x10"3 12.9296 
5 8.973 x10-4 5.9614 
6 1.026 x10"3 6.8140 
8 6.478 x10'3 43.0352 
9 1.030 x10'3 6.8402 
10 1.925 x 10"5 0.1279 
11 2.012 x10"3 13.3690 
12 4.778 x104 3.1742 
13 3.006 x 10-4 1.9970 
21 5.597 x10-4 3.7185 
Table 6.14 - Delayed ignition jet fire frequencies from leaks in sections of the 
compression module (per year). 
Jet fires were recorded initiating from leaks on all thirteen sections within the module, 
both from immediate and delayed ignition. Comparing results for explosions and pool 
fires with the results for delayed ignition jet fires suggests that the majority of 
explosions and pool fires are followed by a jet fire. 
The model predicts that the majority of jet fires are predicted to occur with a duration 
of between 0 and 3.6 minutes, Table 6.15, and an initial flame length of between 0 
and 10 metres, Table 6.16. 
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Fire Duration Frequency Proportion 
(mins) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 3.6 4.367 x10' 88.0402 
3.6 7.2 2.943 x10'3 5.9335 
7.2 10.8 4.536 x10-4 0.9145 
10.8 18 3.919 x 104 0.7901 
18 36 2.126 x10'3 4.2869 
36 72 1.678 x10'5 0.0338 
72 144 4.936 x10'7 0.0010 
144+ 00 
Table 6.15 - Compression module jet fire duration 
Flame Frequency Proportion 
Length (m) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 10 3.580 XIO-2 72.1774 
10 20 6.432 x10"3 12.9677 
20 30 2.298 x10'3 4.6331 
30 40 1.234 x10"3 2.4879 
40 50 5.640 x10-4 1.1371 
50 60 5.110 x104 1.0302 
60 70 4.650 x104 0.9375 
70 80 2.760 x104 0.5565 
80 90 2.520 x104 0.5081 
90+ 1.768 x10"3 3.5645 
Table 6.16 - Compression module jet fire initial flame length 
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The distribution of initial flames lengths is similar to within the open sided module, 
however jet fires within the enclosed module burned, on average, for a shorter length 
of time. 
The frequency of jet fires occurring with a duration sufficient to cause escalation due 
to failure of process pipework or vessels, 15 minutes, is 9.42 x10'3, approximately 
19% of jet fires. No fires were predicted to cause failure of the platform. 
Pool Fires 
There were no pool fires predicted within the compression module. 
6.13.4 Wellhead Module 
The wellhead module contains six sections as within Chapter 5 and was estimated to 
generate approximately 26% of the total ignitions occurring on the platform. 
Explosions 
The total frequency of occurrence of explosions estimated to occur in the wellhead 
module is 1.239 x10"2 per year, accounting for 35% of all ignitions within the module. 
The frequency of occurrence of explosions originating from each section is presented 
in Table 6.18. 
Section Frequency Proportion of 
(per year) explosions (%) 
2 8.513 XIO-5 0.6871 
3 3.132 x10"3 25.2801 
8 8.234 x10"3 66.4643 
10 1.922 x10-4 1.5517 
21 2.191 x104 1.7686 
31 5.263 x104 4.2482 
Table 6.18 - Explosion frequencies from leaks in sections of the 
wellhead module (per year). 
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As for open sided modules, all sections within the wellhead module contain gas and 
are therefore capable of producing an explosion. The majority of explosions are 
predicted to occur from leaks on sections 3 and 8, which contain gas at high pressure. 
The magnitudes of the explosions originating from each section are presented in Table 
6.19. 
Overpressure (bar) Frequency Proportion 
to from (per year) (%) 
011.164 x 10" 94.1709 
123.931 x10'4 3.1806 
231.180 x10-4 0.9546 
346.012 x10"5 0.4864 
452.016 x 10"6 0.0163 
561.224 x10"5 0.0990 
672.856 x10"6 0.0231 
789.912 x10"6 0.0802 
8+ 1.222 x104 0.9889 
Table 6.19 - Explosion Frequencies within the wellhead module (per year) 
Over 90% of all explosions predicted to occur within the module generate an 
overpressure of less than one bar. The frequency of explosions occurring with 
sufficient overpressure to fail an internal safety wall, 0.6 bar, is 1.36 x10'3 , 
approximately 3% of the explosions within the module. The frequency occurring with 
sufficient overpressure to fail the platform, 1.6 bar, is 3.91 x104, accounting for less 
than I% of the explosions within the module. 
Jet Fires 
The total jet fire frequency within the module is 2.338 x10"2, approximately 65% of 
the ignitions within the wellhead module. The frequency of occurrence of jet fires 
following immediate ignition of a leak within the module is 1.169 x10'2, the 
distribution of these between the sections in the module is presented in Table 6.20. 
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Section Frequency Proportion 
(per year) (%) 
2 1.760 x10 1.5054 
3 4.186 x10'3 35.8087 
8 5.189 x10'3 44.3913 
10 3.144 x10"4 2.6898 
21 6.367 x104 5.4473 
31 1.187 x10'3 10.1574 
Table 6.20 - Immediate ignition jet fire frequencies from leaks 
in sections of the wellhead module (per year). 
The frequencies of jet fires occurring following an explosion is 1.364 x10'2, the 
distribution between the sections in the module are presented in Table 6.21. 
Section Frequency Proportion 
(per year) (%) 
2 8.345 x10' 0.7139 
3 2.957 x 10'3 25.2969 
8 7.735 x10'3 66.1784 
10 1.835 x10-4 1.5702 
21 2.139 x10'4 1.8301 
31 5.155 x10-4 4.4105 
Table 6.21 - Delayed ignition jet fire frequencies from leaks 
in sections of the wellhead module (per year). 
Jet fires were recorded initiating from leaks on all six sections within the module, 
both from immediate and delayed ignition. Comparing results for explosions and pool 
fires with the results for delayed ignition jet fires suggests that the majority of 
explosions are followed by a jet fire. As for explosions, the majority of jet fires 
originate from two sections containing gas at high pressure. 
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SAROS predicts that the majority of jet fires are predicted to occur with a duration of 
between 0 and 3.6 minutes, Table 6.22, and an initial flame length of between 0 and 
10 metres, Table 6.23. 
Fire Duration Frequency Proportion 
(mins) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 3.6 1.788 x10" 76.4784 
3.6 7.2 2.088 x10"3 8.9322 
7.2 10.8 4.272 x 10-4 1.8275 
10.8 18 4.992 x10-4 2.1355 
18 36 2.461 x10'3 10.5293 
36 72 2.233 x10"5 0.0955 
72 144 3.358 x 10"7 0.0014 
144+ 00 
Table 6.22 - Wellhead module jet fire duration 
Flame Frequency Proportion 
Length (m) (per year) (%) 
From To 
0 10 1.821 x10" 77.8850 
10 20 2.573 x10'3 11.0062 
20 30 6.727 x10-4 2.8778 
30 40 5.849 x10-4 2.5021 
40 50 2.638 x10"4 1.1283 
50 60 1.692 x10"4 0.7238 
60 70 9.840 x10"5 0.4209 
70 80 5.040 x10"5 0.2156 
80 90 6.456 x105 0.2762 
90+ 6.929 x10-4 2.9641 
Table 6.23 - Wellhead module jet fire initial flame length 
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The frequency of jet fires occurring with a duration sufficient to cause escalation due 
to failure of a process vessel or pipe, 15 minutes, is 2.83 x10'3 per year, approximately 
12% of the jet fires predicted to occur within the wellhead module. No fires were 
predicted to cause failure of the platform. 
Pool Fires 
There were no pool fires predicted within the wellhead module. 
6.14 Discussion 
This chapter has presented the results from the current enclosed sided version of 
SAROS. The model predicts an overall frequency of 3.516 x10"2 per year for 
explosions, 1.014 x10" per year for fires and 8.981 x104 per year for pool fires. 
Comparing these results to those from the open sided SAROS presented in Chapter 5 
suggests that with an identical layout of equipment and inventory fewer ignitions 
would be expected overall on an enclosed module than on an open module platform. 
Table 6.24 compares the frequencies of ignitions within all three modules both open 
and closed. 
Ignition type Separation 
Open Closed 
Compression 
Open Closed 
Wellhead 
Open Closed 
Explosions 
6.91x103 7.23x 10"3 1.77x 10"2 1.55x 10"2 1.47x 10'2 1.24x 10"2 
Immediate 
Ignition jet fires 1.57x10-2 1.59x10"2 3.46x10"2 3.45x10-2 1.31x10'2 1.17x10"2 
Delayed ignition 
1.51x10'2 1.28x10'2 1.77x10"2 1.51x10"2 1.47x10-2 1.36x10"2 
jet fires 
Pool fires 8.39x10"3 8.98x10 2.96x106 0 0 0 
Table 6.24 - Frequencies of explosions, immediate ignition jet fires, delayed ignition 
jet fires and pool fires within the separation, compression and wellhead modules on 
open and closed platforms. 
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The frequencies of explosions and jet fires are comparable between each module in 
the open and enclosed platforms. A larger increase is predicted in the frequencies of 
explosions and jet fires in the enclosed wellhead module compared to the open. 
A negligibly lower frequency of occurrence has been predicted for explosions and jet 
fires on the enclosed module platform. Over 1000 platform years an enclosed 
platform would be expected to generate approximately 35 explosions and 101 jet fires 
in comparison to 39 explosions and 111 jet fires on an open platform. Eight pool fires 
would be expected in 1000 platform years on an open sided platform and less than 
one on an enclosed platform. 
Table 6.25 presents the frequencies of explosions, with regard to the overpressure 
within each of the three modules on both open and closed platform structures. 
Overpressure Separation 
Open Closed 
Compression 
Open Closed 
Wellhead 
Open Closed 
0 1 99.78 95.70 99.80 95.93 99.83 94.17 
1 2 0.07 1.80 0.14 2.39 0.10 3.18 
2 3 0.04 0.73 0.06 0.58 0.04 0.95 
3 4 0.03 0.49 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.49 
4 5 0.04 0.03 0 0.03 0.01 0.02 
5 6 0.02 0.09 0 0.08 0 0.10 
6 7 <0.01 0.07 0 0.04 0 0.02 
7 8 0.01 0.05 0 0.08 0 0.08 
8+ < 0.01 1.04 0 0.64 0 0.99 
Table 6.25 - Proportions of explosions within each module on open and closed 
platforms with respect to the overpressure. 
Although the frequency of explosions occurring in the modules are comparable 
between the enclosed and open SAROS predictions, the severity of explosions is 
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greater within the enclosed modules leading to more predicted failures of the internal 
walls and the platform structure. 
Explosions in all three modules were predicted to be more severe on an enclosed 
platform than an open however approximately 95% of the explosions were still 
predicted as generating an overpressure of less than 1 bar. 
The severity of explosions has increased in the enclosed modules primarily due to 
removal of the deluge system. Within the open sided modules, the minority of 
explosions are unmitigated, the effect of which reduces the potential maximum 
overpressure that can be reached by an explosion. 
Tables 6.26 and 6.27 summarise the proportions of jet fires occurring within all three 
modules on both platforms. 
Jet fire flame 
length 
Separation 
Open Closed 
Compression 
Open Closed 
Wellhead 
Open Closed 
0 10 88.29 91.47 65.07 72.18 34.20 77.89 
10 20 5.56 4.03 16.02 12.97 30.19 11.01 
20 30 2.11 1.52 8.00 4.63 15.08 2.88 
30 40 1.29 0.83 2.48 2.49 4.66 2.50 
40 50 0.58 0.57 1.38 1.14 2.60 1.13 
50 60 0.40 0.21 1.14 1.03 2.15 0.72 
60 70 0.29 0.18 0.94 0.94 1.77 0.42 
70 80 0.23 0.15 0.63 0.56 1.18 0.22 
80 90 0.18 0.12 0.55 0.51 1.04 0.28 
90+ 1.05 0.92 3.79 3.56 7.14 2.96 
Table 6.26 - Proportions of jet fires within each module on open and closed platforms 
with respect to the initial flame length. 
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Jet fire 
duration 
Separation 
Open Closed 
Compression 
Open Closed 
Wellhead 
Open Closed 
0 3.6 90.06 96.54 73.89 88.04 53.66 76.48 
3.6 7.2 0 2.13 0 5.93 10.53 8.93 
7.2 10.8 1.61 0.83 6.20 0.91 4.77 1.83 
10.8 18 4.41 0.34 6.92 0.79 10.63 2.14 
18 36 3.89 0.16 11.30 4.29 17.78 10.53 
36 72 0.02 0 1.61 0.03 2.38 0.10 
72 144 0.01 0 0.05 < 0.01 0.13 < 0.01 
144 216 < 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.05 0 
216 288 0 0 < 0.01 0 0.02 0 
288 + < 0.01 0 0.02 0 0.05 0 
Table 6.27 - Proportions of jet fires within each module on open and closed platforms 
with respect to the fire duration. 
Jet fires on enclosed platforms were predicted to be less severe than on open 
platforms, fires with lower initial flame lengths and durations were calculated and no 
fires on the enclosed platform predicted to lead to failure of the platform. 
A number of assumptions have been made in modelling enclosed platforms that have 
resulted in a reduction in the severity of jet fires. The fires within an enclosed module 
are oxygen limited, and are extinguished if the release rate of the gas from a leaking 
section exceeds the rate at which the gas is combusted. The deluge system is also 
assumed to extinguish jet fires. The combination of these has resulted in a reduction 
in both the average initial flame length and the average duration of a jet fire. 
Fewer pool fires have been predicted on an enclosed module platform, with fires only 
occurring in the separation module. Of these fires, a few were recorded with longer 
initial flame lengths and durations than on an open module platforms and a minor 
frequency of failure for internal walls was predicted. However the fires are predicted 
to occur only eight times per 1000 platform years for enclosed platforms and fewer 
for open modules. 
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These results suggest that when considering the frequency of occurrence of 
explosions and fires on an offshore platform it is only of minor importance whether 
the module is open of enclosed. The effects of the severity of these events on the 
platform population is investigated in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 Development of the Fatality Model for the SAROS Code 
7.1 Introduction 
In order to assess the impact of potential hydrocarbon releases on offshore platforms, 
it is more beneficial to estimate the number of fatalities generated by ignition of the 
releases. A post processor, using the data gathered for each simulation of SAROS, has 
been created to assess the likelihood of fatalities resulting from each ignition. The 
program calculates the frequency of fatalities per year due to each of the following 
ignition types: 
Explosions 
Immediate ignition jet fires 
Delayed ignition jet fires 
Pool fires 
The model distinguishes between three types of fatality, dependent on location: 
Local - fatalities within the module where the ignition takes place. 
Pre-Muster - fatalities within adjoining modules to the ignition module. 
Post-Muster - fatalities within the Temporary Refuge (TR). 
Barriers are installed on platforms to confine the effects of an ignition to the module 
in which they occur and therefore reduce the risk to the workforce in adjacent 
modules. Protection against explosions is provided by `blastwalls', however an 
explosion with an overpressure greater than the resistance of the wall will cause the 
barrier to fail. Fires are confined by the use of `firewalls', however a fire impacting on 
a fire wall for a greater time than the resistance of the wall will cause it to fail. Pre- 
and post-muster fatalities can only occur when the severity of the fire or explosion is 
such that it causes a barrier between two modules to fail. 
Following detection of a leak, the population of the platform (the number of people in 
each module at the time of ignition defined by a population distribution) will gather in 
the Temporary Refuge, TR, where evacuation will begin. Due to platform safety 
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regulations not all lifeboats can be launched at one time and therefore the population 
on board the platform will gradually reduce after evacuation has commenced. 
In order for fatalities to occur in the temporary refuge one or more of the following 
sequences of events must take place. 
" The ignition occurs in the module adjacent to the TR and is of such a severity 
that the safety wall fails. 
" The ignition causes platform collapse. 
The following assumptions, provided by Mobil NS Ltd were made in building the 
model: 
" On average, there will be four people in each module on both open and 
enclosed platforms. 
" Fifty percent of the workforce will be in the temporary refuge at any one time. 
" There will not be failure of more than one safety barrier in any one direction. 
" Only barriers in the horizontal direction can fail (walls). Failure of barriers in 
the vertical (floors/ceilings) will not be considered in this model. 
" If an event results in collapse of an internal safety wall it is assumed that all 
personnel within either module at the time of failure become fatalities. 
" In the event of evacuation of the platform there will be a short delay followed 
by 50 people leaving every 15 minutes. 
" Fatalities due to smoke inhalation are not considered in this model. 
" In evacuating a module, it is assumed that the workforce will evacuate into the 
adjacent module with the lowest resistance barrier. 
" If any ignition, at any time, causes platform collapse, it is assumed that the 
platform fatalities are 100% of the remaining workforce on the platform. 
These assumptions and the equations in this chapter were agreed jointly between 
Mobil NS Ltd and Loughborough University. 
7.2 Fatalities Due to Immediate Ignition 
Immediate ignition events occur prior to detection and therefore module evacuation. 
All module workers will be present at the time of ignition and may potentially become 
fatalities. 
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As a fire is detected immediately following ignition, evacuation of an adjoining 
module will be completed before the fire has breached the module firewall. Therefore 
only local fatalities are generated by immediate ignition fires. 
7.2.1 Gaseous Releases 
Immediate ignition gas releases, jet fires, are treated as fireballs initially within the 
model. The number of fatalities following immediate ignition will be a function of the 
initial mass of fuel in the flame, the module floor area and the number of people 
within the module at the time of ignition. 
The mass of fuel in the initial gas flame at time t, mPi(t), is calculated using Equation 
7.0451 where qg(t) is the initial gas release rate at time t. 
r 
mP, (t) = 
fqg (t)dt 
0 
(7.1) 
For the purposes of fatality modelling, the initial jet fire is treated as a fireball, the 
[8 diameter of which, DF, is given by Equation 7.2'46] 
DF 1.65 mP 
; rpg 
(7.2) 
The intensity of thermal radiation of the fireball, I, is calculated using Equation 7.3. [81 
l= 
E 
(7.3) 
ý 4sd2 
+1 
DF 
where 
c is the surface emissive power of the fireball (kWm-2) 
sd is the 'stand-off' istance. The distance from the centre of the fireball to the 
point where the incident radiation level is I 
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In the case of immediate ignition gas releases the following assumptions are made 
(from research into releases of gas offshore [81): 
" The surface emissive power (E) of the fireball is assumed to be 250 kWm'2. 
" The incident thermal radiation (I) from the fireball is assumed to be 20 kWm'2. 
The value of I is estimated based on a maximum allowable exposure time of 10 
seconds. 
The stand off distance is calculated by rearranging Equation 7.3. 
2 
sd 2= 
D4 1-1 (7.4) 
The number of local fatalities NFL, within the module is calculated using Equation 
7.5 by estimating the proportion of the module that will be within the stand off 
distance of the ignition. 
2 
; ZNd 
NFL =A Pý 
M 
where 
s is the standoff distance calculated using Equation 7.4 
AM is the cross sectional area of the module 
PL is the number of people within the module 
(7.5) 
7.2.2 Liquid Releases 
The calculations required for fatalities due to immediate ignition of a liquid release 
are analogous to the equations used for gaseous releases. The volume of the `fireball' 
is derived by making the assumption that the pool fire is a semi-sphere, with a radius 
of the pool fire flame length. 
In Equation 7.3, the value for the surface emissive power, E, is assumed to be 150 
kWm'2 and the number of fatalities is then calculated using Equations 7.4 and 7.5 as 
before. 
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7.3 Fatalities Due to Delayed Ignition 
Fatalities due to delayed ignition i. e. explosion, are assumed to be due to thermal 
effects rather than blast effects. Therefore an analogous calculation method to 
immediate ignition can be used. 
The diameter of the fireball will be estimated using the volumetric expansion of 1: 8 of 
the stoichiometric gas/air cloud. In Equation 7.3 a value of 250 kWm 2 is used for the 
value of the fireball emissive power. 
When ignition is delayed, the potential exists for the leak to be detected and the 
process modules evacuated prior to ignition. If ignition occurs before the leak is 
detected, then the number of fatalities will be calculated as for immediate ignition 
releases using Equation 7.5. 
If the release is detected before ignition it is assumed that evacuation of the module 
has begun and therefore PL will have a modified value. It is assumed it takes thirty 
seconds to evacuate the module containing the release and therefore: 
If t; <_ tde1 + 30 secs the population within the ignition module is unchanged. 
If t, > tdet +30 secs the population within the ignition module is zero. 
where 
t; is the time to ignition 
tdet is the time to detection 
If the time to ignition is greater than the time to detection of the leak plus thirty 
seconds, then the workforce has left the module and fatalities can only be achieved 
following collapse of an internal safety wall. 
On failure of a barrier it is assumed that all the workforce within both modules are 
fatalities. These fatalities are defined as `pre-muster' fatalities. However, if 
t, > tdet + (6 x 60) secs it is assumed that all the workforce has mustered within the TR, 
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therefore any fatalities caused after this time will be `post-muster'. There are two 
phases to post-muster fatalities, pre-evacuation and during evacuation. 
If t, S to , where to 
is the time to start evacuation, then it is assumed that evacuation 
has not taken place and all the workforce is located in the TR. 
If there is no barrier between the event module and the TR, the proportion of fatalities 
equals 100% of the platform workforce if the overpressure generated by the explosion 
is large enough to exceed the blast resistance of the TR or the ignition causes platform 
failure. 
If the overpressure does not exceed the TR blast resistance then there will be no 
casualties. 
If t; > to then evacuation has commenced on the platform. As above, if the 
overpressure does not exceed the resistance of the TR, there will be no fatalities. If the 
overpressure does exceed the resistance there will be fatalities, the volume of which is 
dependant on the rate of evacuation. 
NFPoS, M = POB - n(NoEvac) (7.6) 
where 
NFpostM is the number of fatalities in the post-muster phase. 
POB is the total number of people on board the platform. 
NoEvac is the number of people evacuated in one time. 
n is the number of lifeboats that have been launched. 
If a single barrier exists between the event module and the TR, there will be no 
fatalities unless the overpressure is equal to or exceeds the blast resistance of the main 
structure. The number of fatalities is calculated using Equation 7.6. 
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7.4 Fatalities due to jet fires following an explosion 
Fatalities due to this event will be calculated in the same way as immediate ignition 
jet fires. However the population within the module takes into account the fatalities 
due to the preceding explosion. 
PL-MOD = PL - 
NFL-EXP 
where 
PL. MOD is the modified population in the module 
PL is the population in the module at the time of ignition 
NFL. ExP is the number of fatalities generated by the original explosion 
PL-MOD can take any value between zero and PL. 
(7.7) 
If the time to ignition of the explosion exceeded the time to detection the workforce 
population in the module will be zero at the time of ignition of the jet fire. 
If ignition of the original explosion occurs after the leak has been detected, there will 
be no local fatalities due to the following jet fire. It is assumed that the jet fire will not 
cause any pre-muster fatalities whether a barrier has or has not failed. If the barrier 
has not failed due to the explosion, it will not fail from fire exposure and if the 
explosion has caused barrier failure, all personnel within the module are already 
assumed to be fatalities. 
For explosions occurring in the post-muster phase, if no barrier exists between the TR 
and the event module, fatalities from a jet fire following an explosion can only occur 
if the explosion has not exceeded the TR barrier resistance. The number of fatalities 
due to the fire is calculated in the same way as for immediate ignition jet fires in 
Section 7.2. 
If a single barrier exists between the event module and TR, it is possible that fatalities 
may be created from a fire following an explosion. However, the event module barrier 
must have been breached in the explosion, but not the integrity of the TR. When 
considering whether the fire breaches the TR, it is not the flame duration at 2m that is 
157 
now required, but the length of time the flame equals or exceeds the distance between 
the point of origin and the TR. 
The number of people at risk remaining within the TR if evacuation has commenced 
is calculated using Equation 7.6. 
If multiple barriers exist between the event module and the TR, it is assumed that no 
further fatalities will be caused by a jet fire following an explosion. 
7.5 Results 
The frequency of fatalities on the open and enclosed platforms discussed in Chapters 
5 and 6 are estimated and presented below. Both platforms contain a separation 
module, compression module and wellhead module with identical inventory and 
layout. 
The model estimates that there would be more fatalities on an enclosed than an open 
platform, Table 7.1. 
Open Platform Enclosed Platform 
Separation Module 1.002 x10" 2.048 x10" 
Compression Module 3.966 x10"2 5.101 x10"2 
Wellhead Module 1.314 x10"2 2.811 x10"2 
Total 6.282 X10-2 9.960 X10-2 
Table 7.1 - Frequencies of fatalities within modules on open and 
enclosed platforms (per year). 
53% of ignitions on the open sided platform result in one or more fatalities, a higher 
proportion of 69% of ignitions on the closed sided platforms result in fatalities. 
Explosions are predicted to generate the largest proportion of the total frequencies of 
fatalities within all modules on both platforms. Table 7.2 presents the frequencies and 
proportions of fatalities due to explosions within all three modules on both platforms. 
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The frequencies of fatalities generated by explosions on the enclosed platform are 
greater within each module than on open sided platforms, over 1000 platform years 39 
fatalities would be expected on an open sided platform and 77 on an enclosed 
platform. Within Chapter 6 it was established that the frequencies of explosions 
occurring were comparable, however, the severity of explosions was greater within 
enclosed modules. A larger overpressure results in a larger frequency of fatalities. 
Open Platform Enclosed Platform 
Frequency Proportion Frequency Proportion 
(per year) (%) (per year) (%) 
Separation Module 7.313 x10" 73.0 1.718 XIO, 2 83.9 
Compression Module 2.399 x10'2 60.5 3.628 x10"2 71.1 
Wellhead Module 7.917 x10"3 60.2 2.348 x10'2 83.5 
Total 3.922 x 10" 62.4 7.694 x 10" 77.3 
Table 7.2 - Frequencies of fatalities due to explosions within modules on open and 
enclosed platforms (per year) and the proportion fatalities from explosions contribute 
to the total module fatalities. 
The largest contribution to fatalities due to explosions was from the compression 
module, on both platforms, which resulted in 61% of the total fatalities due to 
explosions on the open sided platform and 71% on the enclosed platform. 
Immediate ignition jet fires generate 36% of the fatalities on an open platform and 
23% on an enclosed platform. Table 7.3 presents the frequencies and proportions of 
fatalities due to immediate ignition jet fires within all three modules on the open and 
closed platforms. 
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Open Platform Enclosed Platform 
Frequency Proportion Frequency Proportion 
(per year) (%) (per year) (%) 
Separation Module 2.685 10,3 26.8 3.293 x10' 16.1 
Compression Module 1.447 x10"2 36.5 1.474 x10'2 28.9 
Wellhead Module 5.226 x10'3 39.8 4.628 x10'3 16.5 
Total 2.238 XIO-2 35.6 2.266 x10' 22.8 
Table 7.3 - Frequencies of fatalities due to immediate ignition jet fires within 
modules on open and enclosed platforms (per year) and the proportion that these 
fatalities contribute to the total module fatalities. 
The difference between fatalities due to immediate ignition jet fires on open and 
enclosed platforms is negligible. Over 1000 platform years, 22 fatalities would be 
expected on an open sided and 23 fatalities on an enclosed platform. 
Although the frequencies of fatalities are comparable between each module type on 
both platforms, the proportion of fatalities that the immediate ignition jet fires 
contribute to the total module fatalities is larger within the open platform than the 
enclosed platform. This is due to the large frequencies of fatalities due to explosions 
within the enclosed sided platform. 
As for explosions, the compression module generates the largest frequency of 
immediate ignition jet fire fatalities. 
All modules on both platforms generate fatalities due to delayed ignition jet fires, 
Table 7.4. However the frequencies are negligible in comparison to the fatalities due 
to explosions and immediate ignition jet fires. 
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Open Platform Enclosed Platform 
Separation Module 3.607 x10"° 3.230 x10' 
Compression Module 1.206 x10'7 6.331 x10"9 
Wellhead Module 6.736 x10'7 1.999 x10'9 
Total 8.303 x10' 1.156 x10" 
Table 7.4 - Frequencies of fatalities due to delayed ignition jet fires within modules 
on open and enclosed platforms (per year). 
The percentage of total fatalities on either platform generated by delayed ignition jet 
fires is less than 0.01%. The frequency of fatalities on enclosed platforms is smaller 
than on open platforms. The occurrence and severity of these types of ignitions was 
reduced within enclosed modules, leading to a reduction in the fatalities, due to the 
reduction in oxygen available for combustion following an explosion or pool fire. 
The contribution of pool fires towards the total frequency of fatalities was less than 
one percent on each platform. The frequency of fatalities due to pool fires for each 
module on both platforms is presented in Table 7.5. 
Open Platform 
Separation Module 
Compression Module 
Wellhead Module 
1.914 x10" 
1.260 x10"12 
0 
Total 
Enclosed Platform 
3.287 XIO-6 
0 
0 
1.914 x10 3.287 x10" 
Table 7.5 - Frequencies of fatalities due to pool fires within modules on open and 
enclosed platforms (per year). 
A higher frequency of fatalities due to pool fires is predicted within the open sided 
module due to a larger frequency of occurrence of pool fires. However the frequencies 
of fatalities within either platform is negligible in comparison to explosions and 
immediate ignition jet fires. 
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On both the open and enclosed platforms, the majority of fatalities are local, i. e. 
within the module containing the ignition. Table 7.6 presents the proportions of 
fatalities on open and closed platforms categorised as local, pre-muster and post- 
muster. 
Open Platform Enclosed Platform 
Frequency Proportion Frequency Proportion 
(per year) (%) (per year) (%) 
Local 5.993 x10" 95.4 5.704 x10" 57.3 
Pre-muster 1.442 x10"4 0.2 2.805 x10'3 2.8 
Post-muster 2.751 x10'3 4.4 3.976 x10"2 39.9 
Table 7.6 - Proportions of local, pre- and post-muster fatalities on open and 
enclosed platforms (per year). 
The frequency of local fatalities is comparable between both modules, however the 
frequencies of pre- and post-muster fatalities are greater in the enclosed module than 
the open module platform. The results from SAROS predict that only explosions will 
generate pre- and post-muster fatalities. Therefore the higher proportion of pre- and 
post muster fatalities on the enclosed module platform is due solely to the increase in 
the severity of the explosions discussed in Chapter 6. 
7.6 Discussion 
SAROS has predicted that a larger frequency of fatalities per year is expected on an 
enclosed sided platform compared to an open sided platform. The frequency of 
fatalities due to delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires was negligible in comparison 
to the fatalities due to explosions and immediate ignition jet fires. 
The frequencies of fatalities due to immediate ignition jet fires was comparable 
between each platform type, as the differences between the frequencies of occurrence 
of jet fires and the proportions of the initial flame lengths between the two platform 
types are minimal. 
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However the largest contribution to the frequencies of fatalities was due to 
explosions. More fatalities due to explosions were predicted in the enclosed module, 
due to an increase in severity. The predicted increase in overpressure resulted in more 
blast wall and platform failures, resulting in significantly more pre- and post muster 
fatalities. 
Twenty-three fatalities have been reported to the Health and Safety Executive 
Offshore Safety Division between April 1994 and March 2004[471. However it is 
stated that there is a limited accuracy associated with this data due to the voluntary 
nature of the information supplied and in some cases the small number of releases. In 
2004, the fatality rate offshore was 16 per 100,000 workers with a combined fatality 
and major incident rate (per 100,000 workers) of 253.4. The major incidents 
responsible for these figures include hydrocarbon and non hydrocarbon releases, falls 
from height and items dropped from height, collisions, failure or collapse of 
equipment or structure. 
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Chapter 8 Sensitivity Analysis on Open Sided Platforms 
8.1 Introduction 
It is the nature of mathematical models that they commonly use parameters which are 
subject to a large degree of uncertainty. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate 
the effects of this uncertainty and the importance of the parameter accuracy for the 
model predictions. This is achieved by determining the consequences of varying input 
parameters on the model predictions. An analysis was run to determine the sensitivity 
of the input parameters below: 
" Maximum windspeed 
" Ignition frequency 
" Leak frequency 
" Unavailability of isolation and blowdown valves 
" Unavailability of detection systems 
" Unavailability of deluge system 
" Resistance of blast- and fire-walls 
The separation and compression modules will be analysed within this chapter as they 
provide a good representation of the range of releases and ignitions within a platform. 
The results are presented for both modules as the fraction of the total frequencies of 
explosions, immediate ignition jet fires, delayed ignition jet fires, pool fires and 
fatalities that occur in the base case model. 
Analysis of the results concentrated on the effect of varying the parameter on the 
frequency and severity of explosions, jet fires and pool fires and the subsequent effect 
on the predicted frequency of fatalities per year. The results are provided for the 
separation and the compression module and will be used initially to indicate the 
optimum configuration of safety systems on the platform to result in the lowest 
frequency of fatalities per year. 
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Although the maximum windspeed, ignition frequency and leak frequency are not 
criteria that can be optimised, the results will provide an estimation of how sensitive 
the model is to these parameters. 
All Tables for this Chapter can be found within Appendix B. 
8.2 Ventilation Rate 
Within the open sided modules the ventilation rate is dependent on the windspeed. 
The maximum windspeed used in the base case model is 2.4ms 1 and was varied as 
shown in Table 8.1. 
An increase in the maximum windspeed will result in an increase in the average 
ventilation rate throughout the simulation. The ventilation rate affects the rate of 
increase of concentration of the gas cloud build-up within the module and controls the 
rate of reduction of the volume of gas in the module when the ventilation rate exceeds 
the release rate. 
Explosions can only occur when an ignition source occurs and the concentration of 
the gas cloud is within the flammable limits. If the concentration of a cloud has 
exceeded the upper flammable limit an explosion cannot occur, however an increased 
ventilation rate may result in the concentration lowering to within the flammable 
limits, increasing the likelihood of an explosion. Alternately a gas cloud with a 
concentration between the flammable limits may be reduced to below the lower 
flammable limit, therefore reducing the probability of an explosion. 
8.2.1 Results and discussion 
Table 8.2 and Figure 8.1 present the fractions of explosions, jet and pool fires and 
fatalities occurring compared to the frequencies estimated with the base case value of 
maximum windspeed within the separation module. 
It can be seen from the results that, for the separation module, the frequency of 
explosions is inversely proportional to the windspeed factor, a lower windspeed 
results in a higher frequency of explosions. However the variation in the number of 
explosions occurring is minimal. 
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A variation in windspeed results in negligible differences in the frequencies of jet and 
pool fires in the separation module. 
Figure 8.1 demonstrates that the variation in the frequency of ignitions is negligible in 
comparison to the variation in frequency of fatalities. 
The frequency of fatalities is also inversely related to the windspeed. However, the 
reduction of the windspeed to 0.1 of the original value shows that the relationship 
with the frequency of fatalities is non-linear and the frequency of fatalities increases 
substantially. This is due to the decrease in ventilation affecting not only the number 
of ignitions but also generating a significant increase in the severity of the explosions. 
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Figure 8.1 - Comparison of the fractions of ignitions and 
fatalities due to a change in windspeed in the separation module. 
Table 8.3 presents the percentages of explosions occurring within several bands of 
overpressure for each of the factors in Table 8.1. 
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Multiplying the maximum windspeed by a factor of 0.1 results in 98.8% of explosions 
occurring with an overpressure of less than 1 bar and the remaining explosions with 
overpressures of up to and over 8 bar. When the maximum windspeed is multiplied by 
a factor of 10 the highest overpressure recorded does not exceed 5-6 bar and 99.96% 
of the explosions occurring have an overpressure of less than 1 bar. 
Increase in the ventilation rate decreases the concentration of the gas cloud within the 
module at the time of ignition which in turn decreases the overpressure generated. 
The results from the compression module are presented in Table 8.4 and in Figure 8.2. 
The variation in the frequency of fatalities is smaller within the compression module 
than within the separation module. 
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Figure 8.2 - Comparison of the fractions of ignitions and fatalities 
due to a change in windspeed in the compression module. 
As in the separation module, a decrease in the windspeed results in an increase in the 
frequency of explosions, however the increase is greater within the compression 
module. Although the variation in the frequency of explosions is greater, the variation 
167 
in the severity of explosions was not as significant in the compression module as in 
the separation module. 
Table 8.5 presents the percentages of explosions occurring, with overpressures 
between defined limits, for each factor within Table 8.1. 
None of the explosions within the compression module had an overpressure that 
exceeded 4 bar. When the maximum windspeed was subjected to a multiplication 
factor of ten, 99.97% of all explosions occurring had an overpressure of less than 1 
bar and no explosion overpressure exceeded 3 bar. 
No post muster fatalities were generated with this maximum windspeed. Reduction of 
the maximum windspeed resulted in more explosions occurring with overpressures of 
greater than 1 bar and overpressures of between 3 and 4 bar being reached. 
Little difference was noticed in either the immediate or delayed ignition jet fires 
however an effect was noticed in the frequency of pool fires. A decrease in the 
windspeed produced a noticeable decrease in the frequency of pool fires, it then peaks 
at a factor of 2 before reducing. The variation in the severity of the pool fires is 
unaffected. 
The difference between the fractions of pool fires occurring within the compression 
module and the separation module can be attributed to the small number of pool fires 
occurring within the compression module, therefore any deviation from the base case 
is required to result in a larger impact on the fraction of fires. 
As in the separation module, the highest frequency of fatalities is noticed when the 
maximum windspeed is subjected to a factor of 0.1. 
The results verify that it is important not to restrict the natural ventilation in the 
module as this will result in a higher frequency of fatalities. 
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8.3 Frequency of Ignition 
The probability of an ignition source in the vicinity of a leak was assumed to be 0.07 
for immediate ignition in the base case model. If the leak was not ignited immediately 
there was assumed to be a frequency of ignition prior to isolation of 0.28/hr and 
0.0028/hr post isolation. The variations used in the analysis are shown in Table 8.6. 
An increase in the frequency of ignitions would be expected to result in an increase in 
the number of fatalities due to a higher number of fires and explosions occurring. 
8.3.1 Results and discussion 
Table 8.7 and Figure 8.3 present the fractions of fires, explosions and fatalities 
occurring within the separation module compared to the frequencies estimated in the 
base case model. 
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Figure 8.3 - Comparison of the fractions of ignitions and 
fatalities due to a change in ignition rate in the separation module. 
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A decrease in the ignition rate produces a decrease in the predicted frequencies of 
ignitions and fatalities. 
Pool fires vary the least following an increase in the ignition rate. Further analysis 
revealed that 99.5% of all oil leaks that occurred, without deluge functioning, in the 
base case model were ignited, therefore an increase in the ignition rate can only have 
a minimal effect on the frequency of pool fires. A decrease in the ignition rate 
predicted that almost all oil releases would still be ignited. 
The frequency of immediate ignition jet fires is affected the greatest by a change in 
the ignition rate. The fraction of fires occurring is directly proportional to the ignition 
rate factor when compared to the base case model. 
In order for an explosion to occur, the gas leak must not have been ignited 
immediately. An increase in the number of leaks which are ignited immediately 
results in fewer leaks that can form a gas cloud and generate an explosion. However 
there are fewer occasions when an ignition source does not occur and an increase in 
the frequency of explosions is predicted. 
The results from varying the rate of ignition occurring within the compression module 
are presented in Table 8.8 and Figure 8.4. 
Varying the rate of ignition has a greater effect on the explosions, delayed ignition jet 
fires and pool fires in the compression module. Similar trends are noticed between the 
fractions, in comparison to the base case model, of immediate ignition jet fires that 
occur within the modules. 
The variations in the pool fires in the compression module can be attributed to a small 
number of fires occurring in the base case model and therefore only a small variation 
in frequency is required to generate a large variation in the fraction when compared to 
the base case results. 
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Figure 8.4 - Comparison of the Fractions of ignitions and 
fatalities due to a change in ignition rate in the compression module. 
The fractions of fatalities within the compression module follow the same trend as in 
the separation module but are slightly more severe. 
The results demonstrate that a variation in the ignition rate will produce a significant 
variation in the frequency of fatalities. 
A suggestion from platform operatives is to install a constant ignition source within 
modules. This would prevent a gas cloud from forming therefore prohibiting 
explosions. Table 8.9 presents the fractions of ignitions and fatalities that would occur 
within the separation and compression modules of an open sided offshore platform if 
a constant ignition source was present when compared to the base case model. 
As predicted, no explosions occur within either module when a constant ignition 
source is present and as a result the fractions of fatalities due to delayed ignition jet 
fires are reduced. There is no effect on the frequencies of pool fires. 
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The fractions of jet fires that occur have increased significantly, with over fourteen 
times more fires occurring within both modules. This increase in immediate ignition 
jet fires has however predicted an increase in the fractions of fatalities. As no 
explosions occur, the model predicts that there will only be local fatalities generated. 
This has significant implications towards the cost associated with total platform 
failures and predicting that no one ignition would generate fatalities outside of the a 
module. However as the initial predictions are that the frequency of fatalities per year 
will be increased it will not be considered further within this work. 
8.4 Frequency of leak occurring 
Each isolatable section on the platform has a specific leak frequency as defined in the 
input file. This value is the frequency per year that a leak could be expected to occur 
on a vessel or pipework within the section. 
Each frequency in the input file was varied, by the same factors used to analyse the 
ventilation rate, in order to determine the sensitivity of SAROS to the leak frequency. 
8.4.1 Results and Discussion 
SAROS initiates a leak on each simulation of the run, the leak frequencies are used 
only to determine the section on which the leak occurs. In order to determine the 
leaking section, the total leak frequency of the module is calculated and the 
cumulative leak frequency of each section, as a fraction of the total module leak 
frequency, is determined. A random number generator is used to determine which 
section generates the leak. Therefore applying the same multiplication factor to the 
leak frequency of each section will have no impact on the section that is selected or 
the number of leaks. 
The number of ignitions and fatalities generated for each of the factors is identical to 
the base case. However, the frequency of ignitions and fatalities is a multiple of the 
value for the total frequency of leaks within the module is used. Therefore the 
fractions of ignitions and fatalities are identical to the fraction of the leak frequency. 
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No variation due to the Monte Carlo simulation is predicted as the random number 
sequence is not affected by the variation in the leak frequency. 
8.5 Unavailability of Isolation and Blowdown Valves 
The unavailability of the isolation and blowdown valves modelled for the base case 
platform is set at 0.035. A change in this value would not necessarily be expected to 
cause a major change in the number of ignitions occurring, as isolation and blowdown 
will not occur until after the leak has commenced, and potentially ignited, but may 
affect the severity of the events as the inventory leaked is limited. 
If all valves are unavailable the model is expected to predict a number of ignitions 
with a greater severity due to an unlimited volume of inventory available for release 
until manual isolation occurs. 
8.5.1 Results and discussion 
If all valves become unavailable, this has the effect of removing all the isolation and 
blowdown valves from the system, it is expected that there will be an increase in the 
frequency of fatalities. If all valves are 100% available, it is expected there will be a 
less noticeable decrease in the number of fatalities, as for the majority of cases in the 
base case simulation the isolation and blowdown valves are functioning correctly. 
Table 8.10 presents the predicted fractions of ignitions and fatalities compared to the 
base case when all isolation and blowdown valves in the module are either available 
or unavailable within the separation module and Table 8.11 within the compression 
module. 
Removal of all the isolation and blowdown valves has predicted that there will be an 
increase in the frequencies of ignitions and fatalities within both the separation 
module and compression module. The non-linear increase in the frequency of 
fatalities compared to the frequency of ignitions when all the valves are unavailable in 
the separation module suggests that the severity of ignitions may be affected. 
If all isolation and blowdown valves are functioning at the time of ignition, a smaller 
variation in the fraction of fatalities is predicted. Increases are predicted for the 
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fractions of explosions, delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires within both the 
compression and separation modules, however the variations are minor and may be 
attributed partially to the use of the Monte Carlo simulation method. 
It is of interest to determine whether removal or inclusion of either the isolation or the 
blowdown valves in the system has the greatest effect. Tables 8.12 and 8.13 present 
the predictions for frequencies of ignitions and fatalities when either the isolation or 
blowdown valves are all available or unavailable within the separation module and the 
compression module respectively. 
During simulations when the isolation valves are either removed from the model 
(unavailable) or are functioning correctly (available) the blowdown valves function as 
in the base case model and vice versa during analysis of the blowdown valves. 
Within the separation module, the isolation valve has the greatest effect on the 
fractions of fatalities occurring. Availability of the system appears to increase the 
fractions of ignitions occurring and unavailability results in decreases except when 
considering pool fires. 
The variations in the fractions of ignitions occurring are minimal and may be due 
entirely to variations occurring due to use of the Monte Carlo simulation method. 
However the relationship between the fractions of fatalities and ignitions is not linear, 
suggesting the severity of the events are affected. 
Unavailability of the isolation valves within the separation module has a large 
increase on the fraction of fatalities that occur, however the variations in the fractions 
of ignitions are not linear and therefore removal of the valves must have an impact on 
the severity of some of the ignitions. 
Table 8.14 presents the frequency of fatalities in the separation module that are 
generated from explosions and fires when the isolation valves are either unavailable 
or 100% available. The results are presented as a fraction of the total fatalities 
occurring within the module. 
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The results show that when all isolation valves are unavailable the fraction of the total 
fatalities in the module that are due to explosions decreases and the fatalities resulting 
from immediate ignition jet fires increases. This is due not to a decrease in the 
frequency of fatalities due to explosions, which remains similar to the base case, but 
due to a vast increase in the frequency of fatalities due to immediate ignition jet fires 
when isolation valves are unavailable, almost four times as many as when isolation 
valves are 100% available. 
Table 8.12 verifies that this is not due to an increase in the frequency of immediate 
ignition jet fires and therefore must be due to the severity. 
Table 8.15 presents the fraction of the total frequency of jet fires which occur with a 
flame length between sets of limits, for both the base case and when the isolation 
valves are unavailable. 
Within the base case model, approximately 89% of immediate ignition jet fires have a 
flame length of less than ten metres, this decreases to 72% when the isolation valves 
are unavailable. Removal of the isolation valves from the system has resulted in 
immediate ignition jet fires occurring with an average flame length of greater than in 
the base case model. Due to the calculation methods described in Chapter 7, the larger 
the flame length the greater the number of fatalities that result from the jet fire. 
Table 8.14 shows that the trend in the distribution of fatalities generated by explosions 
and fires between the base case and availability of isolation valves is alike. Analysis 
of the characteristics of explosions and fires when the isolation valves are 100% 
available has demonstrated that although there are more events occurring, the severity 
of all ignitions is reduced, resulting in the reduced frequency of fatalities. This trend 
was confirmed for both the separation and compression modules. 
Variation of the frequency of fatalities due to availability and unavailability of the 
blowdown valves is negligible in comparison to analysis of the isolation valves. The 
largest variation is a reduction in the fractions of explosions occurring when the 
blowdown valves are removed from the module. Variation in the blowdown system 
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had no effect on the fractions of pool fires occurring within both modules as the 
system reduces only the gas released during a leak. 
Further analysis of the results has shown that when the blowdown valves are removed 
from the system, the gas release rate and therefore average concentration of the gas 
cloud increases. This led to a larger number of gas clouds with a concentration 
exceeding the Upper Flammable Limit, UFL, at the time of ignition and therefore 
fewer explosions are predicted. However, due to the increase in the average 
concentration of the gas cloud, the average severity of the explosions increased. The 
number of non-ignitions, resulting in no fatalities, was counteracted by larger 
explosions generating more fatalities. 
The fractions of fatalities demonstrate that in both modules removal or availability of 
the isolation valves has a greater effect than the blowdown valves and the effects of 
removing the isolation valves from the system are greater within the separation 
module. 
Tables 8.17 and 8.18 present the fractions of ignitions and fatalities occurring when 
the unavailability of the isolation and blowdown valves, is varied from the base case 
value of 0.035. Table 8.16 shows the variation in the unavailability of the valves. 
Analysis of the results shows that there is, marginally, a greater variation in the 
fatalities in the separation module than in the compression module due to variation in 
the unavailability of the isolation and blowdown system. 
The fatalities are predicted to vary linearly with the unavailability of the valves. The 
variation in the frequency of fatalities was, however, minor. Only slight differences 
were predicted to the frequency of ignitions following variation of the isolation and 
blowdown systems. 
The trends in the fractions of ignitions occurring were expected following the results 
in Tables 8.10 through to Table 8.13. However the actual variations in the frequency 
of fatalities for the factors in Table 8.16 are minimal and in the compression module 
especially can be attributed to the use of the Monte Carlo simulation method. 
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The initial results suggest that variations in the isolation and blowdown system 
unavailability does not impact significantly on the frequency of fatalities. 
8.6 Availability of gas detection systems 
The probability of failure of each of the three possible gas detection systems are set at 
0.07 in the base case model. Decrease in the unavailability of the gas detection 
systems is expected to lead to a higher number of gas leaks being detected prior to 
ignition. This will lead to more mitigated explosions, generating deviations in the 
frequency and severity of explosions and subsequently delayed ignition jet fires from 
the original predictions, in turn leading to variations in the frequency of fatalities. 
Results would not be expected to change for pool fires as they are not detectable by 
the gas detectors, and immediate ignition jet fires as they ignite prior to detection. 
As less than one percent of ignitions occur when all three gas detection systems are 
unavailable, 100% availability of the detection systems is not expected to result in a 
significant decrease in fatalities. 
8.6.1 Results and discussion 
Tables 8.19 and 8.20 present the fractions of the original frequencies predicted to 
occur when all gas detection systems are 100% available or totally unavailable. 
There is only a negligible effect on the immediate ignition jet fires and pool fires from 
variation in the gas detection system. The small changes can be attributed to the use of 
the Monte Carlo simulation method. 
When all detectors are available there is a decrease in the frequency of fatalities that 
occur. The fractions of explosions and delayed ignition jet fires are reduced, leading 
to a decrease in the fractions of fatalities occurring within both the separation and 
compression modules. However the decrease in the frequencies of explosions and 
subsequent delayed ignition jet fires is not proportional to the decrease in the 
frequency of fatalities. 
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As all the detection systems are 100% available, all gas leaks are detected 
automatically and the deluge, isolation and blowdown systems are activated. This 
leads to a reduction in the proportion of unmitigated explosions which lead in turn to 
a decrease in the average overpressure severity, Table 8.20. A reduction in the 
severity of an explosion reduces the fatalities generated by that explosion. 
Unavailability of the detectors has a negative effect on the fractions of explosions and 
delayed ignition jet fires occurring leading to a subsequent increase in the frequency 
of fatalities. However the increase in the frequency of fatalities is not proportional to 
the increase in the frequency of ignitions suggesting an increase in severity. 
Table 8.22 presents the fractions of local, pre- and post-muster fatalities occurring due 
to explosions in the separation and compression modules. The results are presented as 
a fraction of the local, pre- and post-muster fatalities occurring in the base case 
module when the gas detection system is removed from either module. 
Following removal of the gas detection systems, detection of a gas release relies on 
the workforce in the module detecting the gas cloud manually. The average 
concentration of a gas cloud in a module will be greater prior to activation of the 
safety systems, due to an increase in the time to detect the leak and manually isolate 
the leaking section. This increase in the gas cloud concentration led to an increase in 
the severity of explosions and an increase in the number of explosions which exceed 
the resistance of the blast walls. Therefore an increase in the frequency of local and 
pre-muster fatalities is noticed. There is also a large increase in the frequency of post- 
muster fatalities due to an increase in the frequency of explosions with overpressures 
sufficient to cause platform failure. 
It is of interest to determine the effect of each detection type on the frequency of 
ignitions and fatalities. Table 8.23 presents the results when one detector is either 
always available or unavailable and the remaining two function as normal in the 
separation module and Table 8.24 presents the predictions for the compression 
module. 
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Predictions for all three detectors show that the unavailability of one detector results 
in an increase in the fraction of ignitions and fatalities and its availability results in a 
decrease. The removal of one detection system does not have a highly significant 
impact as the remaining two systems function as in the original model. 
The analysis shows the largest variation in frequency of ignitions and fatalities is from 
varying the beam detector, which detects the presence of a gas cloud using an infra 
red beam. 
In order to determine the sensitivity of the results to a change in the unavailability of 
the detections systems, all three systems are analysed simultaneously subjected to the 
factors in Table 8.25. 
Tables 8.26 and 8.27 present the fractions of ignitions and fatalities occurring when 
the unavailability of all three detection systems are varied by the factors in Table 8.24 
for the separation and compression modules respectively. 
The predictions follow the trends set in Table 8.19 and 8.20 for 100% availability and 
unavailability of the gas detection systems. 
These initial results suggest that improvement of the gas detection systems would not 
be highly beneficial in reducing the frequency of fatalities in both the separation 
module and the compression module. 
8.7 Unavailability of the deluge system 
The deluge system has two associated parameters to indicate how likely or frequently 
it fails, these being the unavailability of the system and the frequency that the system 
fails once successfully activated, 0.09 and 9.446x106 per year respectively. It is 
expected that a variation in the unavailability of the deluge system will lead to a 
variation in the number and severity of pool fires in particular, as it is assumed that if 
the deluge system is functioning prior to ignition a pool fire cannot be established. If 
the deluge system functions before or during a release resulting in an explosion it was 
assumed that the explosion overpressure would be reduced due to suppression of the 
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flammability of the gas cloud. Deluge will not extinguish a jet fire in an open sided 
module and therefore no variation would be expected. 
8.7.1 Results and discussion 
Tables 8.28 and 8.29 present the fractions of ignitions and fatalities occurring within 
the separation and compression modules respectively when the deluge system is either 
100% available or removed from the system. 
Less than 10% of explosions in both the separation and compression modules in the 
base case model are unmitigated. Therefore it is not implausible that the variation in 
the frequency of fatalities is negligible when the deluge system is 100% available. It 
is more surprising however that this takes the form of an increase in the separation 
module. The results when the deluge system was removed from the module are more 
unexpected, with a reduction in the frequency of fatalities predicted in the separation 
module. 
The difference in the fraction of pool fires occurring when the deluge system was 
varied can be attributed to a number of key assumptions made when creating the 
SAROS code. Initially, the Monte Carlo simulation method uses a random number 
generator to determine which section the leak will occur on. Sections are selected 
depending on the probability of a leak occurring on that section. The percentages that 
each section is selected during a run of one million simulations are shown in Tables 
8.30 and 8.31. 
Within the separation module, sections 13 and 21 contain no oil and isolation between 
the sections and another section would have to fail to release oil. The majority of 
leaks that occur therefore have the potential to result in an oil leak, dependent on the 
location of the leak hole. 
Only sections 1,2 and 3 have the potential to release oil into the compression module 
as they are linked to oil-containing sections in the separation module. Less than three 
percent of the leaks into the compression module can therefore contain oil and result 
in a pool fire. 
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A further assumption is that an oil leak will not result in a pool fire if the deluge 
system is available at the time of ignition. In the event of a two-phase leak (oil and 
gas simultaneously) occurring when the deluge system is available, SAROS only 
considers the gas release as a potential source of fatalities. This assumption is 
responsible for the increase in the fractions of explosions and immediate ignition jet 
fires occurring when the deluge system is 100% available in the separation module. 
As there are so few oil and or two-phase releases within the compression module, 
100% availability of the deluge system does not generate many more explosions and 
jet fires as in the separation module. 
However the variation in the frequency of ignitions when the deluge system is 100% 
available is not proportional to the variation in the frequency of fatalities. Table 8.32 
presents the fractions of fatalities that occur due to ignitions in the separation and 
compression modules when compared to the base case. 
The increase in the frequency of fatalities due to immediate ignition jet fires is 
comparable to the increase in the frequency of the fires occurring and therefore no 
effect on the severity of the immediate ignition jet fires is assumed. 
An increase is predicted in the fatalities caused by explosions and subsequent delayed 
ignition jet fires within the separation module and a decrease within the compression 
module. However the frequency of fatalities generated by explosions has varied 
disproportionately with the variations in the frequency of explosions within both 
modules. There must therefore be a decrease in the severity of the ignitions within the 
both modules. 
In the base case model, 99.8% of explosions had an overpressure of less than one bar 
in both the separation and compression modules. Within both modules, availability of 
the deluge system does not affect this figure however the highest overpressure that is 
generated is reduced. In the separation module the base case predicted explosions 
occurring over eight bar, 100% availability of the deluge system reduces this to under 
six bar. In the compression module the maximum overpressure generated within the 
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base case model and when the deluge system is 100% available is the same, between 
3 and 4 bar, however there is a decrease in the average overpressure generated. 
A variation in the frequency of fatalities due to delayed ignition jet fires was 
predicted, however the frequency of fatalities due to these events generated in the 
base case is low and therefore the variation is not as relevant as the explosion 
fatalities. 
Unavailability of the deluge system results in an increased number of two-phase 
releases that generate a pool fire. Although the increase in the compression module 
looks substantial, it is however only minor compared to the actual frequency of 
occurrence of pool fires in the separation module. 
Presence of a pool fire inhibits the build up of a gas cloud within the module as it 
presents a constant ignition source. Therefore the increase in pool fires seen in Table 
8.28 leads to a decrease in the frequency of explosions and immediate ignition jet 
fires in the separation module. Fatalities generated from pool fires and delayed 
ignition jet fires are small in comparison to explosions and immediate ignition jet 
fires, and therefore the frequency of fatalities decreases. 
This effect is not witnessed in the compression module as there are a very small 
number of oil releases. The increase in the frequency of fatalities is due to the increase 
in the number of unmitigated explosions. 
It is of interest to model the variation in unavailability of the deluge system and 
determine the rate at which the fractions of ignitions, in particular pool fires, are 
affected. The initial unavailability of the deluge system and the frequency that the 
system fails once it has been activated are varied as in Table 8.33. 
The trends in the frequency of ignitions and fatalities within the separation and 
compression modules are as expected following the results for the total availability or 
unavailability of the system. 
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A decrease in the unavailability of the deluge system results in fewer pool fires 
leading to an increase in the frequencies of gas releases and ignitions within the 
separation module. The severity of the explosions, within both modules when the 
unavailability of the deluge system is reduced, are also reduced. 
Within the separation module, an increase in the unavailability of the deluge system 
generates more pool fires and less gas releases available to result in explosions and jet 
fires. As pool fires are generally less severe and fewer, more severe, gas ignitions are 
occurring, a lower frequency of fatalities is predicted. 
Within the compression module the trend of the results were as expected. A decrease 
in the unavailability of the deluge system resulted more mitigated explosions and a 
lower frequency of fatalities. An increase in the unavailability resulted in more 
unmitigated explosions which due to an increased severity predicted an increase in the 
frequency of fatalities. 
The frequencies of ignitions and fatalities within the separation and compression 
modules follow the trends predicted for the total availability or unavailability of the 
system in Tables 8.28 and 8.29. 
A decrease in the unavailability of the deluge system results in fewer pool fires 
leading to an increase in the frequencies of gas releases and ignitions within the 
separation module. The severity of the explosions within both modules are reduced 
and a minor reduction is noticed in the frequency of fatalities. 
Within the separation module, an increase in the unavailability of the deluge system 
generates more pool fires and less gas releases available to result in explosions and jet 
fires. As pool fires are generally less severe and fewer, more severe, gas ignitions are 
occurring, a lower frequency of fatalities is predicted. 
Within the compression module the trend of the results were as expected. A decrease 
in the unavailability of the deluge system resulted in more mitigated explosions and a 
lower frequency of fatalities. An increase in the unavailability resulted in more 
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unmitigated explosions which due to an increased severity predicted an increase in the 
frequency of fatalities. 
These initial results suggest that removal of the deluge system from modules 
containing a significant proportion of oil would reduce the frequency of explosions 
and jet fires occurring and subsequently reduce the frequencies of fatalities. 
8.8 Resistance of the Blast and Fire walls 
Blast and fire walls are present in modules to prevent the escalation of an explosion or 
fire into surrounding modules. It is not expected that the inclusion or removal of these 
safety features will result in a variation in the number of ignitions but may affect the 
number of fatalities. 
On the example platform considered in this thesis, the separation and compression 
modules are located one above the other on the opposite side of the platform from the 
temporary refuge, TR, Figure 8.5. 
Compression 
TR 
Separation 
Figure 8.5 - Relation of the modules to the TR on the example platform. 
There are two modules placed between the separation and compression modules and 
the TR and the estimated distance from the modules to the TR is 46.5 metres. In order 
to breach the TR and generate post-muster fatalities, a fire from the compression 
module requires a flame length of over 46.5m for 7200 seconds. 
It was assumed in the base case model that no fire would breach the module fire walls 
before it had been detected and the population of the remaining modules had 
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evacuated to the TR. Therefore there can be no fatalities within the modules between 
the compression and separation modules and the TR (pre-muster fatalities) due to 
fires. This assumption will remain for analyses when the resistance of the fire wall is 
equal to or greater than the resistance in the base case model. If the resistance of the 
fire wall is reduced, and the time to penetrate the wall is less than the time to evacuate 
the adjacent module, then pre-muster fatalities will be generated. 
The assumption was made that module walls could only fail in the horizontal 
direction. Due to the characteristics of pool fires it was assumed that pool fires can not 
fail internal walls between modules. 
An explosion within the compression or separation modules requires an overpressure 
of 0.6 bar to exceed the capability of the blast wall and generate pre-muster fatalities 
in adjacent modules. In order to breach the TR blast wall, an explosion must initiate 
within an adjoining module. Therefore explosions within the separation and 
compression modules can only cause post-muster fatalities by causing platform 
collapse. 
8.8.1 Results and Discussion 
Tables 8.36 and 8.37 predict the fractions of fatalities that will occur when the walls 
are either removed or designed to withstand all ignitions within the separation and 
compression modules respectively. 
Removal or strengthening of the walls had no impact on the frequency of ignitions 
that occurred. No variation due to the Monte Carlo simulation method is predicted in 
these results as the fatality section of the model does not require the use of the random 
number generator. However removal of the walls results in a large increase in the 
fraction of fatalities. 
Further analysis of the results highlights that within both modules, the increase is due 
to an increase in the frequency of fatalities generated by explosions and immediate 
ignition jet fires, Table 8.38. 
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With no walls in place in a module, an explosion or jet fire of any strength has the 
potential to create pre-muster fatalities. Due to the assumptions regarding failure of 
walls due to pool fires and fatalities due to fires occurring after an explosion, Chapter 
7, removal of the walls from the module had no effect on the fatalities due to delayed 
ignition jet fires or pool fires. 
Inclusion of walls which can withstand any explosion or fire reduced the fraction of 
fatalities. Table 8.39 shows that the numbers of fatalities due to fires do not change 
from the base case for both the separation and compression modules. In the base case 
model all three categories of fire result in local fatalities only, these fatalities are not 
affected by the improvement of fire walls. The variation in fatalities is a result of a 
decrease in the fatalities due to explosions. 
Tables 8.40 and 8.41 present the fractions of ignitions and fatalities when either the 
fire walls or blast walls are varied. When the firewalls are removed or strengthened 
the blast walls remain as in the base case and vice versa. 
Strengthening of the blast walls to withstand an infinite amount of pressure had only a 
small effect on the frequency of fatalities within either module. Table 8.42 shows the 
fractions of explosions which occur with an overpressure less than or greater than the 
strength of the blast walls in the base case model, 0.6 bar. 
Approximately one quarter of a percent of all explosions that occur have an 
overpressure sufficient to exceed the resistance of the blast walls within both the 
separation and compression modules in the base case model. Increase of the resistance 
of the blast walls to an infinite level reduced the pre-muster fatalities generated by 
explosions to zero for both modules. The only fatalities generated outside of the 
module being analysed were post-muster fatalities, generated by explosions of 
sufficient severity to cause total platform collapse. 
If the assumption was made that the presence of blast walls with infinite resistance 
would remove the possibility of platform collapse due to overpressure, the fractions of 
fatalities with respect to the base case would reduce to the values in Table 8.43. 
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Increase of the resistance of the firewalls to an infinite amount of time resulted in no 
fewer fatalities. This is due to the assumption that no fire would penetrate a fire wall 
at base case strength before evacuation had completed from the adjacent module. 
Removal of the blast walls from the module resulted in an increase in the frequency of 
fatalities. This increase was due solely to an increase in the number of fatalities due to 
explosions. Table 8.44 presents the fractions of local, pre-muster and post-muster 
fatalities occurring within the separation and compression modules as compared to the 
base case model. 
Both modules originally had a small frequency of pre-muster fatalities due to 
explosions in comparison to the frequency of local fatalities, removal of the protective 
blast walls from the modules has a dramatic effect on the frequency of pre-muster 
fatalities, with over 2000 and 500 times the number of fatalities occurring in the 
separation and compression modules respectively as occurred in the base case. As all 
explosions, irrespective of strength, `fail' the blast wall, the population of that module 
who have not evacuated become fatalities. 
The increase in local fatalities is due to the assumption that at the time when an 
explosion fails a blast wall, the total population of the module become fatalities. 
Due to the location of the separation and compression modules from the TR, there is 
no increase in the number of post-muster fatalities. The fatalities generated in the base 
case model are due to total platform failure and not due to the overpressure of the 
explosion failing the TR blast wall. 
Removal of the fire walls from the platform has the greatest effect on the frequency of 
fatalities within both the separation and compression module analysis. Due to the 
assumptions within the base case that a fire would not penetrate a fire wall before an 
adjacent module had evacuated and the distance from the TR, only local fatalities 
were generated. 
Only fatalities due to immediate ignition jet fires were affected by removal of the fire 
walls. Tables 8.45 and 8.46 shows the fractions, when compared to the base case 
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model, of local, pre-muster and post-muster fatalities occurring within the separation 
and compression modules when the fire walls are removed from the platform. 
Although the fraction of local fatalities occurring due to immediate ignition jet fires 
following removal of the fire walls is lower than in the base case, the actual frequency 
of local fatalities is higher. The decrease in the fraction is due to the vast increase in 
the frequency of pre-muster fatalities. 
Removal of the walls allows a fire of any strength to generate fatalities within 
adjoining modules. The assumption was made that if a fire wall is failed then the 
population of both modules will become fatalities. As the fires are ignited 
immediately there will be no evacuation and on the occurrence of an adequate fire in a 
module, the total population of that module and the adjoining module will become 
fatalities. 
Removal of the fire walls had no impact on the post-muster fatalities. As in the base 
case, no fires reached the TR due to the distance and the number of modules in 
between and no fires generated were sufficient to cause platform collapse. 
The strength of the blast and fire walls was varied by a number of factors, presented 
in Table 8.47, to determine the effects of introducing different walls within the 
modules. The blast walls have a maximum overpressure (bar) which they can 
withstand while the firewalls can endure a 2m long flame for a period of time (mins). 
Varying the resistances of both the fire and blast walls had the effects presented in 
Tables 8.48 and 8.49. 
Reduction of the resistance of the blast and fire walls increases the fatalities generated 
within the separation and compression module analyses. Improvement of the walls 
has a negligible effect on the fatalities. Reduction of the walls to 0.1 of the resistance 
used in the base case resulted a large step from the frequency of fatalities predicted 
when the walls were reduced by 50%. This is due to an assumption made in the model 
that the minimum overpressure an explosion can generate is 0.10 bar, therefore all 
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explosions exceed this blast wall strength and the majority of jet fires that are 
generated are predicted to have a duration of less than 3.6 minutes and can therefore 
breach these lower resistance walls. 
As clarified previously in the section, these changes are due to the variations in the 
frequencies of fatalities due to explosions and immediate ignition jet fires due to 
variations in the severities of the blast walls and fire walls respectively. 
The results suggest that an increase in the resistance of the blast and fire walls within 
an open module would have an insignificant effect on the frequency of fatalities. 
8.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the effect of varying key input parameters on the 
predicted frequency of explosions, jet fires, pool fires and fatalities. Tables 8.50 and 
8.51 present an overview of the fractions of fatalities generated for each input 
parameter within both the separation and compression modules respectively. 
There are two categories of parameter identified within this chapter. Reduction of one 
type of parameter predicts a reduction in the frequency of fatalities and the other 
predicts an increase. These parameters are listed and assigned an order of importance, 
with 1 being the most desirable, within the separation module within Tables 8.52 and 
8.53. 
Although the maximum windspeed, ignition frequency and leak frequency can not be 
varied to provide an optimum safety system configuration, they provide an insight 
into the sensitivity of the SAROS model to some of the uncontrollable input 
parameters. Tables 8.52 and 8.53 predict that variation of these parameters will have a 
significant effect on the frequency of fatalities. The same trend is noticed in the 
compression module. 
Variation of the maximum windspeed from the base case value of 2.4ms" predicted a 
variation in the frequency of fatalities. However it is highlighted that in order to reach 
the upper maximum windspeeds tested, the environmental conditions around the 
platform would be considered severe 
[481. We can be reasonably confident therefore 
that the value used in the base case model is sufficiently suitable. However the 
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distribution used to estimate the ventilation rate within the module due to the effects 
of the wind is an estimation and is not verified by this analysis. 
Deviations in the frequencies of ignitions and leaks resulted in large variations in the 
frequencies of fatalities. The variation in the frequencies of fatalities were directly 
proportional to the variation in the leak frequency, slightly reduced variation was 
noticed in the ignition frequency. These predictions suggest that it would be beneficial 
to conduct further work to verify the accuracy of the parameter values used. 
The remaining parameters analysed in this chapter could be varied by platform 
operators if it could be justified that the modifications were cost and time effective. 
The unavailability of the parameters could be improved by installation of more 
reliable components or in some cases by reduction of the maintenance intervals. Both 
these options increase the running cost of the platform and therefore the effect on the 
frequency of fatalities must be sufficient to justify any alterations. 
Tables 8.54 and 8.55 present the predicted factors of fatalities for the remaining 
parameters when it is assumed that the unavailability or resistance is subjected to a 
factor of 2 (or 0.5) and 10 (or 0.1) in order to reduce the factors of fatalities within the 
separation and compression modules. 
Due to assumptions made in SAROS, strengthening of the firewalls was predicted to 
have no effect on the frequency of fatalities. Strengthening of the blast walls had only 
a minor effect on the frequency of fatalities, as the majority of explosions that 
occurred in the base case did not exceed the blast wall strength. Increasing the 
resistance of the blast and fire walls had the smallest effect on the fractions of 
fatalities predicted within the separation module and the second smallest in the 
compression module (as the isolation and blowdown system effects were 
inconsistent). 
Removal of the walls from the modules increased the frequency of fatalities 
substantially, although only a minor increase was noticed when the strength of the 
walls was halved. The results suggest that there would be no significant benefit 
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associated with increasing the resistance of the blast and fire walls within either 
module. 
Variation of the unavailability of the isolation or blowdown valves resulted in only 
minor differences in the frequencies of ignition and fatalities. Varying the isolation 
and blowdown valves independently demonstrated that the maximum effect is gained 
when both systems are used simultaneously, removal of one system from the module 
resulted in a minor increase in fatalities. Removal of the isolation system from the 
modules had a more significant effect on the increase in fatalities than the blowdown 
system. 
Negligible results were noticed when the unavailability of the isolation and blowdown 
systems were reduced, more so within the compression module. These results would 
suggest that there would be no significant benefit in improving the isolation and 
blowdown valve system or decreasing the maintenance intervals. However the results 
could be interpreted to suggest that there would be only a minimal increase in the 
number of fatalities if the valves were maintained less regularly in order to reduce 
running costs within both modules. 
Variation in the unavailability of the deluge system had unexpected results. The 
predictions within this chapter suggest that in theory, for a module with a high 
proportion of sections containing oil, it would be beneficial to remove the deluge 
system entirely. This has the effect of generating more pool fires, which generate 
fewer fatalities per ignition, and limiting the number of explosions and jet fires, which 
generate higher numbers of fatalities per ignition. The largest decrease in fatalities 
predicted within the analysis was increasing the unavailability of the deluge system in 
the separation module. 
For modules containing a minority of sections which could result in a pool fire, a 
decrease in the unavailability of the deluge system would have a minor effect on 
reducing the number of fatalities. 
Unavailability of the gas detection system had the greatest effect on the frequency of 
fatalities within both modules when the unavailability was halved. The detector type 
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which had the largest effect on the frequency of fatalities was the beam detector, 
however combination of all three detectors functioning as three independent systems 
reduced the frequency of fatalities the greatest. 
The initial results from this chapter suggest that individual improvements to the safety 
systems would not have a significant impact on reducing the frequency of fatalities. 
However if all systems were improved as discussed above, a more significant 
decrease in the frequency of fatalities may be predicted. The optimum combination of 
safety systems in the open sided modules will be considered further in Chapter 10. 
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Chapter 9 Sensitivity Analysis on Enclosed Sided Platforms 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the sensitivity of the SAROS model when an enclosed module 
is being evaluated. An identical methodology as outlined in Chapter 8 is used to 
determine the sensitivity of the model to the following input parameters: 
Ventilation rate 
" Frequency of ignition 
Frequency of a leak 
" Unavailability of the isolation and blowdown valves 
" Unavailability of the gas detection system 
" Unavailability of the deluge system 
" Resistance of the blast and fire walls 
The purpose of these analyses is to identify which parameters have the greatest 
influence on the frequency of explosions, jet fires and pool fires and subsequently the 
frequency of fatalities per year, and therefore which parameters will be analysed 
further in an optimisation problem. As for the open sided modules, the frequency of 
ignition and leak frequency are not considered further as part of the optimisation 
scheme, they are included in this chapter to determine the sensitivity of the model to 
changes in key input parameters. Unlike open modules, the ventilation rate in the 
enclosed modules is controllable and can potentially become part of the optimisation 
strategy. 
As for open modules the results are provided for the separation and compression 
modules. Table 9.1 presents a summary, from Chapter 6, of the actual frequencies of 
ignitions and fatalities generated within the base case model for both the separation 
and compression modules. 
The compression module on the enclosed platform generates no pool fires. However 
the frequencies of explosions and jet fires is larger than within the separation module 
resulting in a larger frequency of fatalities. 
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All Tables for this Chapter can be found within Appendix C. 
9.2 Ventilation Rate 
On enclosed module platforms the ventilation is provided by a controllable forced 
ventilation system and is independent of the windspeed external to the platform. The 
ventilation rate is measured in air changes per hour, ACPH, the number of times per 
hour a volume of air equal to the volume of the module is replaced. The ventilation 
rate in the base case was assumed to be 50 ACPH and was varied as in Table 9.2. 
An increase in the ventilation rate would be expected to result in a decrease in the 
concentration of gas within the module resulting in explosions of reduced severity and 
frequency and therefore fewer fatalities. 
9.2.1 Results and discussion 
Tables 9.3 and 9.4 present the fractions, as compared to the basecase model, of 
explosions, jet fires, pool fires and fatalities occurring within the separation and 
compression module respectively. 
Only minor variations are noticed for the fractions of explosions and fires occurring 
within either module which can be attributed to the use of the Monte Carlo simulation 
method. Although there is little variation in the frequency of ignitions occurring, there 
is a significant effect on the frequency of fatalities and therefore the severity of the 
ignitions which occur. 
Tables 9.5 and 9.6 present the fractions of fatalities due to explosions, immediate and 
delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires when compared to the frequencies of fatalities 
within the base case for both the separation and compression modules respectively. 
Within the base case of both the separation and compression modules, the frequencies 
of fatalities due to delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires is negligible in comparison 
to the fatalities due to explosions and immediate ignition jet fires. Therefore, although 
the variation in the fractions of fatalities due to delayed ignition jet fires looks 
significant, the actual variations in the frequency are minimal. 
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The large variations in the fractions of fatalities due to explosions is responsible for 
the overall variation in the frequency of fatalities. An increase in the ventilation rate 
severely reduces the fatalities. 
Table 9.7 presents the severities of the explosions within the separation module 
compared to the base case model when the ventilation rate is subjected to the factor in 
Table 9.2. 
Within the base case model, 96% of explosions occur with a severity of less than one 
bar and the maximum explosion overpressure is between 8 and 8.1 bar. Variation in 
the ventilation rate within the module did not have a significant effect on the 
maximum overpressure reached, however the average severity of an explosion was 
affected. Reduction of the ventilation rate reduced the number of explosions that 
occurred with an overpressure of less than one bar and increased the average severity 
of the explosions. An increase in the ventilation rate resulted in the opposite effect. 
The variation in the explosion overpressures within the compression module followed 
the trend identified within the separation module in Table 9.7. 
The results demonstrate that, for both modules, an increase in the ventilation rate 
results in a decrease in the frequency of fatalities. However a compromise must be 
reached between an increased ventilation rate reducing the numbers of fatalities due to 
explosion or fire and maintaining a practical working environment. Although a large 
reduction in the frequency of fatalities would be beneficial, increasing the ventilation 
rate by a factor of ten may cause other difficulties. 
It is currently assumed within the enclosed sided platform modelled on SAROS that 
on detection of a leak the ventilation within the module will be shutdown and only a 
background ventilation of one ACPH will be present. The results from this section 
suggest that following detection of a leak it would be more beneficial to increase the 
ventilation rate. However the risk that the gas ventilated from the module may ignite 
elsewhere on the platform is not considered. 
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Table 9.8 presents the fractions of explosions, immediate ignition jet fires, delayed 
ignition jet fires, pool fires and fatalities within the separation module when the 
ventilation rate is doubled, rather than decreased, following detection of a leak. The 
ventilation rate of the module before detection is the same as within the base case 
model. 
When compared to the base case model, the results when the ventilation rate is 
doubled following detection of a leak demonstrate that the frequency of fatalities will 
be dramatically decreased. The decrease in fatalities is due to a severe decrease in the 
frequency of fatalities due to explosions. A similar trend was predicted for the 
compression module. 
9.3 Frequency of Ignition 
Although this parameter cannot be optimised in order to minimise the frequency of 
fatalities, it is included in the analysis to determine the sensitivity of the model to the 
value estimated in the input data. 
The probability of an ignition source in the vicinity of a leak was assumed, as for 
open modules, to be 0.07 for immediate ignition in the base case model. If the leak 
was not ignited immediately there was assumed to be a frequency of ignition prior to 
isolation of 0.28 per hour and 0.0028 per hour post-isolation. The variations used in 
the analysis are shown in Table 9.9. 
As within the open module analysis an increase in the number of fatalities, due to a 
higher number of fires and explosions, would be expected when the ignition 
frequency was increased. 
9.3.1 Results and discussion 
Tables 9.10 and 9.11 present the results for the separation and compression modules. 
Variation of the ignition rate has a noticeable effect on the fractions of ignitions and 
fatalities. A decrease in the ignition rate decreases the fractions of ignitions occurring 
resulting in a decrease in the fraction of fatalities. 
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Similar trends are noticed between the results in Table 9.10 and 9.11 and the results 
for the open sided modules in Tables 8.7 and 8.8. The most noticeable difference is in 
the fractions of pool fires which occur within the separation module. Within the open 
module there was very little difference between the frequencies of pool fires when the 
ignition frequency was varied due to the majority of oil releases occurring within the 
base case model (without deluge available) being ignited. 
Although it is assumed that the module layouts and inventories on the enclosed 
platform are identical to those used in the open modules, far fewer pool fires are 
ignited within the enclosed module. Within the enclosed module, only ten percent of 
oil leaks, occurring without deluge, become established pool fires. Therefore an 
increase in the ignition rate results in the ignition of a greater number of oil releases. 
No pool fires occur within the base case compression module. Increase in the ignition 
rate has resulted in the occurrence of pool fires within the enclosed compression 
module, however the frequency of occurrence is very low with only six pool fires, 
from one million simulations, being ignited when the ignition frequency is increased 
by a factor of ten. 
The variation in the fractions of fatalities is due to the variation in the factors of 
ignitions, no variation is detected in the severity of ignitions. 
As within open modules, presence of a constant ignition source reduced the frequency 
of explosions and therefore fatalities outside of the module to zero, for both separation 
and compression modules. However the increase in the frequency of immediate 
ignition jet fires led to an increase in the frequencies of fatalities. 
9.4 Frequency of leak occurring 
Each section on the enclosed platform has the same leak frequency as it's equivalent 
section on the open platform, the frequency per year that a leak could occur on that 
isolatable section. 
Each frequency within the input file was varied by the factors in Table 9.12. 
197 
9.4.1 Results and Discussion 
As within the open sided modules, a random number generator is used to determine 
which section generates the leak and therefore applying the same multiplication factor 
to the leak frequency of each section will have no impact on the section that is 
selected or the number of leaks. 
The number of ignitions and fatalities generated for each of the factors is identical to 
the base case and the fractions of ignitions and fatalities are therefore identical to the 
fraction of the leak frequency. 
As previously mentioned, no variation due to the Monte Carlo simulation method is 
noticed as variation of the leak frequency does not affect the use of the random 
number generator. 
9.5 Unavailability of Isolation and Blowdown Valves 
The unavailability of each isolation and blowdown valve is set in the base case model 
at 0.035, identical to the open sided module. Variations in the unavailability of the 
isolation or blowdown valves would be expected to have a minor impact on the 
fraction of ignitions occurring but have a larger impact on the severity of the events 
and therefore the fraction of fatalities as in the open sided modules. 
9.5.1 Results and discussion 
Tables 9.13 and 9.14 present the fractions of ignitions and fatalities occurring when 
all the valves (isolation and blowdown) are either functioning correctly (available) or 
have been removed from the system (unavailable). 
Removal of the isolation and blowdown valve systems from the platform result in a 
decrease in the fractions of ignitions and a minor increase in the fractions of fatalities 
within both the separation and compression modules. 
Table 9.15 presents the fractions of total fatalities within the modules due to 
explosions, immediate and delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires generated by 
removal of the isolation and blowdown valves within the separation and compression 
modules. 
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The actual frequencies of fatalities due to the delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires 
are negligible within both modules. Therefore the variation in the frequency of 
fatalities between the modules is due to the explosions and immediate ignition jet 
fires. 
Table 9.16 presents the fractions of fatalities generated by explosions and immediate 
ignition jet fires within both modules when compared to the fatalities within the base 
case models. 
The frequency of fatalities generated by immediate ignition jet fires is much smaller 
than the frequency of fatalities due to explosions and the increase in the total 
frequency of fatalities within both modules is due predominantly to explosions. 
Although there has been a reduction in the predicted frequencies of explosions, there 
has been an increase in the fatalities due to explosions in both modules, indicating an 
increase in severity. 
Analysis of the results has shown that when the isolation and blowdown valves are 
removed from the modules the release rate and therefore amount of oil and gas 
released into the module increases. 
Within both modules there is a decrease in the proportion of gas clouds with a 
concentration less than the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) at the time of ignition. 
However as there is a more significant increase in the proportion of gas clouds with a 
concentration over the Upper Flammable Limit (UFL) the frequency of explosions 
decreases. Due to the increase in release rates, the average concentration at the time of 
ignition has increased resulting in an increase in the fatalities due to explosions. 
It was assumed, within enclosed modules, that if the gas release rate during a jet fire 
exceeded a maximum release rate, the fire would self extinguish due to lack of 
oxygen. A negligible decrease is seen in the fractions of immediate ignition jet fires 
occurring however an increase in the gaseous release rate results in jet fires with a 
reduced severity. The decrease in both the explosions and pool fires results in a 
decrease in the fraction of delayed ignition jet fires within both modules. 
199 
Improvement of the isolation and blowdown valves to 100% availability has only a 
minimal effect on the fractions of ignitions and a decrease in the frequencies of 
fatalities. The decrease is minor and can be attributed predominantly to the use of the 
Monte Carlo simulation method. 
Tables 9.17 and 9.18 present the results when either all the blowdown valves or all the 
isolation valves are available or unavailable within the separation module and 
compression module respectively. During simulations when the isolation valves are 
either removed from the model (unavailable) or functioning correctly (available) the 
blowdown valves function with a likelihood as in the base case model and similarly 
for isolation valves when analysing the blowdown valves. 
As for Tables 9.13 and 9.14, a negligible difference is seen in the fractions of 
immediate ignition jet fires predicted. 
Only small variations are noticed in the frequencies of fatalities when the isolation 
and blowdown valves are varied within both the separation and compression modules 
and no variation is predicted to the pool fires in the compression module. 
The smallest variation is predicted when each of the systems is 100% available. This 
is due to the remaining system still functioning as in the base case model and 
therefore in the majority of cases the inventory released to the module is still being 
inhibited by both systems. 
When either the isolation or the blowdown valves are removed from the separation 
and compression modules the fractions of ignitions follow the trend in Tables 9.12 
and 9.13; a reduction is seen in the explosions, pool fires and delayed ignition jet 
fires. Removal of either system within the either module results in a minor increase in 
fatalities. 
Table 9.19 presents the fractions of fatalities due to explosions and immediate ignition 
jet fires within the separation module compared to the base case when the isolation or 
blowdown valves are removed. 
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The fraction of fatalities due to explosions compared to the base case is greater than 
the fractions of explosions when either the isolation or blowdown valves are removed. 
As mentioned previously this is due to an increase in the average concentration of the 
gas clouds resulting in more severe explosion overpressures. Analysis of the 
compression module results predicts a similar trend with an increase in fatalities due 
to explosions. 
The unavailability of both sets of valves was varied from the base case value by the 
factors presented in Table 9.20. Tables 9.21 and 9.22 show the results for the 
separation module and compression module respectively. 
Variation in the fractions of fatalities is negligible within both modules. As within 
Tables 9.13 and 9.14 the variations in the proportions of immediate ignition jet fires 
are slight, however as the unavailability of the valves increases and the gas release 
rate increases to above the maximum release rate for combustion, the severity of the 
jet fires decreases resulting in fewer fatalities. 
As the unavailability increases, the average concentration of gas clouds increases, 
resulting in more severe overpressures but fewer explosions and therefore delayed 
ignition jet fires occurring. 
The variation in severity and frequency of ignitions results in a non-linear relationship 
between the fractions of fatalities presented in Tables 9.21 and 9.22 and the valve 
unavailability. Although there is little difference in results and an optimum 
unavailability for isolation and blowdown valves cannot be predicted from these 
results, it can be estimated that slightly fewer fatalities could be generated within the 
compression module if the valve unavailability is reduced significantly. 
9.6 Unavailability of gas detection systems 
The same safety systems modelled in the open module analysis are also used in the 
enclosed module, namely three independent detection systems, consisting of sonic, 
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point and beam detectors. The probability of failure of each of the three systems is 
0.07 in the base case model. 
Within enclosed modules it is assumed that pool fires and immediate ignition jet fires 
are detected manually, immediately upon ignition. Therefore they will not be affected 
by variation in the unavailability of the gas detection system. 
9.6.1 Results and discussion 
Tables 9.23 and 9.24 present the fractions of ignitions and fatalities occurring when 
all three detection systems are either removed from the system (unavailable) or 
functioning correctly (available). 
When all detectors are available there is negligible difference to the fractions of 
ignitions and fatalities predicted in the model. 
Removal of the gas detection system doubles the fatalities occurring within the 
separation module and increases the fatalities within the compression module by a 
factor of 3.9. The increase in both modules is due solely to an increase in the fatalities 
due to explosions, Table 9.25. 
Removal of the detection systems results in an increase in the average concentration 
of a gas cloud at the time of ignition; due to isolation and blowdown valves not 
activating, an increase in the number of unmitigated explosions occurring; due to the 
deluge system not being activated, and an increase in the number of people in the 
modules at the time of ignition due to evacuation procedures not commencing. 
Although an increase was recorded in the number of local and pre-muster fatalities, 
the increase in fatalities is due predominantly to a large increase in the frequency of 
post-muster fatalities due to explosions, Table 9.26. 
The compression module was affected more by the changes to the detection systems 
than the separation module. Changes in both modules however were significantly 
smaller than in the open module analysis. 
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It is of interest to determine which detector type, if any, has the greatest effect on the 
fractions of fatalities. 
Tables 9.27 and 9.28 present the results when one detector is either available or 
unavailable and the remaining two function as in the base case model for the 
separation module and compression module correspondingly. 
Removal of, or 100% availability of, one type of detector from the module does not 
have a significant effect on the fractions of ignitions. As the remaining two systems 
function as in the base case and a large proportion of the ignitions are detected 
manually at the time of ignition the variation in the fatalities is negligible. 
The three systems were analysed simultaneously to determine the effect of varying the 
probability of failure from the base case parameter of 0.07, Table 9.29. 
It is expected that an increase in the failure probability of the detection systems will 
result in a increase in ignitions and fatalities. The fractions of ignitions and fatalities 
when the probability of failure of the gas detection system is varied by the factors in 
Table 9.29 is presented in Tables 9.30 and 9.31 for the separation and compression 
modules respectively. 
Tables 9.30 and 9.31 demonstrate that variations in the unavailability of the gas 
detection system have no effect on the proportion of immediate ignition jet fires or 
pool fires, variations in these ignitions are due to the use of the Monte Carlo 
simulation method. 
A decrease in the unavailability predicts only a negligible decrease in the proportions 
of explosions and a small decrease in the fractions of fatalities. Further analysis shows 
that there is no effect on the severity of ignitions due to a decrease in the 
unavailability of the gas detection system. 
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An increase in the unavailability suggests only a slight increase in the fractions of 
explosions will occur, however the subsequent increase in the severity of the 
explosions results in an increase in the frequency of fatalities. 
The results predict varying the unavailability of the gas detection system in the 
enclosed module has a lesser effect than in the open modules. 
The above analysis has identified that the majority of the differences in the 
frequencies of fatalities from varying the unavailability of the gas detection system 
results from a large change to the frequencies of fatalities generated by explosions. 
This was due to the assumption that the ventilation rate would be reduced following 
detection. Section 9.2 revealed that a decrease in the ventilation rate increased the 
frequencies of fatalities due to explosions and fatalities could be reduced by 
increasing the ventilation rate following detection. Table 9.32 presents the fractions of 
ignitions and fatalities when the detection system is 100% available or removed from 
the separation module. However following detection the ventilation rate is doubled 
rather than decreased. 
Compared to the base case model with the altered assumption that the ventilation rate 
doubles following detection, increasing the availability of all the gas detection 
systems to 1 reduces the frequency of fatalities. These initial results suggest that it 
may be beneficial to consider the combination of a more reliable gas detection system 
with an increase in the ventilation rate upon detection within the optimisation scheme. 
A similar trend was noticed when the compression module was subjected to the same 
assumption. 
9.7 Unavailability of the deluge system 
The deluge system within enclosed modules is modelled in the same way as on open 
module platforms. The system has an initial unavailability, 0.09, and then a frequency 
of 9.446x10-6 per year that the system fails once successfully activated. However, 
within enclosed modules it is assumed that the presence of water deluge will not 
affect explosions. It will however extinguish jet and pool fires. 
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9.7.1 Results and discussion 
Tables 9.33 and 9.34 present the results when the deluge system is either available or 
unavailable during the analysis. 
As within the open modules, the assumption was made that a pool fire would not be 
established if the deluge system was available prior to ignition. 100% availability of 
the deluge system has reduced the number of pool fires occurring within the 
separation module to zero. As within the open modules this has resulted in an increase 
in the factors of explosions and jet fires occurring, resulting in an increase in the 
frequencies of fatalities. 
The increase in the frequencies of fatalities is larger within the enclosed module than 
within the open modules. Table 9.35 presents the proportions of the total fatalities due 
to explosions and fires in the base case model and when the deluge system is 100% 
available. 
The proportion of fatalities generated by explosions is slightly greater when the 
deluge is available than within the base case model. Availability of the deluge system 
has no direct effect on the severities of explosions however on activation of the deluge 
system it is assumed that the ventilation will be reduced further, which as discussed in 
Section 8.2 results in more explosions of greater severity. 
No pool fires are predicted to occur within the enclosed sided compression module 
within the base case model therefore 100% availability of the deluge system does not 
affect this value. Subsequently the increase in the factors of explosions and jet fires 
noticed in the separation module is not predicted. 
Removal of the deluge system from the separation module results in an increase in the 
fractions of pool fires and subsequent delayed ignition jet fires. As within the open 
sided modules, a two phase release cannot produce an explosion or jet fire at the same 
time as a pool fire, therefore as removal of the deluge system results in a large 
increase in the number of pool fires, the factors of explosions and jet fires decreases. 
As the fatalities generated by pool fires are negligible and the other ignitions have 
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reduced, the removal of the system is predicting an increase in the severity of one or 
all of the ignitions. 
Table 9.36 presents the proportions of fatalities generated by explosions, immediate 
ignition jet fires, delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires within the separation module 
for both the base case and when the deluge is unavailable. 
A large reduction in the fraction of total fatalities generated due to explosions and an 
increase in fatalities due to immediate ignition jet fires is predicted when the deluge 
system is removed from the module. The deluge system has no direct effect on the 
severity of explosions and only a slight decrease in the fatalities due to explosions is 
predicted. 
The variations are due to a substantial increase in the frequency of fatalities due to 
immediate ignition jet fires due to an assumption within SAROS that if a deluge 
system is available at the time of ignition of a jet fire, the fire will be extinguished due 
to a reduction in the oxygen available for combustion. If the deluge system is 
removed from a module the jet fires are not extinguished and therefore the length of 
time which the fire bums is increased. 
Removal of the deluge system from the compression module results in a small 
number of pool fires occurring. However this increase is not large enough to decrease 
the factors of explosions and jet fires. Removal of the system results in an increase in 
explosions and jet fires, however the increases are negligible and can be attributed 
mainly to the Monte Carlo simulation method. Although the factors of ignitions are 
not affected greatly, a non linear decrease in the proportions of fatalities is predicted. 
Table 9.37 presents the proportions of fatalities generated by explosions, immediate 
ignition jet fires, delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires within the compression 
module when the deluge is unavailable. 
Although only a small variation in the proportions of fatalities due to explosions and 
jet fires are predicted, the actual frequency of fatalities due to immediate ignition jet 
fires is the same as in the base case. The variation is due solely to a decrease in the 
fatalities due to explosions when the deluge is unavailable. As stated earlier this is not 
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due to direct effects of the deluge system but due to further reduction of the 
ventilation rate being avoided. 
The deluge system availability was varied by the factors in Table 9.38. The results for 
the separation module and compression module are presented in Tables 9.39 and 9.40 
respectively. 
The fractions of ignitions and fatalities generated by variation of the deluge system 
are not as expected. Both modules predict that the minimum number of fatalities is 
not at one extreme (i. e. system 100% available or removed) but within between these 
limits. In the separation module the minimum occurs when the deluge unavailability 
is doubled and within the compression module is when the unavailability is subjected 
to a factor of ten. 
Within both modules, reduction in the unavailability of the deluge system has resulted 
in an increase in the frequencies of fatalities due to the assumption that the ventilation 
rate decreases if deluge is present. 
The largest reduction in the frequencies of fatalities, within the separation module, is 
predicted when the unavailability of the deluge system is doubled. Within the 
compression module the largest reduction is when the system unavailability is 
subjected to a factor of ten. 
When the deluge system unavailability is increased within both modules there is an 
increase in the number of two-phase releases resulting in a pool fire and subsequently 
a reduction in the frequency of explosions and immediate ignition jet fires. However 
these variations are negligible within the compression module. 
Doubling the unavailability of the deluge system within the separation module 
predicts an increase in the fatalities due to jet fires and pool fires, however a large 
decrease in the fatalities due to explosions results in an overall decrease in the total 
frequency of fatalities. 
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When the unavailability of the deluge system is reduced further, there are only minor 
further decreases in the frequency of fatalities due to explosions, however the 
fatalities due to pool fires continues to increase. 
Reducing the unavailability of the deluge system within the compression module 
increases the fraction of explosions and subsequent delayed ignition jet fires and 
reduce the immediate ignition jet fires, however the variations are minimal and can be 
attributed to the use of the Monte Carlo simulation method. An increase in the 
unavailability of the deluge system results in a decrease in the frequency of fatalities 
due to explosions due to the effects of the ventilation rate. 
The majority of results predicted when varying the unavailability of the deluge system 
are dependent on the presence of the ventilation rate affecting the fatalities due to 
explosions. Table 9.41 below presents the frequencies of ignitions and fatalities when 
the deluge system is 100% available or removed from the separation module. 
However the assumption that the ventilation rate will decrease following detection has 
been removed and replaced with the assumption that following detection the 
ventilation rate will increase. There will still be a small reduction in the ventilation 
rate following activation of the deluge system. 
When compared to the base case model assuming that the ventilation rate double on 
detection of a release, the deluge system has a far more significant effect than when 
the ventilation rate reduced. From these initial results, it appears that it would be 
beneficial to model the deluge system within the optimisation strategy if variations to 
the ventilation rate are also included. 
A similar trend was predicted in the compression module. 
9.8 Resistance of the Blast and Fire walls 
As within the open sided platform, blast and fire walls are positioned between 
modules in order to contain ignitions and reduce fatalities. If the overpressure of an 
explosion or flame duration of a fire exceeds the resistance of one of these walls it 
will be assumed to fail. On failure of a blast or fire wall it is assumed that the 
population of both modules will become fatalities. 
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It was assumed within the base case model that the population of an adjacent module 
would have evacuated prior to the time to fail a fire wall, and therefore only local 
fatalities can occur due to both pool and jet fires. It has been assumed within this 
analysis that if the resistance of the fire wall is reduced, and the time to penetrate the 
wall is less than the time to evacuate the adjacent module, then pre-muster fatalities 
will be generated. 
The relationship of the separation and compression modules within the enclosed 
platform to the Temporary Refuge (TR) is the same as for open modules, Figure 8.5. 
Therefore only explosions can generate post-muster fatalities by causing platform 
failure. 
9.8.1 Results and discussion 
Tables 9.42 and 9.43 predict the fractions of fatalities that will occur when the walls 
are either removed or designed to withstand all ignitions within the separation and 
compression modules respectively. 
Removal or strengthening of the walls had no impact on the frequency of ignitions 
that occurred. Strengthening of the walls reduces the predicted fractions of fatalities 
however removal of the walls results in a large increase. 
Table 9.44 presents the fractions of fatalities that occurred due to explosions, jet and 
pool fires within the base case when the walls within the module were strengthened. 
Within both modules, the fatalities due to immediate and delayed ignition jet fires and 
pool fires are unaffected to strengthening of the blast and fire walls. Only the 
fatalities due to explosions are varied. This was due to the assumption that in the base 
case model no fires would generate fatalities outside the module, therefore no further 
fatalities will be generated when the resistance is increased. 
However, it is still assumed within the model that an explosion with an overpressure 
exceeding 1.6 bar will cause failure of the platform and generate local, pre- and post- 
muster fatalities. If it is assumed that infinite strengthening of the blast and fire walls 
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would result in the platform withstanding an explosion of any overpressure, the 
frequency of fatalities is reduced further as presented in Table 9.45. 
Removal of the fire walls from the modules increased the fractions of fatalities 
considerably. Table 9.46 presents the fractions of fatalities that occurred due to 
explosions, jet and pool fires within the base case when the walls between the 
modules were removed. 
As within the open sided modules, with no walls in place in a module, an explosion or 
jet fire of any strength has the potential to create pre-muster fatalities. Due to the 
assumptions regarding failure of walls due to pool fires and fatalities due to fires 
occurring after an explosion, Chapter 7, removal of the walls from the module had no 
effect on the fatalities due to delayed ignition jet fires or pool fires. 
Tables 9.47 and 9.48 present the fractions of and fatalities when either the fire walls 
or blast walls are varied. When the firewalls are removed or strengthened the blast 
walls remain as in the base case and vice versa. 
Strengthening of the fire walls had no effect within either module. Tables 9.47 and 
9.48 predict that strengthening of the blast walls is responsible for the reduction in the 
fractions of fatalities when both walls are strengthened as within open sided modules. 
Removal of either wall results in an increase in the fractions of fatalities that are 
predicted. However the tables predict that removal of only one type of wall is not as 
damaging as removal of both walls. As within the open sided modules, removal of 
blast walls generated more fatalities due to explosions and removal of the fire walls 
increased the fatalities due to jet fires. 
The resistances of the blast and fire walls were varied by a number of factors, 
presented in Table 9.49, to determine the effects of introducing different walls within 
the modules. The blast walls have a maximum overpressure (bar) which they can 
withstand while the firewalls can endure a 2m long flame for a period of time (mins). 
Varying the resistances of both the fire and blast walls had the effects presented in 
Tables 9.50 and 9.51. 
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The results predict that there is no benefit in improving the strength of the fire and 
blast walls indefinitely, frequency of fatalities predicted when infinite strength walls 
are installed is reached when the resistances of the walls are multiplied by a factor of 
five. 
The results suggest that an increase in the resistance of the blast and fire walls within 
an enclosed module would have an insignificant effect on the frequency of fatalities. 
9.9 Conclusions 
This chapter has investigated the effect of varying key input parameters on the 
predicted frequency of explosions, jet fires, pool fires and fatalities. Tables 9.52 and 
9.53 present an overview of the fractions of fatalities generated for each input 
parameter within both the separation and compression modules respectively. 
Variation of the unavailability of the isolation and blowdown valve system did not 
predict a consistent increase or decrease in the fractions of fatalities and it was 
assumed that the majority of variation was due to use of the Monte Carlo simulation 
method. Therefore they will not be considered within any further optimisation. 
Although the ignition and leak frequencies are not included within the optimisation 
problem that follows this section, the results provide an indication of the sensitivity of 
the SAROS model to these parameters. 
As within the open sided modules, variation in the fatalities due to variations in the 
leak and ignition frequencies generated a significant variation in the frequencies of 
fatalities. The variation in the frequencies of fatalities were directly proportional to 
the variation in the leak frequency, slightly reduced variations, very similar to the 
values predicted in the open sided module, were noticed in the ignition frequency. As 
within the open sided modules, these predictions suggest that it would be beneficial to 
conduct further work to verify the accuracy of the parameter values used. 
The remaining three parameters can be varied to a degree by installation of 
components with differing unavailability or variation in the interval between periodic 
testing and maintenance. Installation of a more reliable component or a decrease in 
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the inspection interval will increase the lifetime cost to the platform operatives and it 
must be justified that such increases in cost will result in a visible decrease in 
fatalities. 
Tables 9.54 and 9.55 present the predicted factors of fatalities for the remaining 
parameters when it is assumed that the unavailability or resistance is subjected to a 
factor of 2 (or 0.5) and 10 (or 0.1) in order to reduce the factors of fatalities within the 
separation and compression modules. 
The detection system is predicted to have the smallest effect on the frequency of 
fatalities when compared to base case results. This was due to the assumptions in 
developing the model that when a release is detected, the ventilation within an 
enclosed module will shutdown. This shutdown generated an increase in the severity 
of explosions and subsequently an increase in the fractions of fatalities, counteracting 
the reduction of fatalities predicted to occur due reduction in the inventory leaked to 
the module. However, increase of the ventilation rate following detection was 
determined to result in a more significant decrease in the frequencies of fatalities 
following a reduction in the unavailability of the detection systems. 
Reduction in the frequencies of fatalities due to strengthening of the blast and fire 
walls was also negligible. An increase in strength in the walls reduced the pre- and 
post-muster fatalities due to explosions, however the differences are not substantial 
enough to consider further, especially when taking into account the large costs that 
would be incurred in increasing the resistance. 
The deluge system had a significant effect on the frequencies of fatalities, however 
the minimum frequency was not predicted when either the system was removed or 
was 100% available. As with the detection systems, an increase in the ventilation rate 
following detection improved the effect of decreasing the unavailability of the system. 
The decreases are significant enough to consider within further analysis in Chapter 
11. 
Increase of the ventilation rate also had a significant effect in reducing the frequencies 
of fatalities. Increasing the rate by a factor of 10 had the largest effect on reducing the 
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fatalities, however this may result in an unsafe working environment. A practical set 
of values for the ventilation rate will be included in further analysis in Chapter 11. 
Section 9.2 highlighted that if the ventilation rate was increased rather than decreased 
following detection of a release the severity of explosions and therefore the 
frequencies of fatalities will be reduced. An option to increase the ventilation rate 
rather than decrease it following detection will be included in Chapter 11. 
The results within Tables 9.54 and 9.55 suggest that there would be a benefit in 
improving the ventilation rate and deluge system only within the enclosed modules. 
However, within Section 9.6 the effect of varying the unavailability of the gas 
detection systems when the ventilation rate increased following detection was 
considered. A noticeable improvement in the effect of the gas detection system was 
predicted. As the option of increasing the ventilation rate within a module following 
detection will be considered within the Genetic Algorithm it would be beneficial to 
consider the gas detection system also. 
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Chapter 10 Optimisation of the Safety Systems on an Open 
Module Platform 
10.1 Introduction 
Ignition of a gas release on an offshore platform will lead to a fire or explosion with 
the potential to cause fatalities and also platform failure. The example platform 
modelled in SAROS was assumed to have blast walls and fire resistant walls between 
modules capable of withstanding certain severities of explosions and fires. The 
resistance of these walls and the unavailability of the isolation and blowdown valves, 
deluge systems and gas detection systems have been estimated from existing platform 
data. The model has been used previously to estimate the frequency and severity of 
explosions and fires and predict the frequency of expected fatalities per year. In order 
to optimise the safety systems on the platform the frequencies of fatalities must be 
minimised with constraints placed on the resources available to make design 
improvements and limit changes to those which are practical in the offshore 
environment. 
The results from the sensitivity analysis carried out in Chapter 8 suggested that there 
was no major benefit in reducing the unavailability of any one system within the 
module. However a combination of improvements may have a greater impact on 
reducing the predicted frequency of fatalities. It is also possible that the same level of 
performance can be achieved using less resources. 
The systems analysed in Chapter 8 that can be optimised were: 
" Isolation and blowdown valve systems 
Gas detection systems 
" Deluge system 
" Fire and blast walls 
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Reduction in the resistance of the fire and blast walls between modules generated the 
lowest decrease in the frequency of fatalities and will not be considered within the 
optimisation. 
The parameter that generated the largest reduction in the frequency of fatalities was 
the variation in the unavailability of the deluge system within the separation module. 
An increase in the unavailability of this system within a module containing oil was 
shown to reduce the frequency of fatalities. It would be of interest to determine how 
the variation in the unavailability of the deluge system affects the frequency of 
fatalities when other systems are also under analysis. Decrease in the unavailability of 
this system in the compression module resulted in a decrease in fatalities. 
The system which was most consistent across both modules at reducing the frequency 
of fatalities was the gas detection system. Each detector type was analysed 
individually and all three together as one system. Improvements in the unavailability 
of all the detectors resulted in a noticeable decrease in the fatalities, improvements in 
only one detector type showed a far lower reduction in the frequency of fatalities. 
Isolation and blowdown valves had a larger effect on improving the fatality rate 
within the separation module than the compression module. Reduction in the 
unavailability of the isolation valves was more effective than blowdown, however 
improvements to both valves simultaneously had the greatest influence. 
Determination of the optimum configuration of safety systems will be established by 
variation of the inspection intervals of each system and the type of system installed. 
Decreasing the intervals between inspections of the systems will reduce the 
unavailability and therefore the frequency of fatalities, however more frequent 
inspections increase the running cost of the platform. Installation of a more expensive 
system will reduce the unavailability but incur a greater cost to the platform operator. 
An optimisation technique will be developed that allows an analysis of all desired 
parameters being varied simultaneously. 
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10.2 Overview of the Optimisation Strategy 
The objective of the optimisation strategy is to minimise the frequency of fatalities 
occurring on the example offshore oil and gas platform by identifying the optimal 
configuration of safety systems. 
Three elements; valves (isolation and blowdown), gas detection systems and the 
deluge system, are to be optimised using SAROS. Each valve, detector or deluge 
system will be optimised with the intention of minimising the frequencies of fatalities 
whilst limited by a set of constraints. 
The constraints associated with cost are estimated specific to this platform only. All 
costs are values estimated to be relative between the initial cost of installing a specific 
system type and the costs associated with regular maintenance. Costs for each system 
are also relative to the installation and maintenance costs of other systems on the 
platform. 
The safety systems are to be optimised within the three processing modules, 
separation, compression and wellhead on the example platform using the Genetic 
Algorithm optimisation technique introduced in Section 10.3 and developed in 
Section 10.5. Each module has an individual gas detection and deluge system which is 
independent from the systems installed in other modules. Some isolation and 
blowdown valves are common to both modules therefore an optimum solution across 
the platform must be reached. 
Although a reduction in the unavailability of the isolation and blowdown valves did 
not influence the frequency of fatalities occurring within the compression module, 
they will be included within the analysis to ensure that any decisions made through 
analysis of the results for the remaining two modules is not detrimental to the 
reduction of fatalities within the compression module. However the contribution 
made by isolation and blowdown valves to reducing the frequencies of fatalities was 
not as significant as the deluge and detection systems and therefore fewer options will 
be considered for these parameters. It may prove beneficial to reduce the cost spent on 
the isolation and blowdown system and improve other more influential systems. 
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The unavailability of each of the systems or valves will be determined dependent on 
which type of system or valve is installed initially and the inspection and maintenance 
intervals assigned. 
10.2.1 Optimisation of the Isolation and Blowdown Valves 
Two types of valves and four inspection intervals will be considered for the isolation 
and blowdown valves. It was assumed within the base case model that isolation and 
blowdown valves, V2, with an unavailability of 0.035 were installed and maintained 
once every twelve months, Ov2. A cost, CV2, of 1000 units to purchase and install each 
of these valves has been assumed. The optimisation strategy will also consider the 
option of installing a more reliable valve, V1, at a cost, Cv1, of 2000 units which has 
an unavailability of 0.020. Each valve within the analysis can be selected to be either 
of the two valves described above however every isolation and blowdown valve 
within the analysis will be subject to the same inspection interval. Within the base 
case model all valves are inspected every twelve months. The optimisation will 
determine the optimum inspection interval between 0V3; used in the base case model, 
Ovl; inspecting every 6 months and assumed to have the effect of halving the 
unavailability, Ov2; inspecting every 3 months and reducing the unavailability to one 
quarter of the value in the base case and OV4; inspecting once every 24 months and 
doubling the unavailability. 
The unavailability of each of these combinations and the cost for purchase of both 
types of valve is presented in Table 10.1. 
The potential exists to decrease the unavailability of the isolation and blowdown 
valves significantly. However this will result in an increase in cost, both initially and 
across the lifetime of the platform. 
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Valve type 
Inspection interval 
e,,, 
6V2 
OV3 
O V4 
Valve Cost (Cv) 
v, 
0.0050 
0.0100 
0.0200 
0.0400 
2000 
V2 
0.00875 
0.0175 
0.0350 
0.0700 
1000 
Table 10.1- Unavailability and initial cost of isolation and blowdown valves 
for each combination of valve type and inspection interval. 
The cost of maintenance of each valve will consist of two components, the labour cost 
associated with inspection and repair and the cost of spares. It was assumed that three 
man-hours are required to inspect any one valve and carry out any maintenance 
required on that valve at a cost of 100 units per man-hour. 
Part of the maintenance of each valve is to repair or replace any failed components 
associated with the valve. Although valve V1 is initially more expensive that valve V2, 
it is assumed that the cost of parts for either valve is the same. It is likely that on some 
inspections no spares will be required and on others a large proportion of spares may 
be used. Therefore an average cost of 25 units per year has been estimated. 
The maintenance cost CMV, in units, for each of the four options over the platform 
lifetime of 30 years is presented in Table 10.2. 
As it can be seen the only factor that influences the maintenance of the isolation and 
blowdown valves is the length of the inspection interval. 
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Valve type 
Inspection interval 
eV, 
OV2 
OV3 
eV4 
Vi 
39000 
18750 
9750 
2625 
V2 
39000 
18750 
9750 
2625 
Table 10.2 - Maintenance costs of isolation and blowdown valves 
for each combination of valve type and inspection interval. 
To subject each isolation and blowdown valve on the platform to the variations in 
Tables 10.1 and 10.2 would require a great deal of computational time. Therefore an 
importance analysis will be developed, Section 10.4. This analysis will identify the 
contribution each valve provides through failure to the total frequency of fatalities 
over one million simulations in SAROS when leaks are initiated within the separation, 
compression and wellhead modules. 
During the algorithm, the isolation and blowdown valves not selected during the 
importance analysis and all systems other than those identified above will remain 
unchanged from the base case model. 
10.2.2 Optimisation of the gas detection systems 
The gas detection systems had a larger effect on reducing the frequencies of fatalities 
and therefore more configurations will be considered in the optimisation. Three types 
of gas detection system are used in each module and each of these systems functions 
independently of the remaining two. 
The possibility to install one of four types of detection system will be considered in 
addition to assigning one of four inspection intervals to the entire gas detection 
system. Within the base case all three detectors had an unavailability of 0.07, 
assuming an inspection interval of twelve months, 0G3. A cost of 5000 units, C03, has 
been assumed for each of these detector types. 
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Two more reliable detection systems, GI and G2i will be assumed to have initial costs 
of 9000, CG1, and 7500, CG2, units and have unavailability's of 0.02 and 0.04 
respectively. The fourth system, G4, will have a lower initial cost of 3500 units, CGa, 
and an unavailability of 0.10. 
The optimisation will also include the possibility of reducing the inspection interval of 
all three detectors to six months, 0G2, and three months, OGi, assumed to reduce the 
unavailability of a system to 50% and 25% respectively. A further option, increasing 
the inspection interval to 24 months, 0G4, will be considered. Doubling the inspection 
interval would to double the unavailability of a system. 
The unavailability's associated with each system, considering the initial system 
installed and the inspection interval of the system, are presented in Table 10.3. 
Detector type 
Inspection interval GI G2 G3 C7q 
6Gi 
OG2 
6G3 
8G4 
Detector cost (CG) 
0.005 0.010 0.0175 0.025 
0.010 0.020 0.035 0.050 
0.020 0.040 0.070 0.100 
0.040 0.080 0.140 0.200 
9000 7500 5000 3500 
Table 10.3 - Unavailability of the gas detection systems dependent on the inspection 
interval and the system installed for all three modules. 
As for isolation and blowdown valves it is assumed that it requires three man-hours at 
a cost of 100 units per man-hour to inspect and repair a gas detection system. 
However spares costs associated with the gas detection system will vary dependent on 
the type of system installed and the maintenance interval. 
It was assumed that the lower the inspection interval, the fewer spares were required 
during each inspection, however the actual cost of those spares is dependent on the 
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type of system installed. The cost of spares associated with G3 and G4 were assumed 
to be proportional to the purchase cost of the system. Although GI and G2 were 
initially more expensive than G3 and G4, it is assumed that spares for G2 are less 
expensive than spares for G3 and G4. The cost of spares (in units) per inspection are 
presented in Table 10.4. 
Detector type 
Inspection interval 
eGi 
eG2 
eG3 
OG4 
GI G2 G3 G4 
80 50 60 50 
100 60 80 60 
140 80 100 70 
310 180 210 160 
Table 10.4 - Maintenance costs of the gas detection systems, per inspection, for each 
combination of system type and inspection interval. 
The total maintenance cost of each gas detection system, CMG, for the lifetime of the 
platform is presented in Table 10.5. 
Detector type 
Inspection interval 
eGi 
eG2 
eG3 
eG4 
Gi G2 G3 G4 
45600 42000 43200 42000 
24000 21600 22800 21600 
13200 11400 12000 11100 
9150 7200 7650 6900 
Table 10.5 - Total maintenance costs of the gas detection systems for each 
combination of system type and inspection interval. 
10.2.3 Optimisation of the Deluge System 
The unavailability of the deluge system within the base case model was 0.09 
assuming a twelve month inspection interval, °G3" 
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The options for the initial system installed in the optimisation strategy will vary 
depending on whether the module contains oil. A module containing no oil will have 
the option of two systems, DI, with a reduced unavailability and D2, the system 
installed in the base case model. A module containing oil will have the option of the 
system installed in the base case and the option of removing the system from the 
module altogether, D3. 
It was assumed that a cost of 6000 units was incurred during installation of the system 
used in the base case, CD2. The more reliable system, DI, costs 11000 units and has an 
unavailability of 0.04 respectively. Not installing a system, D3, does not incur a cost 
and has an unavailability of 1. 
Four maintenance intervals are available of 3,6,12 and 24 months which have the 
same effect on the unavailability as for detection systems in Section 10.2.2. The 
unavailability and cost of each deluge system due to both variables is presented in 
Table 10.6. 
System type 
Inspection interval Di D2 D3 
6DI 
eD2 
eD3 
ON 
System cost (CD) 
0.010 0.0225 1 
0.020 0.045 1 
0.040 0.090 1 
0.080 0.180 1 
11000 6000 0 
Table 10.6 - Unavailability of the deluge systems dependent on the inspection 
interval and the system installed for all three modules. 
As for the detection systems, it is assumed that three man-hours at a cost of 100 units 
per man-hour are required for each inspection and the cost of spares per inspection 
varies dependent on the system installed and the time between inspections. The cost 
of spares per inspection is presented in Table 10.7. There are no inspections for 
system D3 and therefore no spares or maintenance costs. 
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System type 
Inspection interval 
ODI 
eD2 
eD3 
ON 
Di D2 
50 20 
70 30 
100 60 
180 140 
Table 10.7 - Maintenance costs of the deluge systems, per inspection, for each 
combination of system type and inspection interval. 
The total maintenance costs over the lifetime of the platform are presented in Table 
10.8. 
System type 
Inspection interval 
ODI 
eD2 
eD3 
ON 
Di D2 
42000 38400 
22200 19800 
12000 10800 
7200 6600 
Table 10.8 - Total maintenance costs of the deluge system for each 
combination of system type and inspection interval. 
10.2.4 Development of Constraints within the Optimisation Strategy 
Determination of the optimal safety systems on the platform will be subjected to the 
following constraints: 
" Initial cost of the safety systems 
" Inspection and maintenance costs of the safety systems 
" Spurious shutdown 
The initial costs of installing each system are presented in Tables 10.1,10.3 and 10.6. 
The total initial cost for a module, CT, in installing the safety systems is calculated 
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using Equation 10.1, where Nei is the number of components VI installed, Cv1 is the 
cost of component VI installed etc. 
24 
Cr =ý ýNv; Cvr + NDrCDr ý+ ýýNcrCcrý (10.1) 
1=1 i=t 
The costs associated with installing the safety systems in the base case modules are 
presented in Table 10.9. 
Separation Compression Wellhead 
Number of Isolation and blowdown valves 
Number of gas detection systems 
Number of deluge systems 
Cost of safety systems in the base case 
model 
22 33 18 
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43000 54000 39000 
Constraint 55000 65000 50000 
Table 10.9 - Number and costs of safety systems for the separation, 
compression and wellhead modules. 
The constraints for the initial cost of the safety systems have been chosen in order to 
allow improvement of some components, however, installation of all the most 
expensive components will exceed this constraint. 
The maintenance costs associated with each module, over the 30 year lifetime of the 
platform, CMT, have been calculated using Equation 10.2 and are presented in Table 
10.10. 
24 12 12 44 CMT =L2: NViq 
8 
CMViý. + ND61 e CMDi6) + 
)2: 
Y, 
[NGi6j 
e-12 
ý"MGibý (10.2) 
i=i J-l J>' j-1 J 
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Separation Compression Wellhead 
Cost of maintenance of safety systems in 
the base case model 
257340 362610 219060 
Table 10.10 -Costs of maintenance of the safety systems for the separation, 
compression and wellhead modules. 
The constraint associated with maintenance costs for each module is that the costs per 
year should not exceed the maintenance cost of the base case model. 
Spurious shutdown is the activation of a safety system when it is not required 
resulting in shutdown of the platform. Spurious failure of an isolation or blowdown 
valve or a gas detection system will result in an interruption in processing operations 
on the platform. A shutdown incurs a high cost due to a loss of production and the 
requirement to inspect and then restart systems. 
The spurious shutdown frequencies for each of the isolation and blowdown valve 
types are presented in Table 10.11 and the frequencies for the gas detection systems in 
Table 10.12. It is assumed that the inspection interval will not affect the frequencies. 
Valve type 
v, 
V2 
Spurious frequency 
(per year) 
2.25 x10' 
1.50 x10'2 
Table 10.11- Spurious failure rates for each type of isolation and blowdown valve 
(Xsv). 
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System type 
Gi 
G2 
G3 
G4 
Spurious frequency 
(per year) 
3.00 x10 
2.50 x10'2 
2.25 x10'2 
1.50 x10'2 
Table 10.12 - Spurious failure rates for each type of gas detection system (Xso)" 
The total spurious failure rate, %ST, for the valves and gas detection systems in the 
base case is 0.8775 per year using Equation 10.3. The constraint placed on the 
spurious frequency is that no more than one per year can occur on the platform. 
ia 
a'ST 
=L (NV. Av, )+1: (NGr Acr ) (10.3) 
i=1 i=1 
As each module is modelled independently, a constraint must be determined for the 
spurious failure rate for each module. The spurious failure rate of each module in the 
base case is calculated using Equation 10.3. The constraint for each module is then 
calculated using Equation 10.4, where XM; is the spurious failure frequency of the 
components within module i. 
AST 
Ami 
A summary of the constraints is presented in Table 10.13. 
(10.4) 
Separation Compression Wellhead 
Initial cost (units) 55000 65000 50000 
Maintenance cost (units) 257340 362610 219060 
Spurious failure rate (per year) 0.5157 0.7350 0.4359 
Table 10.13 - Summary of the constraints within each module 
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10.3 Overview of the Genetic Algorithm Method 
A Genetic Algorithm is a search method based on the mechanics of natural selection 
and genetics [49,501 The algorithm can be used to search for an optimum scenario by 
varying the set of input parameters a number of times and analysing the outcomes. 
The input parameters which generate the best outcomes are then used as the basis for 
the next round of analysis. 
A genetic algorithm uses a number of finite-length strings of binary digits 
representing the values of the parameters. For example, consider a black box device 
with eight input switches. For each configuration of the eight switches there is an 
output signal f, mathematically f= f(s) where s is any one of the potential settings of 
all eight switches. The objective of the problem is to set the switches to obtain the 
maximum possible value off. Where other optimisation methods would work directly 
with the parameter set; toggling switches from one setting to another, with genetic 
algorithms the switches are coded as a finite-string length. A simple code can be 
generated using a string of eight 1's and 0's where each of the eight switches is 
represented by a1 if it is on and a0 if it is off. 
Many alternative optimisation techniques for solving the black box problem would 
start with one set of switch settings, apply some transition rule and then move to the 
next group of settings. The disadvantage of this `point-to-point' method is that a false 
optimum solution may be reached in a multi-modal (many peaked) search space 
[49) 
. 
The genetic algorithm method starts with a population of binary strings. In the black 
box problem, a random start using successive coin flips (head = 1, tail = 0) will be 
used to generate an initial population of size n=4. 
01101010 
10110110 
00110101 
11100110 
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After this start, successive populations are generated using the genetic algorithm. By 
working from a population rather than an individual point, the genetic algorithm 
becomes more robust and reliable in finding the optimum solution in a potentially 
many peaked search space. 
Genetic algorithms require only the objective function, f(s) associated with each 
string, which will be calculated based on predictions provided by SAROS in this case, 
to determine the optimum solution. The mechanics of the genetic algorithm method is 
relatively simple, involving copying and swapping partial strings. A number of 
different variations and methods exist however all genetic algorithms have the same 
basic arrangement. Having chosen a population of a set of strings at random and 
determined the output signal, f, of each, a series of operations is used to generate the 
successive populations and converge on the optimum solution. 
A simple genetic algorithm is composed of three operators: 
" Reproduction 
" Crossover 
" Mutation 
Reproduction is the process in which individual strings are copied according to their 
objective function values, f, referred to from now as the as the fitness value, (where f 
is some measure to be maximised). Copying strings according to their fitness value 
means that strings with a higher value have a higher probability of contributing to one 
or more strings in the next generation. 
`Roulette Wheel' selection will be used for reproduction in SAROS. Referring to the 
black box example discussed previously, Table 10.14 presents the objective or fitness 
function values f for each of the four randomly generated strings. 
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No String Fitness % of Total 
S1 01101010 250 30.9 
S2 10110110 104 12.8 
S3 00110101 371 45.8 
S4 11100110 85 10.5 
810 100.0 
Table 10.14 - Sample strings and fitness values for the black box problem. 
Summing the total fitness over four strings, a total of 810 is obtained. The percentage 
of total fitness for each string is shown in the table. The corresponding weighted 
roulette wheel for this generation is shown in Figure 10.1. 
To reproduce, the weighted roulette wheel is `spun' four times. In the black box 
example, string number one has a fitness value of 10.5 percent of the total fitness. As 
a result string 1 is given 10.5 percent of the roulette wheel, and each spin turns up 
string 1 with probability 0.105. Each time a string is required for the next generation, 
a `child' string, it is determined using a spin of the wheel. In this way, more highly fit 
`parent' strings have a higher number of offspring in the succeeding generation. 
Figure 10.1 - Weighted roulette wheel for black box problem. 
After reproduction has selected n child strings for the next generation, crossover will 
proceed in the following two steps. 
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Initially, the child strings are paired off at random. Secondly, each pair of child strings 
undergoes crossover. An integer position k along a pair of child strings is selected at 
random between 1 and the string length less one [1 ,1- 1]. Two new strings are 
created by swapping all characters between positions k+1 and 1 inclusively. For 
example consider strings S1 and S2 from the black box initial population: 
Si=01 1011010 
S2=101110110 
Assuming that k=4 is selected when randomly selecting an integer between 1 and 7 
(as indicated by the separator symbol I ). The resulting crossover yields two new 
strings, S', and S'2. 
S'1=01100110 
S'2=10111010 
In order to ensure that the optimisation is not converging on an incorrect solution and 
isolating other possible solutions, a third operator, mutation, is included. Mutation of 
a child string is the random alteration of the value of one binary digit in a string. The 
probability of mutation is low, in the order of one mutation per thousand bit transfers. 
Once the set of child strings has been through the crossover and mutation stages, the 
genetic algorithm has completed a full cycle and the child strings become the next 
population of parent strings. This process is repeated until a the process converges on 
one solution in particular. 
The algorithm method described above is simple but effective and will be used to 
determine the optimised configurations for the safety systems in SAROS. 
Configuration of the method for use in SAROS is described in Section 10.6. 
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10.4 Importance Analysis 
In order to determine whether the failure of each of the isolation and blowdown 
valves contribute significantly to the frequency of fatalities and would benefit from a 
shorter inspection interval, an importance analysis was developed. 
The frequency of fatalities generated when each isolation valve within the separation, 
compression and wellhead modules failed was recorded. These values were then used 
to calculate the contribution of failure of each isolation valve towards the fatalities 
generated by a leak in each section within a module and towards the total frequency 
of fatalities for the module. 
The section and valve numbers correspond to the original layouts presented in 
Chapter 5 for each of the three modules on the example platform. Some sections and 
valves can occur within more than one module as some sections form part of the 
processing equipment within both modules. 
Some valves which appear to not to be directly linked to a section contribute to the 
frequency of fatalities in that section. This is due to multiple valve failures leading to 
the combination of a number of sections, as described in Chapter 5. The results are 
shown as a percentage of the fatalities within each section or module in Tables 10.15, 
10.16 and 10.17 for the separation, compression and wellhead modules respectively. 
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Section Number 
Failed 
Valve 
No Fail 
l 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
123 13 21 32 33 Total 
70.771 88.3917 83.1289 92.5876 92.6609 84.1998 43.6596 75.1498 
3.3577 0.0163 0.1922 001.2813 28.6709 2.7777 
0.1692 00007.4174 2.8022 0.2864 
0.0017 00003.6245 0.7895 0.0763 
0.3075 3.4014 0.1931 000.1372 0.1664 0.4868 
0.1090 0 3.1398 00000.6436 
0.0511 0.1117 2.7370 00000.0540 
0.0511 0 2.7795 00000.5398 
0.0027 000.0023 0000.0019 
0003.5856 0000.1389 
1.6291 0.0181 0.0218 002.1270 12.8909 1.3431 
3.5308 0.4563 3.1835 000.0110 1.7419 2.9766 
3.0966 0.2712 0.1108 000.7644 0.8092 2.1135 
3.0615 0.0516 0.1244 000.0042 1.2338 2.0716 
0.2711 0.1901 0.2307 0000.0015 0.2348 
3.1076 0.2108 0.2457 000.1372 1.0115 2.1339 
0.1417 0.0121 3.4266 0.0094 0000.7186 
3.0226 0.1258 0.0942 0003.6512 2.0878 
0.0874 0.0027 0.0003 0 0.0180 000.0583 
0.0679 0.0169 0.008 0000.1245 0.0497 
0.0763 0 0.0087 0.2800 0000.0629 
0.2661 0 0.0361 0.0094 0.0415 0 0.2616 0.1879 
3.1421 0.2087 0.0929 0 0.3122 0.2961 0.8246 2.1321 
0.0054 000.0416 0000.0052 
0000.0017 0000.0001 
0003.4730 0000.1346 
0.1705 0.0803 0.1264 0.0094 0.0233 0 0.0259 0.1426 
3.2987 3.0060 0.1184 0001.3263 2.4401 
0.1256 3.4280 0.0010 0000.0085 0.3284 
0.0761 0003.4530 0 0.0001 0.0929 
0.0019 0003.4911 000.0443 
Table 10.15 - Percentages of fatalities in the separation module due to isolation valve 
failure per section. 
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Section Number 
Failed 
Valve 
No Fail 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
238 10 21 31 Total 
86.4492 81.917 85.2596 95.9658 93.5006 96.1344 84.6053 
0 0.0754 0.0149 0000.0318 
000.0058 0000.0039 
0000000 
3.4380 0.2179 0.0014 000.1051 0.0676 
0 3.3839 00000.9741 
0 2.9808 00000.8581 
0 3.2659 00000.9401 
003.0871 0.0012 002.1047 
000.1141 0000.0778 
0 0.0252 00000.0073 
0.1683 3.0969 0.0011 000.0009 0.8923 
0.5683 0.1007 00000.0293 
0.0759 0.1272 0.0349 0000.0604 
0.2120 0.1321 00000.0381 
0.0001 0.2752 0.0150 0000.0894 
0.0060 3.7204 0.0003 000.0021 1.0712 
0.0661 0.2071 0.1888 0000.1884 
0 0.0036 0.0899 0000.0623 
0 0.0024 0.0985 0000.0679 
0.0143 0.0124 3.3233 0002.2693 
0 0.0155 0.1624 0000.1152 
0.0002 0.1675 000.0356 0 0.0485 
004.0280 0002.7462 
000.1696 4.0330 000.1257 
003.3109 0002.2573 
0.1113 0.1416 0.0738 0000.0911 
4.0973 0.1281 0.0169 000.0281 0.0510 
4.7931 0.0005 0003.7294 0.0805 
0 0.0030 0.0038 0 2.4723 0 0.0194 
00003.9915 0 0.0258 
Table 10.17 - Percentages of fatalities in the wellhead module due to isolation valve 
failure per section. 
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In all three modules, the largest percentage of fatalities occur when no valves have 
failed, as the majority of the time all valves are available when required. The 
remaining values however are the percentages of fatalities that occur when one of the 
valves is not available when required. 
In order to determine the relevance of a valve failure affecting all three modules, the 
average percentage of fatalities generated on the platform when each valve fails is 
presented in Table 10.18. The valves are ranked, from 1 to 31, in order of contribution 
to the total frequency of fatalities on the platform. 
The failure of any one isolation valve contributes to the total frequency of fatalities on 
the platform. However only three of the valves generate more than 1% of the total 
frequency of fatalities. In order to reduce the number of parameters to a size more 
manageable under optimisation, the five valves which have the largest impact on the 
frequency of fatalities will be optimised. Once the best possible solution has been 
reached for these valves within all three modules, the importance analysis will be run 
again. This analysis of the results will determine whether those five valves selected 
for optimisation still remain at the top of the table or whether other valves within the 
modules now significantly contribute to the number of fatalities. If the latter is the 
case the sensitivity analysis will be run again analysing the new top five. The 
optimisation will be complete when the importance analysis shows little or no 
variation in the ranking of valves according to the proportion of fatalities they 
generate or repeated runs of the optimisation show no improvement in the frequency 
of fatalities. 
An analysis was also carried out on blowdown valves. The contribution of the failure 
of each valve towards the frequencies of fatalities is calculated and presented as a 
percentage of the total frequencies of fatalities within each section and each module. 
As for the isolation valves some of the sections appear in more than one module and 
valves which are not directly linked to sections appear to contribute the fatalities in 
that section. 
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Failed 
Valve 
No Fail 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Separation Compression Wellhead Average Rank 
75.1498 86.9711 84.6053 82.2421 1 
2.7777 0.0682 0.0318 0.9592 8 
0.2864 0.0006 0.0039 0.0970 29 
0.0763 000.0254 31 
0.4868 0.5058 0.0676 0.3534 22 
0.6436 0.0311 0.9741 0.5496 15 
0.54 0.0279 0.8581 0.4753 18 
0.5398 0.013 0.9401 0.4976 16 
0.0019 0.8876 2.1047 0.9981 5 
0.1389 0.0135 0.0778 0.0767 30 
1.3431 0.0776 0.0073 0.4760 17 
2.9766 0.092 0.8923 1.3203 2 
2.1135 0.5361 0.0293 0.8930 11 
2.0716 0.6153 0.0604 0.9158 10 
0.2348 0.8516 0.0381 0.3748 21 
2.1339 0.5369 0.0894 0.9201 9 
0.7186 0.5278 1.0712 0.7725 14 
2.0878 0.6062 0.1884 0.9608 7 
0.0583 0.5707 0.0623 0.2304 25 
0.0497 0.6104 0.0679 0.2427 24 
0.0629 1.0531 2.2693 1.1284 4 
0.1879 0.8454 0.1152 0.3828 20 
2.1321 0.372 0.0485 0.8509 13 
0.0052 0.8176 2.7462 1.1897 3 
0.0001 0.2689 0.1257 0.1316 28 
0.1346 0.5716 2.2573 0.9878 6 
0.1426 1.1511 0.0911 0.4616 19 
2.4401 0.0899 0.051 0.8603 12 
0.3284 0.0632 0.0805 0.1574 27 
0.0929 0.5276 0.0194 0.2133 26 
0.0443 0.6964 0.0258 0.2555 23 
Table 10.18 - Percentages of fatalities in all three modules due to isolation valve 
failure 
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The results for the separation module, compression module and the wellhead module 
are presented in Tables 10.19,10.20 and 10.21 respectively. 
Failed 
Valve 
No Fail 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Section Number 
123 13 21 32 33 Total 
98.5669 92.3438 94.5097 95.9954 99.7506 99.9956 98.2469 97.2924 
00000000 
0.1240 7.2966 00000.0956 0.6160 
0.1723 0.0015 5.2820 00001.0902 
0.5055 0.0381 0.0496 000.0044 0.2012 0.3470 
0.3418 0.2248 0.1477 0000.0284 0.2685 
0.2277 0.0052 0.0089 0001.1248 0.1692 
0 0.0022 000000.0002 
0.0026 000.1145 0000.0063 
00000000 
00000000 
0.0019 0000.2292 000.0042 
0.0572 0.0878 0.0020 0 0.0202 0 0.3032 0.0493 
0003.8901 0000.1567 
00000000 
00000000 
Table 10.19 - Percentages of fatalities in the separation module due to blowdown 
valve failure per section 
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Section 
Failed 
Valve 
No Fail 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
238 10 21 31 Total 
96.0224 96.0052 95.7861 96.1099 99.9577 99.9048 95.9646 
0000000 
3.7706 00000.0949 0.0039 
0 3.6298 0.0011 0001.0358 
0 0.0440 00000.0125 
0.1924 0.2861 0.0004 000.0003 0.0819 
0 0.0237 0.2250 0000.1606 
0 0.0032 0.0201 0000.0146 
0.0146 0 3.6038 0002,4647 
000.2155 0.2214 000.1479 
000.0157 3.6687 000.0201 
00000.0259 0 0.0002 
0 0.0081 000.0164 0 0.0024 
000.1324 0000.0905 
0000000 
0000000 
Table 10.21 - Percentages of fatalities in the wellhead module due to blowdown valve 
failure per section 
A summary of the contribution of the failure of each blowdown valve towards the total 
frequencies of fatalities within each module is presented in Table 10.22. The contribution 
of the valves to the total platform fatalities are calculated and ranked from 1 to 13 where 
1 is the highest contribution. 
Failure of valves 1,14 and 15 have no impact on the number of fatalities generated on the 
platform and the majority of valves have only a minor contribution to the total frequency 
of fatalities. Only the most significant blowdown valve will be optimised. Once these 
valves have been optimised, an importance analysis will be run again as for isolation 
valves and the blowdown valve contributions re-analysed. The optimisation will be run 
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again if the results in Table 10.22 have varied significantly to indicate that further 
analysis would be beneficial. 
Failed 
Valve 
No Fail 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Module 
Separation Compression Wellhead Total Rank 
97.2924 92.8805 97.8371 96.0033 1 
0000- 
0.6160 0.0294 0.0039 0.2164 7 
1.0902 0.0198 1.0358 0.7153 3 
0.3470 1.0148 0.0125 0.4581 5 
0.2685 0.9366 0.0819 0.4290 6 
0.1692 1.3932 0.1606 0.5743 4 
0.0002 0.0422 0.0146 0.0190 12 
0.0063 2.4647 0.5922 1.0211 2 
0 0.2723 0.1479 0.1401 9 
0 0.0090 0.0201 0.0097 13 
0.0042 0.5404 0.0002 0.1816 8 
0.0493 0.3667 0.0024 0.1395 10 
0.1567 0.0304 0.0905 0.0925 11 
0000- 
0000- 
Table 10.22 - Proportions of fatalities in all three modules due to blowdown valve failure 
Five isolation valves; 8,11,20,23,25 and one blowdown valve; 8 will be analysed 
initially in the genetic algorithm, the remaining valves will be treated as in the base case 
model. 
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10.5 Development of the algorithm 
The binary string used in the SAROS genetic algorithm will contain two binary digits for 
the inspection intervals of each of the safety systems. Each valve and deluge system 
considered in the analysis will be represented by one digit and each gas detection system 
by two digits to determine the initial system or valve installed. 
All three modules will be analysed to determine the optimum systems and inspection 
intervals for the detection systems, deluge system and the isolation and blowdown 
systems. To analyse all valves and systems at one time would require a string of 56 digits 
in length. 
A string of this length requires a great deal of computational time and therefore only the 
isolation and blowdown valves identified in Section 10.4 will be analysed. The analysis 
will be run with a string length of 19 representing the five isolation valves, one 
blowdown valve, three detection systems and one deluge system. 
The first seven digits of the string represent the isolation and blowdown valves. The first 
six of these are the type of valve 
installed (five isolation and one blowdown) and the 
remaining two digits the inspection 
interval. The next eight digits represent the systems 
installed for the gas detection systems and the inspection interval and the last three digits 
the deluge system selected and the inspection interval, Figure 10.2. 
7 17 444444444-. 
5 bits I 2 bits 6 bits 
V; 6vi Gi 
2 bits 1 2 bits 
HHH 
OGi D; ON 
V 
Figure 10.2 - The nineteen digit string representing the valves, systems 
and inspection intervals. 
Table 10.23 presents the relationship between each binary digit and the type of isolation 
or blowdown valve installed. 
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Binary digits 
0 
1 
Valve Type 
VI 
V2 
Table 10.23 - Relation of the binary digits to the type of valve installed for the isolation 
and blowdown valve system. 
The representation of the pairs of digits to the system type for the gas detection system is 
presented in Table 10.24. 
Binary digits 
00 
01 
10 
11 
System installed 
GI 
G2 
G3 
G4 
Table 10.24 - Relation of the binary digits to the type of gas detection system installed 
and the inspection intervals. 
The interpretation of the digits used for the deluge system depend on whether the module 
being optimised is an oil containing module or not. Table 10.25 presents the binary 
coding used for the deluge system in oil containing modules and Table 10.26 within the 
modules not containing oil. 
Binary digits 
0 
1 
System installed 
D2 
D3 
Table 10.25 - Relation of the binary digits to the type of deluge system installed and the 
inspection intervals within modules containing oil. 
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Binary digits 
0 
1 
System installed 
Di 
D2 
Table 10.26 - Relation of the binary digits to the type of deluge system installed and the 
inspection intervals within non-oil containing modules. 
All three safety systems are subjected to one of four inspection intervals. The relationship 
between the binary digits and the inspection interval is presented in Table 10.27. 
Binary digits 
00 
01 
10 
11 
Inspection Interval 
eDl 
eD2 
8D3 
ON 
Table 10.27 - Relation of the binary digits to the inspection intervals 
for all three safety systems. 
A study carried out on genetic algorithm methods 
[49] suggested that to get a good 
performance from a genetic algorithm requires a high crossover probability, a low 
mutation probability and a moderate population size. Following these suggestions, the 
following parameters have been chosen for SAROS. 
0.001 Probability of mutation 
0.6 Probability of crossover 
10 Population size 
SAROS will use a population of ten strings to determine the optimum solution for the 
safety systems within each of the three modules on the example platform. The binary 
digits are assigned using the random number generator to determine whether each of the 
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digits on the initial parent strings are zero or one. The model is run once (one million 
simulations) for each string and the frequency of fatalities predicted by each run 
recorded. 
Within SAROS the optimum solution is to minimise the fatalities, therefore the string 
which generates the lowest frequency of fatalities will have the highest fitness value. The 
roulette wheel method introduced in Section 10.3 will be used to select the child strings. 
The fitness of each string is determined using Equation 10.4. The difference between 
each fatality frequency and the largest frequency generated by the thirty strings is 
calculated. Each fitness number is then generated by calculating the proportion that each 
of these differences assumes of the total sum of the differences. SAROS determines each 
of the child strings by comparison of a random number to the cumulative fitness values of 
the strings. 
F fs\ _ 
fmax 
-f (s) 
lJ2: 
fmax 
-f ls) 
S=1 
where F(s) is the fitness value of each string, s 
f(s) is the frequency of fatalities generated by each string, s 
(10.4) 
However before this stage is conducted, the model must determine whether any of the 
safety systems represented by the strings have exceeded the constraints. 
The initial cost, maintenance costs and spurious shutdown frequency of the systems 
represented by each string are calculated using 
Equations 10.1,10.2 and 10.3. If the 
string is within the level of constraint allowed, the frequency of fatalities remains 
unchanged. However if any one constraint 
is exceeded, the frequency is scaled. The 
fraction of the cost or spurious frequency which is exceeded, compared to the constraint 
value, is calculated. The fitness is then 
increased by the fraction of the constraint. 
245 
-+- Major 
-. 0- Significant 
--o- Minor 
92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 00101 
Year 
Figure 2.2 - Number of gas releases per year. 
92/93 93/94 00/01 94/95 95/96 96/97Year97/98 
--"- Major 
-C--Significant 
-6 am Minor 
98/99 99/00 
Figure 2.3 - Number of oil releases per year. 
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Figure 2.4 - Number of 2-phase releases per year. 
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SAROS is then run for the child strings generated using during the previous simulations. 
The model will continue to run until an optimum set of parameters is identified. 
For the open sided module analysis, an optimum solution will be attained when a 
particular string demonstrates dominance within the ten string set. If the results do not 
appear to be converging towards one dominant string, the current string population and 
their fitness's will be analysed to determine whether an optimum setting for the more 
influential safety systems identified in Chapter 8 and components identified in Section 
10.4 has been reached. 
10.6 Results 
Optimisation has been carried out on all three processing modules on the open sided 
platform. An initial analysis of the results after one run with a population of ten strings 
indicated that the variation between the fitness values was not sufficient to ensure that the 
selection process was biased towards selection of the strings generating the lowest 
frequencies of fatalities. 
An alternative method for assigning the fitness values to strings has been determined. A 
more definitive difference is required in the fitness values for strings which generate 
fewer fatalities than the base case model and strings which generate more fatalities than 
the base case. Figure 10.3 presents the relationship between fatality frequency and fitness 
value. 
Fatality frequency 
Figure 10.3 - Relationship between fatalities frequency and fitness 
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If the frequency of fatalities generated by a string is equal to the frequencies of fatalities 
predicted by the base case a fitness value of 1 is assigned. 
A string with a frequency of fatalities greater than the base case model is not ideal, and 
the greater the frequency of fatalities, the less desired the string is to be selected for the 
next generation. Equation 10.5 will be used to calculate the fitness value of strings with a 
fatality frequency greater than the base case frequency, f(bc). 
F(s) =f . 
(bC) 
AS) (io. s) 
The fitness values assigned to strings with fatality frequencies greater than the base case 
model are more desirable and this must be represented in the fitness value. The fitness's 
of these strings will increase exponentially as the frequency of fatalities decreases, up to a 
maximum of 10 assigned to the string with the lowest frequency of fatalities, Figure 10.4. 
Fitness' 
10 
1 
-----------------------------t 
f(bc) f(s)mi. Fatality frequency 
Figure 10.4 - Exponential relationship between fitness and fatality frequency 
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In order to calculate the relative fitness of each string between 1 and 10, Equation 10.6 is 
used to normalise the frequencies of fatalities (calculate the difference between the string 
and base case fatalities and divide by f(bc) f(s), ;,, ) and apply to the exponential function. 
f(bc)-f(s) 
F(s) =10 f(bc)-f(s)m,. (10.6) 
Finally Equation 10.7 is used to calculate the fraction that each of string contributes to the 
total fitness value in order to construct the roulette wheel illustrated in Section 10.3. 
F(s) _ 1F 
(s) 
0 
J: F(i) 
! =t 
(10.7) 
10.6.1 Optimisation Results 
The optimisation was run for each module until the results had converged and subsequent 
optimisation cycles were not minimising the frequencies of fatalities further. This took 
five cycles for the separation module, six for the compression module and eight for the 
wellhead module. 
Table 10.29 presents the frequencies of fatalities within each of the modules following 
optimisation, and the fraction of 
fatalities predicted within the base case model that they 
represent. The total frequency of 
fatalities predicted for an open sided offshore platform 
is 5.640 x 10-2,89.8% of the fatalities predicted in the base case. 
Separation Compression Wellhead 
Lowest frequency of fatalities 9.674 x10" 3.501 x10' 1.202 x10' 
Fraction of base case fatalities 0.966 0.883 0.915 
Table 10.29 - Frequencies of fatalities within each module on the open sided offshore 
platform post-optimisation. 
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A summary of the optimum configuration of safety systems within each of the modules is 
presented within Tables 10.30,10.31 and 10.32 for the gas detection systems, deluge 
system and isolation and blowdown valves respectively. Which type of system, valve or 
inspection interval is selected by each of the ten strings is represented by 'SI' and the 
results are presented for each module. 
G 
Separation 
Compression 
Wellhead 
Sonic Detector 
G2 G3 0 
4 
Beam Detector 
G 0 G G 
q 
4 
Point Detector 
G 0 G 
4 
G 
Inspection Interval 
0 0 03 1 04 
Table 10.30 - Optimum configuration of the gas detection systems on an 
open sided platform. 
ý 
ý 
The optimisation of the detection systems has highlighted, as within the sensitivity 
analysis, that improvement of the beam detector has the greatest effect on reducing the 
frequency of fatalities. 
Within the separation module, it is suggested that the sonic and point detectors remain 
unchanged from the base case model, but that the beam detector installed is detector type 
G1, which had the lowest unavailability of the four possible choices. The results suggest 
that the detectors within the separation module be inspected every six months, 02, twice 
as frequently as was modelled in the base case. 
Within the compression module, the results have predicted that the most cost effective 
reduction of fatalities will be achieved by installing the G2 detector type for the beam 
detector, and G4 detector type for both the sonic and point detectors and reducing the 
inspection intervals of the detection system to once every two years, 04. 
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The wellhead module results predict that all three detector types could remain as within 
the base case, G3. However it is predicted that the maintenance interval could be reduced 
to 04 without detriment to the overall frequencies of fatalities. 
Deluge 
System 
Dý 
Separation 
Compression 
Wellhead 
D2 
ý 
ý 
ý 
D3 
Inspection Interval 
e, 02 03 04 
a 
J 
4 
Table 10.31 - Optimum configuration of the deluge system on an open sided platform. 
Optimisation of the deluge system has predicted that within predominantly oil containing 
modules, removal of the deluge system is not the best solution. In order to minimise the 
frequency of fatalities, it is predicted that the separation module would benefit if the 
deluge system remained as within the base case model and the maintenance interval was 
reduced to once every six months. 
Within both the compression and wellhead modules, where few or no pool fires were 
predicted to occur, it is predicted that the deluge system should be upgraded to system 
D2, which has a lower unavailability than system Di used in the base case. Within the 
compression module it is predicted that there is no advantage 
in decreasing the inspection 
intervals of the system, however in the wellhead module, as in the separation module it is 
predicted that reduction of the inspection 
interval to once every six months will reduce 
the frequencies of fatalities. 
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Isolation Valve 
Vi 
Separation 
Compression 
Wellhead 
8 11 20 23 25 
V2 
J 
VI 
ý 
ý 
«I 
V2 v, V2 
a 
ý 
ý 
v, 
4 
V2 
ý 
ý 
VI V2 
ý 
ý 
ý 
Blowdown 
Valve 8 
VI 
4 
4 
V2 
q 
Inspection 
Interval 
o, 02 03 04 
q 
Table 10.32 - Optimum configuration of the isolation and blowdown valves on an 
open sided platform. 
4 
4 
Optimisation of the isolation and blowdown valves is, unlike the gas detection and deluge 
system optimisations, dependent on the predictions across the whole platform. Not all 
three modules contain all five isolation and the one blowdown valve. 
All five isolation valves are contained within the compression and wellhead modules. 
Both modules predict that the optimal configurations of the valves in order to lower 
frequencies of fatalities while remaining within the constraints would be for isolation 
Valves 8,20 and 25 to remain as they were modelled in the base case and Valve 11 to be 
changed to a valve with a lower unavailability. The separation module includes isolation 
Valves 11 and 25 which also predict that Valve 11 should be changed and Valve 25 
should remain the same. 
The results for Valve 23 differs between the compression and wellhead modules. The 
compression module predicts that Valve 23 should remain as it was modelled in the base 
case while the wellhead module results suggest that it should be changed to valve type 
VI. Within the importance analysis in Section 10.4, it was determined that over 2% of 
fatalities within the wellhead module resulted from failure of Valve 23, while less than 
0.9% resulted in the separation module, Table 10.18. Therefore it will be assumed that 
Valve 23 will be changed for a valve with a lower unavailability. 
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The blowdown valve modelled is only linked directly to a section within the compression 
module. The compression module, like the wellhead module predicted that the fatalities 
would be minimised if the blowdown valve was changed to a valve with a lower 
unavailability. The results from the separation module appear to contradict this 
prediction, however the failure of blowdown Valve 8 only contributed to 0.006% of the 
fatalities within the base case separation module (Table 10.23) and therefore the 
prediction can be ignored. 
The compression and wellhead modules both predict that the inspection intervals of the 
valves should be increased to once every two years, 04. The separation module, which 
contains only two of the six valves modelled predicts an annual inspection is required. As 
the wellhead and compression modules have a larger effect frequency of fatalities due to 
the valves modelled the inspection interval will increase to once every two years for all 
six valves. 
A summary of the optimised valve configuration across the platform is presented in Table 
10.33. 
Isolation Valve 
8 11 20 23 25 
Blowdown 
Valve 8 
Inspection 
Interval 
V, V2 V1 V2 V, V2 V1 V2 V, V2 V1 V2 01 02 03 04 
Table 10.33 - Optimised isolation and blowdown valve configurations. 
Each of the valve types selected has a higher unavailability than in the base case, mainly 
due to the reduction in the inspection interval. As mentioned in Chapter 8, minor 
variations in the unavailability's of the isolation and blowdown valves made little 
difference to the frequencies of fatalities, and therefore the total platform costs could be 
decreased by increasing the valve unavailability's without a significant effect on the 
fatalities. 
253 
Failed 
Valve 
No Fail 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Separation Compression Wellhead Average Rank 
76.5924 84.0148 76.7182 79.1085 1 
1.9461 0.1067 0.0639 0.7056 14 
0.2670 0.0030 0.0005 0.0902 30 
0.0789 000.0263 31 
0.5773 0.3969 0.0324 0.3355 23 
0.7338 0.0348 1.0248 0.5978 18 
0.8171 0.0136 1.3323 0.7210 11 
0.9498 0.0209 1.1739 0.7149 13 
0.1112 1.3549 4.1976 1.8879 4 
0.3294 0.0223 0.1669 0.1729 28 
1.9701 0.0568 0.0215 0.6828 16 
2.6035 0.1227 1.2494 1.3252 5 
1.2852 0.7183 0.0777 0.6937 15 
1.4191 0.6929 0.0633 0.7251 10 
0.1948 1.0026 0.0614 0.4196 21 
1.4935 0.5583 0.1000 0.7173 12 
0.8849 0.5096 1.1658 0.8534 7 
1.4886 0.7540 0.1654 0.8027 8 
0.0371 0.6993 0.1525 0.2963 24 
0.0577 0.6605 0.1138 0.2773 25 
0.1724 2.5794 4.4949 2.4156 2 
0.1231 0.8657 0.1572 0.3820 22 
1.6334 0.2984 0.0893 0.6737 17 
0.0548 0.8562 2.2368 1.0493 6 
0.0001 0.2046 0.1816 0.1288 29 
0.8212 1.0560 4.5223 2.1332 3 
0.1306 1.0213 0.2314 0.4611 19 
2.1136 0.0878 0.0466 0.7493 9 
0.5166 0.0245 0.0878 0.2096 27 
0.2938 0.3054 0.0434 0.2142 26 
0.3027 0.9578 0.0273 0.4293 20 
Table 10.34 - Percentages of fatalities in all three modules due to isolation valve failure 
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Prior to conducting the optimisation, five isolation and one blowdown valve were 
selected from a total of forty five valves on the platform according to the results of an 
importance analysis, Section 10.4. In order to determine whether optimisation of a 
selection of the remaining valves should be considered, the importance analysis was re- 
run using the configuration of safety systems identified in this section. 
Tables 10.34 and 10.35 present the total contribution of each valve to the fatalities within 
each module and the platform, for isolation and blowdown valves respectively. The 
valves are ranked according to their contribution to the total platform failures. 
Failed 
Valve 
No Fail 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Separation Compression Wellhead Total Rank 
97.3847 94.4615 95.7382 95.8615 1 
0000- 
0.6562 0.0134 0.0092 0.2263 8 
0.9296 0.0141 1.1089 0.6842 4 
0.2114 1.3423 0.0050 0.5196 5 
0.2059 0.7232 0.0797 0.3363 6 
0.0881 1.5434 0.4330 0.6882 3 
0.0020 0.0406 0.0081 0.0169 12 
0.0443 0.5829 2.1679 0.9317 2 
0.0266 0.1740 0.1908 0.1305 10 
0 0.0050 0.0201 0.0084 13 
0.0216 0.7824 0.0001 0.2680 7 
0.0606 0.2811 0.0062 0.1160 11 
0.3690 0.0361 0.2330 0.2127 9 
0000- 
0000- 
Table 10.35 - Percentage of fatalities in all three modules due to blowdown valve failure 
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Comparison between Tables 10.34 and 10.35; post-optimisation, and Tables 10.18 and 
10.19; pre-optimisation, predicts that the six valves selected for the optimisation scheme 
are still the largest contributors to the total frequencies of fatalities and therefore no 
further optimisation is required. 
An increase in the unavailability of the valves has led to an increase in the fractions of 
fatalities occurring due to failure of each of the valves however the actual frequency of 
fatalities has reduced. 
10.6.2 Discussion on results 
This section compares the proportions of ignitions and fatalities that are generated within 
each module both pre- and post-optimisation. Table 10.36 presents the frequencies of 
explosions, immediate and delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires occurring on the 
platform before and after optimisation and the fraction that the total frequency of 
ignitions has been reduced by. 
Pre-optimisation Post-optimisation Fraction 
Explosions 3.927 x10" 3.811 x10" 0.972 
Immediate Ignition Jet Fires 6.346x10"2 6.301 x10"2 0.993 
Delayed Ignition Jet Fires 4.742 x10'2 4.215 x10'2 0.889 
Pool Fires 8.397 x10'3 4.194 x10"3 0.499 
Table 10.36 - Frequencies of ignitions pre and post optimisation 
Optimisation of safety systems within the open sided modules has led to a reduction in 
the frequency of all ignition types. The largest decrease was predicted for pool fires. 
Table 10.37 presents the frequencies of fatalities due to each of the ignition types 
modelled 
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Pre-optimisation Post-optimisation Fraction 
Explosions 3.922 x10' 3.476 x10' 0.886 
Immediate Ignition Jet Fires 2.238 x10'2 2.193 x10'2 0.980 
Delayed Ignition Jet Fires 8.303 x 10'7 1.269 x 10'7 0.153 
Pool Fires 1.914 x10'5 1.404 x10'5 0.734 
Table 10.37 - Frequencies of fatalities pre and post optimisation 
Fatalities resulting from each type of ignition are reduced following optimisation. This is 
due to a reduction in the frequency of ignitions that are predicted to occur but also to a 
reduction in the severity of the ignitions. 
10.7 Summary 
Four safety systems; isolation valves, blowdown valves, gas detection systems and 
deluge systems have been optimised within all three modules of an open sided platform. 
The optimisation resulted in a reduction of the platform frequencies of fatalities by 8%. 
The optimised configuration of safety systems is within the constraints specified within 
Section 10.2.4 
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Chapter 11 Optimisation of the Safety Systems on an Enclosed 
Module Platform 
11.1 Introduction 
As for the open module analysis in Chapter 10, the safety systems within the enclosed 
module are to be subjected to a Genetic Algorithm in order to determine their optimum 
configuration to minimise the predicted frequency of fatalities per year. 
In contrast to the sensitivity analysis of the open module platform, Chapter 8, a number 
of safety systems which made a significant impact on the frequency of fatalities were 
determined within the enclosed module analysis. Improvement of any one of the systems 
below would reduce the predicted frequency of fatalities per year within a module: 
" Ventilation Rate 
" Deluge System 
" Detection System (when ventilation system is increased following detection) 
Improvements to these safety systems resulted in the reduction of the predicted 
frequencies of fatalities within each module, however further analysis is required to 
determine which combinations of improvements would have the greatest effect, whilst 
remaining within a set of constraints. 
Variation of the ventilation rate by a factor of ten predicted the greatest reduction in the 
frequencies of fatalities. In addition to analysing the effect of an increase in the 
ventilation rate prior to detection, the option that the ventilation rate would double 
following detection, rather than decrease as in the base case, was considered. The 
increase resulted in a large reduction in the frequencies of fatalities and was also 
predicted to improve the effectiveness of both the detection and deluge systems. 
Variation of the ventilation rate both prior to and post reduction will be considered. 
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The optimum configuration for the deluge system could not be determined from the 
results in Chapter 9. However an increase in the ventilation rate following detection 
predicted that the frequencies of fatalities would reduce when the unavailability of the 
deluge system was increased within each module. 
Initial results from the detection system predicted that there would only be a small effect 
on the frequencies of fatalities when the unavailability was reduced. However inclusion 
of the assumption that the ventilation rate would increase following detection improved 
the effectiveness of the detection system sufficiently to include within the optimisation. 
A Genetic Algorithm, as developed in Chapter 10 will be used to determine the optimum 
configuration of safety systems within the enclosed modules. Although the algorithm 
model will be the same as described in Section 10.3, the construction of the binary strings 
will be specific to the enclosed module analysis. 
11.2 Overview of the Optimisation Strategy 
The objective of the optimisation strategy is the same as for the open modules, to 
minimise the frequencies of fatalities predicted per year on an offshore oil and gas 
platform by identifying the optimal configuration of safety systems. 
Three systems; ventilation, deluge and detection are to be optimised using the Genetic 
Algorithm and the SAROS enclosed module code. The algorithm will be used to 
determine the optimum setting for each of the three gas detector types, the deluge system 
and the ventilation system whilst adhering to a set of constraints. 
All three processing modules on the example platform, separation, compression and 
wellhead, will be considered in the optimisation. The safety systems within all three 
modules are considered to be independent of each other, and therefore each module can 
be optimised independently without consideration of the remaining two modules. 
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The unavailability of each of the deluge and detection systems will be determined 
dependent on which type of system is installed in the module initially and the length 
between the inspection intervals of each system. 
11.2.1 Optimisation of the Ventilation System 
Only negligible increases in the running costs of the platform would result from variation 
of the ventilation rate. It was assumed in the base case model that the ventilation rate 
within each module was fifty air changes per hour (ACPH) A2. The optimisation strategy 
will also consider the option that the ventilation rate could also be set at a higher rate, Al, 
of 65 ACPH prior to detection. 
Currently within the base case model, the ventilation rate reduces to one ACPII when a 
release is detected, AR2. The analysis in Chapter 9 suggested that it would be more 
beneficial to increase this ventilation rate following detection of a release. An option will 
be included to increase the ventilation rate by a factor of two, ARt, when a release is 
detected. 
Each module has an independent ventilation system which can be set initially to run at 50 
or 65 ACPH, Table 11.1. However there are four options for the ventilation rate 
following detection of release, presented in Table 11.2. 
Al 
65 
Az 
50 
Table 11.1-Number of ACPH initially for each setting of the ventilation system. 
Al 
ARI 
AR2 
130 
1 
A2 
100 
1 
Table 11.2 - Number of ACPH within a module following detection of a release. 
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Although there is only a negligible cost difference between running the ventilation at a 
rate of Al or A2, it is assumed that running at a higher rate will put more of a strain on the 
ventilation system and it will require more regular maintenance than when it is run at the 
rate in the base case. It was assumed that if the ventilation rate is run at the higher rate 
during normal processing, the system will require inspection and maintenance twice a 
year as opposed to once a year in the base case. As for the systems in the open module an 
inspection is assumed to require three man-hours at a cost of 100 units per man-hour. 
Increase of the ventilation rate following detection puts an additional strain on the 
ventilation system and it is assumed that this system will require more repair during 
inspections, resulting in a further increase in the maintenance costs. Table 11.3 presents 
the costs estimated for the inspection and maintenance of the ventilation system, CM, A, 
dependent on the ventilation rate, in any of the three modules. 
AR1 
AR2 
At 
19500 
18000 
A2 
10500 
9000 
Table 11.3 - Maintenance costs associated with each option 
for the ventilation system. 
11.2.2 Optimisation of the Gas Detection Systems 
As within the open sided modules, the unavailability of the gas detection systems is 
dependent on the type of detector installed initially and the interval between inspections. 
The possibility to install one of four types of gas detector will be considered for each gas 
detector in the module. The same gas detector types considered within the open module 
analysis will be considered within enclosed modules. 
Within the base case all three 
detectors had an unavailability of 0.07, G3, assuming an inspection interval of 12 months, 
603. Two systems with a lower unavailability, GI and G2, are considered in addition to a 
detector type with a higher unavailability Ga. 
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The optimisation will also include the possibility of reducing the inspection interval of all 
three detectors to six months, 0G2, and three months, OGt, assumed to reduce the 
unavailability of a system by 50% and 25% respectively. A further option, increasing the 
inspection interval to 24 months, 004, will be considered. Doubling the inspection interval 
was assumed to double the unavailability of a system. 
The unavailability associated with each system, considering the initial system installed 
and the inspection interval of the system is presented in Table 11.4 along with the cost of 
installing each system. 
Inspection interval 
eG, 
OG2 
0G3 
OG4 
Detector cost (Cr, ) 
Detector type 
G, 
0.005 0.010 0.0175 0.025 
0.010 0.020 0.035 0.050 
0.020 0.040 0.070 0.100 
0.040 0.080 0.140 0.200 
9000 7500 5000 3500 
G2 G3 G4 
Table 11.4 - Unavailability of the gas detection systems dependent on the inspection 
interval and the system installed for all three modules. 
As within the open module it is assumed that it requires three man-hours at a cost of 100 
units per man-hour to inspect and repair a gas 
detection system. The cost of spares for 
each of the systems installed above are the same as 
for the open module and therefore the 
total maintenance cost of each gas detection system, CMG, for the lifetime of the platform, 
30 years, is presented in Table 11.5. 
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Detector type 
Inspection interval 
eG, 
OG2 
OG3 
OG4 
Gi G2 G3 G4 
45600 42000 43200 42000 
24000 21600 22800 21600 
13200 11400 12000 11100 
9150 7200 7650 6900 
Table 11.5 - Total maintenance costs of the gas detection systems for each combination 
of system type and inspection interval. 
11.2.3 Optimisation of the Deluge System 
In enclosed modules, the frequencies of fatalities predicted by variation of the 
unavailability of the deluge system was not consistent. The lowest frequencies of 
fatalities were not predicted when the system was either 100% available or unavailable. 
Within oil containing modules on an open sided platform, a reduction in the 
unavailability of the deluge system had the opposite effect of within predominantly gas 
only modules. This effect was not seen within the enclosed modules, due to a 
combination of fewer pool fires occurring in the base case model and an the effect on the 
severity of the ignitions of reducing the ventilation rate. 
When the ventilation rate was assumed to increase following detection, reduction in the 
unavailability of the detection system resulted in a large decrease in the frequencies of 
fatalities. 
Therefore, as for the detection system, there will be four types of deluge system available 
for installation, two with a lower unavailability, G, and G2, and one with a higher 
unavailability G4, than the system modelled in the base case. The same four inspection 
intervals used for the detection systems; 3,6,12 and 24 months, will be considered. 
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The unavailability of each deluge system, dependent on the type of system installed and 
the inspection interval is presented in Table 11.6 
Inspection interval 
ODI 
eD2 
OD3 
ON 
System cost (Co) 
System type 
Di D2 D3 Da 
0.010 0.015 0.0225 0.030 
0.020 0.030 0.045 0.060 
0.040 0.060 0.090 0.120 
0.080 0.080 0.180 0.240 
11000 8500 6000 4500 
Table 11.6 - Unavailability of the deluge systems dependent on the inspection interval 
and the system installed for all three modules. 
As for the gas detection systems, it is assumed that three man-hours at a cost of 100 units 
per man-hour are required for each inspection and the cost of spares per inspection varies 
dependent on the system installed and the time between inspections. The cost of spares 
per inspection is presented in Table 11.7. 
System type 
Inspection interval 
ODI 
OD2 
OD3 
ON 
Di D2 D3 D4 
50 20 35 15 
70 30 45 25 
100 60 80 40 
230 140 170 85 
Table 11.7 - Maintenance costs of the deluge systems, per inspection, for each 
combination of system type and inspection interval. 
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The total maintenance costs over the lifetime of the platform, CMD, are presented in Table 
11.8. 
System type 
Inspection interval Di D2 D3 Da 
ODI 
OD2 
ep, 
ON 
42000 38400 40200 37800 
22200 19800 20700 19500 
12000 10800 11400 10200 
7950 6600 7050 5775 
Table 11.8 - Total maintenance costs of the deluge system for each 
combination of system type and inspection interval. 
11.2.4 Development of Constraints within the Enclosed Module Optimisation Strategy 
Determination of the optimal configuration of safety systems on an enclosed platform 
will be subjected to the same constraints as for open modules: 
" Initial cost of the safety systems 
" Inspection and maintenance costs of the safety systems 
" Spurious shutdown 
The initial costs of installing each type of system are presented in Tables 11.4 and 11.6. 
The total initial cost for an enclosed module, CET, in installing the safety systems is 
calculated using Equation 11.1, where NGI is the number of components G, installed and 
CG, is the cost of that component etc. 
4 
CET = j(Nc, Cc; + Nn; Cor ) 
i=1 
(11.1) 
The costs associated with the installation of the three detection systems and one deluge 
system within the base case is presented in Table 11.9. 
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Cost of safety systems in the base case 
model 
Constraint 
21000 
30000 
Table 11.9 - Cost of installation of safety system in the base case and 
constraint for the analysis (in units). 
As three detection and one deluge system are installed in each of the three modules, the 
initial cost and therefore the constraint will be the same for each module. The constraint 
has been selected to allow an improvement from the systems currently installed on the 
platform, however installation of the most expensive components will exceed this 
constraint. 
The maintenance costs associated with each module, over the 30 year lifetime of the 
platform, CEMT, have been calculated using Equation 11.2 and are presented in Table 
11.10. 
4422 
CMT 
-ýE 
(Ar 
GiOCMGibj + 
NDaCMDiYJ+ Ej-, 
\NAi6jCMAi6Y/ 
i=1 J=1 i=I j=I 
Cost of maintenance of safety systems in 
the base case model 
Constraint 
56400 
56400 
Table 11.10 - Maintenance costs and constraints (in units) for each of the 
base case modules. 
(11.2) 
The constraint associated with the maintenance costs is as for the open modules, that the 
cost of maintenance of all systems should not exceed the maintenance costs of the 
systems used in the base case. 
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Spurious shutdown is the result of the activation of a safety system when it is not required 
leading to shutdown of the platform. This event incurs a large cost to the platform 
operators in terms of loss of production due to suspension of processing operations and 
the cost of inspecting and then restarting systems. The spurious failure of the ventilation 
system or gas detection system will result in shutdown of the facility. Tables 11.11 and 
11.12 presents the spurious shutdown frequencies rate, Xs, for the ventilation system and 
gas detection system per year respectively. 
Ventilation 
rate 
Al 
A2 
Spurious frequency 
(per year) 
3.00 x10 
2.50 x10'2 
Table 11.11- Spurious failure rates for each ventilation rate (XsA). 
System type Spurious frequency 
(per year) 
GI 
GZ 
G3 
G4 
3.50 x10- 
3.00 x10"2 
2.25 xl0'2 
1.50 x10'2 
Table 11.12 - Spurious failure rates for each type of gas detection system (Xsa)" 
The total spurious failure rate, %SET, for the ventilation and gas detection systems in the 
enclosed module base case are presented 
in Table 11.13 using Equation 11.3 and 
assuming that the spurious 
failure rate of the isolation and blowdown valves, Xyr, are 
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calculated using the information in Chapter 10. Using Equation 11.3 the total spurious 
failure frequency for the enclosed platform is 0.8900. 
24 
"SET = 2: (NA, AN )+!: (NG, "cr + "VT 
t=I I=I 
(11.3) 
As within open modules, no more than one spurious shutdown failure can be tolerated per 
year on the platform. As each module is modelled independently, a constraint must be 
determined for the spurious failure rate for each module. The spurious failure rate of each 
module in the base case is calculated using Equation 11.3. The constraint for each module 
is then calculated using Equation 11.4, where %. M; is the spurious failure frequency of the 
components within module i. 
-IsEr 
Ami (l1.4) 
The constraint on the gas detection and ventilation systems is that when combined with 
the failure frequency of the valves within the module they do not exceed the constraint 
for that module. 
Separation Compression Wellhead 
Allowable failure rate (per year, in 0.4436 0.6168 0.3806 
each module) 
Spurious failure rate (per year) for 0.3300 0.4950 0.2700 
isolation and blowdown valves 
Constraint 0.1136 0.1218 0.1106 
Table 11.13 - Calculation of the constraint placed on spurious failure frequency 
of the gas detection and ventilation systems. 
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A summary of the constraints is presented in Table 11.14. 
Separation Compression Wellhead 
Initial cost (units) 30000 30000 30000 
Maintenance cost (units) 56400 56400 56400 
Spurious failure rate (per year) 0.1136 0.1218 0.1106 
Table 11.14 - Summary of the constraints within each module 
11.3 Development of the Algorithm 
The string used to represent the configuration of the ventilation, gas detection and deluge 
systems will consist of fourteen binary digits, Figure 11.1. As variation of the isolation 
and blowdown valves did not have a consistent effect on the frequencies of fatalities, they 
are not to be considered within the enclosed module analysis. 
f/ ///////// /7/ J 
1 I 6 bits 2 bits 2 bits 2 bits 
ýHHH 
OGi D, evi 
A; ARE 
G; 
V 
Figure 11.1 - The fourteen digit string representing the ventilation, gas detection and 
deluge systems in the enclosed module. 
The first two digits of the string represent the ventilation rate before and after detection. 
The next six digits determine which type of gas detector is installed for each of the three 
gas detection systems within a module and the following two the 
inspection interval for 
all three detection systems. The remaining four digits represent the type of deluge system 
installed and the inspection interval for that system. 
Table 11.15 and 11.16 present the relationship between each binary digit and the 
ventilation rate prior to and post detection. 
269 
Binary Digits 
0 
1 
Ventilation rate 
Al 
A2 
Table 11.15 - Relation of the binary digits to the ventilation rate prior to isolation. 
Binary Digits 
0 
1 
Ventilation rate 
AR I 
AR2 
Table 11.16 - Relation of the binary digits to the ventilation rate post isolation. 
The interpretation of the digits used for the gas detection system and the deluge system 
are presented in Table 11.17 and the inspection intervals are presented in Table 11.18. 
Binary Digits 
00 
01 
10 
11 
System installed 
GI 
G2 
G3 
Ga 
Di 
D2 
D3 
D4 
Table 11.17 - Relation of the binary digits to the type of gas detection and deluge system 
installed. 
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Binary Digits 
00 
01 
10 
11 
System installed 
eGl 
eG2 
eG3 
e0q 
ODI 
©D2 
©D3 
ON 
Table 11.18- Relation of the binary digits to the type of gas detection and deluge system 
installed. 
The binary digits are, initially, assigned randomly to ten strings using a random number 
generator. As within the open modules the SAROS model is run once for each of the 
strings, through one million simulations, and the frequency of fatalities predicted by each 
run is recorded. Again the frequency of fatalities of each string is increased accordingly if 
a constraint has been exceeded. The fitness of each string is then calculated using 
Equation 10.4. The strings pass through the selection, crossover and mutation operators 
described within Chapter 10 with the following parameters: 
0.00 1 Probability of mutation 
0.6 Probability of crossover 
10 Population size 
The child strings are then run through the SAROS enclosed model Genetic Algorithm 
and the process is repeated until an optimum solution has been reached. A solution is 
determined to be optimum when a particular string demonstrates dominance within the 
ten string set. 
11.4 Optimisation Results 
Table 11.19 presents the frequencies of fatalities within each of the modules following 
optimisation, and the fraction of fatalities predicted within the base case model that they 
represent. The total frequency of fatalities predicted for a closed sided offshore platform 
is 5.017 x 10"2, approximately 50% of the fatalities predicted in the base case. 
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Lowest frequency of fatalities 
Fraction of base case fatalities 
Separation Compression Wellhead 
8.981x10' 2.917x10' 1.202 x10' 
0.439 0.572 0.428 
Table 11.19 - Frequencies of fatalities within each module on the closed sided offshore 
platform post-optimisation. 
The optimisation was run for each module until the results had converged and subsequent 
optimisation cycles were not considerably minimising the frequencies of fatalities. 11 
cycles were required for the compression module to converge, 6 for the separation 
module and 6 for the wellhead module. 
A summary of the optimum configuration of safety systems within each of the modules is 
presented within Tables 11.20,11.21 and 11.22 for the ventilation system, gas detection 
systems and deluge system respectively. Which type of system or inspection interval is 
selected by each of the ten strings is represented by `1' and the results are presented in 
order of highest fitness in the last cycle. 
Ventilation Rate 
Pre-detection 
Al 
Separation 
Compression 
Wellhead 
a 
ý 
-1 
Az 
Post- de 
ARt 
ý 
ý 
ý 
tection 
AR2 
Table 11.20 - Optimum configuration of the ventilation system within the separation 
module of an enclosed sided platform. 
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Within all three modules, the results predict that the frequencies of fatalities would be 
minimised when the ventilation rate was at a higher rate than the base case model prior to 
detection and then increases following detection. 
Separation 
Compression 
Wellhead 
Sonic Detector 
GI G2 G3 Ga 
ý 
ý 
ý 
Beam Detector 
Gi G2 G3 G4 
a 
ý 
ý 
Point Detector 
Gi G2 G3 G4 
ý 
ý 
ý 
Inspection Interv 
Oi 1 02 03 
ý 
ý 
al 
04 
q 
Table 11.21 - Optimum configuration of the gas detection systems on an enclosed sided 
platform. 
For all three modules it has been predicted that the sonic detector would benefit the most 
from improvement and should be exchanged for detector type GI. 
Deluge System Inspection Interval 
D, DZ D3 D4 61 6Z ©3 ©ý 
Separation 
Compression 
Wellhead 
Table 11.22 - Optimum configuration of the deluge system on an enclosed sided 
platform. 
Within the separation module, it is predicted that the deluge system should be changed to 
system type D2 and the 
inspection interval maintained at once per year as within the base 
case. 
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For both the compression and wellhead modules, it is predicted that the deluge system 
should remain the same as in the base case however the inspection interval could be 
reduced to once every two years. 
11.5 Discussion 
Table 11.23 presents the frequencies of ignitions which are predicted to occur on an 
enclosed module both pre- and post-optimisation. 
Explosions 
Immediate Ignition Jet Fires 
Delayed Ignition Jet Fires 
Pool Fires 
Pre-optimisation Post-optimisation Fraction 
3.516 x10" 3.565 x10" 1.014 
6.191 x 10"2 6.249 x 10"2 1.009 
3.949 x10"2 3.757 x10'2 0.951 
8.981 x104 4.492 x104 0.500 
Table 11.23 - Frequencies of ignitions pre- and post-optimisation 
Table 11.23 predicts that negligible difference will be noticed in the frequency of 
explosions and immediate ignition jet fires on an enclosed platform following 
optimisation. Pool fires will be reduced the most significantly. 
Table 11.24 presents the frequencies of fatalities due to each of the ignition types 
modelled 
Explosions 
Immediate Ignition Jet Fires 
Delayed Ignition Jet Fires 
Pool Fires 
Pre-optimisation Post-optimisation Fraction 
7.694 x10" 2.562 x10" 0.333 
2.266 x10"2 2.232 x10"2 0.985 
1.156 x10"8 1.598 x10"7 13.824 
3.287 x10"6 1.027x10"6 0.312 
Table 11.24 - Frequencies of fatalities pre- and post-optimisation 
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The fatalities due to explosions and pool fires have reduced significantly, to 
approximately one third of the frequency prior to optimisation. The reduction in fatalities 
due to explosions and immediate ignition jet fires is due entirely to a reduction in the 
severity of the ignitions. 
Although the fatalities due to delayed ignition jet fires has increased following 
optimisation, the actual frequency of fatalities is minimal. 
11.6 Summary 
Three safety systems; the ventilation system, gas detection systems and deluge systems 
have been optimised within three modules of an enclosed sided platform. The reduction 
of fatalities was greater within the enclosed module than in the open sided platform 
following optimisation and the optimised safety system configuration was within the 
constraints specified in Section 11.2.4. 
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Chapter 12 Summary and Conclusions 
The objectives of this thesis are firstly to develop SAROS, a simulation code for 
modelling explosions and fires on open sided and enclosed platforms, secondly to 
conduct a sensitivity analysis on the input variables and thirdly to develop a methodology 
to produce an optimal configuration of safety systems for each platform type which 
minimises the frequencies of fatalities accounting for limitation on resources. 
Chapter 3 presents the analytical version of SAROS, a methodology developed by 
Andrews and Smith, to predict the frequencies of explosions occurring on an offshore 
platform and the magnitude of the overpressures generated. Extension of the SAROS 
coding to use Monte Carlo Simulation is presented in Chapter 4. This expansion also 
includes the modelling of jet and pool fires, predicting the initial flame length and fire 
duration. 
Chapter 5 extends the existing SAROS model for open sided modules, SAROS-OM, to 
consider the effects of the deluge system on the ventilation rate and mitigation of 
explosions, improvement of the method for calculation of settle out pressures following 
failure of an isolation valve between sections and modelling of non-return, liquid level 
control and maximum pressure relief valves. Three gas detection systems are 
included in 
the modelling and consideration of the module population in order to predict the manual 
time to detection. 
Chapter 6 describes the development of SAROS to model enclosed sided modules, 
SAROS-EM. As for the open sided SAROS, the frequency and severity of explosions, jet 
fires and pool fires is predicted. The key difference between modelling of open and 
enclosed sided modules was the emphasis on 
ignitions within the enclosed modules 
being oxygen dependent as opposed to fuel dependent. Current practice is to turn off the 
forced ventilation on detection of gas in a module. In this way the concentration of a gas 
cloud will rapidly exceed the UFL at which 
it becomes incombustible. 
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Chapter 7 describes the development of an additional modelling capability within both 
SAROS-OM and SAROS-EM that used the ignition type and severity to predict the 
frequency of fatalities per year within a module. Fatalities are calculated due to 
explosions, immediate and delayed ignition jet fires and pool fires and categorised as 
local, pre-muster and post-muster dependent on their location at the time of ignition. 
Chapters 8 and 9 present a sensitivity analyses on SAROS-OM and SAROS-EM 
respectively. Key input parameters are analysed for each module type and the parameters 
which benefit from optimisation are identified. A number of factors are analysed to 
determine the model dependency on the accuracy of these inputs. 
Chapters 10 and 11 present the optimisation strategy used within both SAROS-OM and 
SAROS-EM. A genetic algorithm is developed and used to predict the optimum 
configuration of safety systems on both platform types. An optimum solution is assumed 
to have been reached for each module when the minimum fatalities generated by each 
generation converged, and there was a noticeable trend for the safety system 
configurations represented by the strings. 
The frequencies of fatalities predicted to occur within each module subjected to the 
optimisation scheme were reduced. 
The following objectives have been achieved: 
Literature concerning fires and explosions has been reviewed alongside 
information available on offshore releases and ignitions. 
SAROS-OM has been updated to include a modelling capability for pool and jet 
fires. Safety systems are also modelled more effectively. 
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" SAROS-EM has been developed to model enclosed modules on offshore 
platforms. It was determined that fewer ignitions would be expected to occur per 
year within enclosed modules than in open modules. 
"A model to estimate the frequency of fatalities per year for both open and 
enclosed sided modules has been developed. The results suggest that more 
fatalities would be expected per year on enclosed modules than open modules. 
"A sensitivity analysis was carried out on the data parameters required for both 
open and enclosed versions of SAROS. 
Within the open sided modules, the isolation and blowdown valves, gas detection 
systems and deluge systems were optimised using a Genetic Algorithm. For the 
example platform considered optimisation of these systems predicted an 8% 
reduction in the frequencies of fatalities per year. 
Optimisation of the enclosed module considered the ventilation rate, gas detection 
system and deluge system. Using the Genetic Algorithm, for the example 
platform considered a 50% reduction in the frequencies of fatalities per year was 
predicted. 
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Appendix A Input Files 
Topology data file 
\* Base Case data for Open Module SAROS 
30 
`Isol Valve 1' 
1,33,0.035 
'Isol Valve 2' 
33,32,0.035 
... etc 15 
`BD valve 1' 
2,33.01,0.035 
`BD Valve 2' 
33,32,0.035 
... etc 16 
`Well Valve 1' 
14,3,0.0007 
`Well Valve 2' 
15,3,0.0007 
... etc 0 
6 
'NRV 1' 
5,6,0.200,0.035 
`NRV2' 
4,5,0.200,0.035 
... etc 0 
6 
`LLCV 1' 
1,3,0.100,0.035 
`LLCV2' 
1,33,0.100,0.035 
... etc 
13 
`PSV 1' 
1,3.85 
`PSV2' 
2,58.3 
... etc 
\* Number of isolation valves 
\* Valve name 
\* Initial section, connecting section, unavailability of valve 
\* Number of blowdown valves 
\* Valve name 
\* Section, blowdown diameter, unavailability of valve 
\* Number of wellhead valves 
\* Valve name 
\* Initial section, connecting section, unavailability of valve 
\* Number of single non-return valves 
\* Number of combined non-return valves 
\* Valve name 
\* Initial section, connecting section, unavailability of NRV 
\* valve, unavailability of isolation valve 
\* Number of single liquid level control valves 
\* Number of combined liquid level control valves 
\* Valve name 
\* Initial section, connecting section, unavailability of LLCV, 
\* unavailability of isolation valve 
\* Number of combined liquid level control valves 
\* Valve name 
\* Section, maximum allowable pressure 
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Inventory data file 
\* Base Case data for Open Module SAROS 
\* Separation Module 
2.4 
1.22 
101325 
5 
15 
0.20 
1675.55 
2200 
511000 
0.07 
0.28 
0.0028 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.02 
0.09 
9.446x 10-6 
0.30 
45 
30 
`loc l' 
8.7 
0.32 
`loc2' 
2.7 
0.41 
, loc3' 
6.5 
0.4 
8.88 
-17.693 
1.0563 
-18.215 
1.007 
0.6 
1.6 
2.0 
15 
120 
15 
120 
\* Maximum Windspeed 
\* Air density 
\* Atmospheric pressure 
\* Lower flammability limit 
\* Upper flammability limit 
\* Proportion of LFL required for detection 
\*Specific heat capacity at constant volume 
\*Specific heat capacity at constant pressure 
\* Latent heat of vaporisation 
\* Probability ignition is simultaneous with release 
\* Frequency of ignition prior to isolation 
\* Frequency of ignition post isolation 
\* Unavailability of sonic gas detection system 
\* Unavailability of beam gas detection system 
\* Unavailability of point gas detection system 
\* Unavailability of fire detection system 
\* Unavailability of deluge system 
\* Failure frequency of deluge system once activated 
\* Reduction factor for ventilation once deluge is activated 
\* Time between detection and activation of deluge 
\* Time between detection and isolation/blowdown valves 
\* Location label 
\* Max overpressure - deluge inactive 
\* Max overpressure - deluge active 
\* Location label 
\* Max overpressure - deluge inactive 
\* Max overpressure - deluge active 
\* Location label 
\* Max overpressure - deluge inactive 
\* Max overpressure - deluge active 
\* Stoichiometric concentration 
\* A- deluge inactive 
\* B- deluge inactive 
\* A- deluge active 
\* B- deluge active 
\* Overpressure required to fail a blast wall 
\* Overpressure required to fail a structure 
\* Minimum sustainable length of a flame 
\* Minimum time for jet fire to fail vessel 
\* Minimum time for jet fire to fail structure 
\* Minimum time for pool fire to fail vessel 
\* Minimum time for pool fire to fail structure 
ms-1 
kgm-3 
Pa(abs) 
%v/v 
%v/v 
Jkg-1'C-1 
Jkg-1'C-1 
Jkg-1 
hr-1 
hr-1 
hr-1 
s 
s 
bar 
bar 
bar 
bar 
bar 
bar 
%v/v 
bar 
bar 
m 
mins 
minn 
mins 
mins 
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38 
11 
2 
... etc `1-atsep' 
108.52 
334.16 
260000 
0.6 
2.35 
0 
00.3 
987 
0.1 
`2-test sep' 
... etc 16 
1 
0.001 
2 
0.001 
... etc 15 
`Separation' 
10.0 
20.0 
40.0 
7 
1 
0.00653 
15 
\* Number of sections 
\* Atmospheric separator 
\* Test separator 
\* Section Name 
\* Section volume 
\* Section temperature 
\* Section pressure 
\* Section gas proportion 
\*Section gas density 
\*Section condensate proportion 
\*Section condensate density 
\* Section oil proportion 
\*Section oil density 
\* Section water proportion 
\* 
\* 
\* 
Number of wells 
Well number 
Well leak rate 
Well number 
Well leak rate 
\* 
\* 
\* 
\* 
\* 
\* 
\* 
Time for manual isolation of wells 
Module name 
Module height 
Module width 
Module length 
Number of sections in the module 
Section number 
Leak frequency of section 
Time for blowdown of section 
k 
kgm-3 
kgm-3 
kgm-3 
yr-1 
yr-1 
mins 
m 
m 
m 
yr" 1 
mins 
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Changes to Inventory data file 
\* Base Case data for Enclosed Module SAROS 
\* Separation Module 
50 \* Ventilation rate 
1 
1.22 
101325 
5 
15 
0.20 
1675.55 
2200 
511000 
0.07 
0.28 
0.0028 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.02 
0.09 
9.446x 10-6 
45 
30 
g. 7 
8.88 
0.6 
1.6 
2.0 
15 
120 
15 
120 
38 
1 
2 
... etc , 1-at sep' 
108.53 
334.16 
260000 
0.6 
2.35 
0 
0 
\* Ventilation rate following detection 
\* Air density 
\* Atmospheric pressure 
\* Lower flammability limit 
\* Upper flammability limit 
\* Proportion of LFL required for detection 
\*Specific heat capacity at constant volume 
\*Specific heat capacity at constant pressure 
\* Latent heat of vaporisation 
\* Probability ignition is simultaneous with release 
\* Frequency of ignition prior to isolation 
\* Frequency of ignition post isolation 
\* Unavailability of sonic gas detection system 
\* Unavailability of beam gas detection system 
\* Unavailability of point gas detection system 
\* Unavailability of fire detection system 
\* Unavailability of deluge system 
\* Failure frequency of deluge system once activated 
\* Time between detection and activation of deluge 
\* Time between detection and isolation/blowdown valves 
\* Max overpressure 
\* Stoichiometric concentration 
\* Overpressure required to fail a blast wall 
\* Overpressure required to fail a structure 
\* Minimum sustainable length of a flame 
\* Minimum time for jet fire to fail vessel 
\* Minimum time for jet fire to fail structure 
\* Minimum time for pool fire to fail vessel 
\* Minimum time for pool fire to fail structure 
\* Number of sections 
\* Atmospheric separator 
\* Test separator 
\* Section Name 
\* Section volume 
\* Section temperature 
\* Section pressure 
\* Section gas proportion 
\*Section gas density 
\*Section condensate proportion 
\*Section condensate density 
\` 
ACPH 
ACPII 
kgm-3 
Pa(abs) 
%v/v 
%v/v 
Jkg-1'C-1 
Jkg-1'C-1 
Jkg-1 
hr-1 
hr-1 
hr-1 
s 
s 
bar 
%V/V 
bar 
bar 
m 
mins 
mins 
mins 
mins 
k 
kgm-3 
kgm-3 
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0.3 
987 
0.1 
`2-test sep' 
... etc 16 
1 
0.001 
2 
0.001 
,.. etc 15 
`Separation' 
10.0 
20.0 
40.0 
7 
1 
0.00653 
15 
\* Section oil proportion 
\*Section oil density 
\* Section water proportion 
\* Number of wells 
\* Well number 
\* Well leak rate 
\* Well number 
\* Well leak rate 
\* Time for manual isolation of wells 
\* Module name 
\* Module height 
\* Module width 
\* Module length 
\* Number of sections in the module 
\* Section number 
\* Leak frequency of section 
\* Time for blowdown of section 
kgm-3 
yr-1 
yr-I 
mins 
m 
m 
m 
yr-1 
mins 
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Appendix B- Tables for Sensitivity Analysis on Open Sided Modules 
Factor Maximum Windspeed 
0.1 0.24 
0.5 1.2 
1 2.4 
2 4.8 
5 12 
10 24 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Table 8.1 - Variation in windspeed (in ms'') 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0092 0.9958 0.9996 1.0047 1.6875 
1.0006 0.9959 0.9988 1.0041 1.0785 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9941 0.9969 0.9970 0.9974 0.9310 
0.9935 0.9961 0.9971 0.9988 0.9135 
0.9917 0.9959 0.9971 1.0001 0.9095 
Table 8.2 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the 
separation module of an open platform 
due to variation in the maximum windspeed. 
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Factor 
Overpressure 
(bar) 
0-1 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
4-5 
5-6 
6-7 
7-8 
8+ 
0.1 0.5 125 10 
98.7964 99.6430 99.7789 99.8563 99.9418 99.9588 
0.4552 0.1258 0.0714 0.0684 0.0342 0.0172 
0.2359 0.0748 0.0476 0.0103 0.0034 0.0069 
0.1619 0.0578 0.0272 0.0240 0.0137 0.0069 
0.1146 0.0408 0.0408 0.0103 0.0034 0.0034 
0.1281 0.0204 0.0272 0.0308 0.0000 0.0069 
0.0506 0.0204 0.0034 0.0000 0.0034 0.0000 
0.0472 0.0136 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0101 0.0034 0.0034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 8.3 - Percentages of explosions occurring within the separation module 
due to variation in the maximum windspeed. 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0135 0.9968 1.0108 0.6667 1.3441 
1.0062 0.9981 1.0061 0.8333 1.0301 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9998 0.9981 1.0030 1.1667 0.9624 
0.9991 0.9979 1.0017 1.0000 0.9464 
0.9852 0.9960 1.0044 0.8333 0.9409 
Table 8.4 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the 
compression module of an open platform due to variation in the maximum windspeed. 
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:i 
Overpressur 
e (bar) 
0-1 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
Factor 
0.1 0.5 125 10 
98.9336 99.6585 0.9983 99.9276 99.9470 99.9666 
0.7661 0.2665 0.0011 0.0000 0.0446 0.0278 
0.2591 0.0666 0.0005 0.0613 0.0084 0.0056 
0.0413 0.0083 0.0001 0.0111 0.0000 0.0000 
Table 8.5 - Percentages of explosions occurring within the compression module 
due to variation in the maximum windspeed. 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Immediate Pre-Isolation Post-Isolation 
0.007 0.028 0.00028 
0.035 0.14 0.0014 
0.07 0.28 0.0028 
0.14 0.56 0.0056 
0.35 1.4 0.014 
0.7 2.8 0.028 
Table 8.6 - Variation in ignition parameters 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
0.1664 0.1012 0.6303 1.0001 0.1129 
0.5511 0.5001 0.7967 0.9916 0.5125 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.7512 2.0038 1.3352 1.0008 1.8045 
3.0708 5.0196 1.6082 1.0008 3.7079 
4.0212 10.0590 1.9434 1.0009 4.7593 
Table 8.7 - Fractions of explosions, jet fires and pool fires within the 
separation module of an open platform due to variation in the ignition rate. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
0.2056 0.1050 0.1956 1.5000 0.0966 
0.9879 0.4937 0.9884 0.8333 0.4800 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
2.9713 1.9958 2.9726 1.6667 1.7607 
3.7310 4.9915 4.0326 1.1667 3.5637 
4.8176 9.9891 4.8187 1.3333 5.1408 
Table 8.8 - Fractions of explosions, jet fires and pool fires within the 
compression module of an open platform due to variation in the ignition rate. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Separation 
Compression 
0.0000 14.3430 0.5436 1.0002 3.5014 
0.0000 14.2617 0.0004 1.0067 5.9514 
Table 8.9 - Fractions of explosions, jet fires and pool fires within the 
compression module of an open platform due to constant ignition rate. 
All available 
All unavailable 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0124 1.0024 1.0043 1.0058 0.9579 
1.0246 1.0057 1.0093 1.0096 1.6986 
Table 8.10 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of an open 
platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown system. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
All available 
All unavailable 
1.0536 0.9993 1.0541 1.6667 0.9976 
1.0336 1.0006 1.0162 2.1667 1.3082 
Table 8.11 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of an 
open platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown system. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Isolation 
valves 
Available 
Unavailable 
Blowdown 
valves 
Available 
Unavailable 
1.0067 1.0070 1.0070 1.0063 0.9720 
0.9323 0.9985 0.9564 1.0049 1.7048 
1.003 8 0.9997 1.0019 1.0001 1.0011 
0.8599 1.0056 0.9393 1.0003 0.9926 
Table 8.12 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of an open 
platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown system. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Isolation 
valves 
Available 
Unavailable 
Blowdown 
valves 
Available 
Unavailable 
1.0585 0.9948 1.0409 1.5000 0.9990 
1.0398 0.9988 1.0403 1.6667 1.0093 
1.0127 1.0010 1.0128 1.0000 0.9995 
0.6647 1.0028 0.6646 1.0000 1.1095 
Table 8.13 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of an 
open platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown system. 
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Ignition Type Base Case Model Isolation valves Isolation valves 
unavailable available 
Explosion 
Immediate Jet Fire 
Delayed Jet Fire 
Pool Fire 
0.7300 0.4364 0.7372 
0.2681 0.5627 0.2621 
< 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
0.0019 0.0009 0.0007 
Table 8.14 - Fatalities occurring within the separation module of an open platform 
due to variation in the isolation valve system. 
Flame length (m) 
to from 
0 10 
10 20 
20 30 
30 40 
40 50 
50 60 
60 70 
70 80 
80 90 
90 + 
Fraction of immediate ignition jet fires 
Base Case Valves Unavailable 
89.1322 72.3633 
5.6102 8.2764 
2.1329 5.1011 
1.2984 4.3155 
0.5885 2.8074 
0.4086 1.1037 
0.2974 1.0805 
0.2339 0.9513 
0.1855 0.6861 
0.1125 3.3146 
Table 8.15 - Fraction of immediate ignition jet fires occurring with flame length 
between set limits within the separation module. 
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Factor Valve unavailability 
0.1 0.0035 
0.5 0.0175 
1 0.035 
2 0.070 
5 0.175 
10 0.350 
Table 8.16 - Variation in unavailability of the isolation and blowdown valves 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Jet Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Fires 
1.0059 1.0076 1.0027 0.9995 0.9650 
0.9984 1.0090 0.9980 0.9982 0.9889 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9930 1.0043 0.9950 0.9975 1.0100 
0.9669 1.0043 0.9809 0.9995 1.0163 
0.9631 1.0020 0.9753 0.9973 1.0362 
Table 8.17 - Fraction of explosions, jet fires and pool fires within the separation module 
of an open platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown systems. 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0438 0.9965 1.0443 1.8333 0.9983 
1.0314 1.0013 1.0317 1.0000 1.0028 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9705 0.9964 0.9708 1.5000 0.9968 
0.9033 0.9929 0.9023 0.8333 0.9997 
0.9091 0.9995 0.9056 1.0000 1.0124 
Table 8.18 - Fraction of explosions, jet fires and pool fires within the compression 
module of an open platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown systems. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
All available 
All unavailable 
0.9877 1.0014 0.9975 1.0006 0.9405 
1.1097 1.0047 1.1089 0.9998 2.1493 
Table 8.19 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of an open 
platform due to variation in the detection systems. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
All available 
All unavailable 
0.9594 0.9934 0.9681 0.9991 0.9139 
1.2098 0.9993 1.1908 0.9999 2.6785 
Table 8.20 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of an 
open platform due to variation in the detection systems. 
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Mitigated Unmitigated 
explosions explosions 
Base Case 
Detection system 100% available 
92.48 7.52 
99.14 0.86 
Table 8.21 - Percentages of mitigated and unmitigated explosions 
in the separation module. 
Separation Module 
Compression module 
Local fatalities Pre-muster Post-muster 
fatalities fatalities 
1.5866 1.2955 4.2425 
2.2108 1.9569 5.0124 
Table 8.22 - Fractions of local, pre-muster and post-muster fatalities generated by 
explosions following removal of the gas detection system. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Sonic Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
Beam Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
Point Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
0.9987 1.0002 0.9984 0.9997 0.9754 
1.0523 1.0038 1.0629 0.9914 1.2841 
0.9918 1.0003 0.9975 0.9980 0.9882 
1.0784 1.0046 1.0178 1.0088 1.4276 
0.9979 1.0004 0.9987 0.9950 0.9817 
1.0421 1.0105 1.0360 0.9954 1.2494 
Table 8.23 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of an open 
platform due to variation in the detection systems. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Sonic Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
Beam Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
Point Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
0.9824 0.9976 0.9832 0.9964 0.9477 
1.0518 0.9932 1.0952 1.0009 1.3855 
0.9607 1.0071 0.9612 1.0118 0.9623 
1.0823 0.9982 1.1492 0.9978 1.6714 
0.9872 0.9969 0.9901 0.9982 0.9676 
1.0320 1.0129 1.0321 1.0182 1.3193 
Table 8.24 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of an 
open platform due to variation in the detection systems. 
Factor Detection system 
unavailability 
0.1 0.007 
0.5 0.035 
1 0.070 
2 0.140 
5 0.350 
10 0.700 
Table 8.25 - Variation in unavailability of the detection systems 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
0.9891 0.9988 0.9893 1.0010 0.9565 
0.9970 0.9998 0.9975 1.0004 0.9821 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0144 1.0021 1.0142 1.0002 1.0932 
1.0452 1.0001 1.0449 0.9987 1.4923 
1.0802 0.9984 1.0798 1.0011 1.8645 
Table 8.26 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of an open 
platform due to variation in the detection systems. 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
0.9641 0.9955 0.3812 1.0000 0.9283 
0.9797 0.9945 0.6342 0.9891 0.9684 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0285 0.9957 1.0284 1.0000 1.1292 
1.0940 1.0009 1.0937 1.0000 1.5105 
1.1474 0.9971 1.1423 0.9782 1.9825 
Table 8.27 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of an 
open platform due to variation in the detection systems. 
Deluge Available 
Deluge Unavailable 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.1492 1.0292 0.5239 0.0000 1.0032 
0.7574 0.6196 6.3725 11.0729 0.8300 
Table 8.28 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the 
separation module of an open platform due to variation in the deluge system. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Deluge Available 
Deluge Unavailable 
0.9896 1.0014 0.9988 0.0000 0.9667 
1.0013 0.9996 1.0009 22.5000 1.8601 
Table 8.29 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the 
compression module of an open platform due to variation in the deluge system. 
Section 
1 
2 
3 
13 
21 
32 
33 
Percentage selected 
(%) 
28 
11 
18 
6 
5 
18 
14 
Table 8.30 - Percentage that leak occurs on each section in the separation module (%). 
302 
Section 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
21 
Percentage selected 
(%) 
<1 
1 
1 
19 
13 
15 
13 
6 
<1 
19 
7 
1 
5 
Table 8.31 - Percentage that leak occurs on each section in the compression module (%). 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Separation 
Compression 
1.0187 1.0189 1.0446 0.0000 
0.9716 1.0031 0.9824 0.0000 
Table 8.32 - Fraction of fatalities occurring due to ignitions in the separation and 
compression module of an open platform when deluge is 100% available. 
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Factor Initial unavailability prior to Frequency failure once 
activation activated 
0.1 0.009 9.446x 10' 
0.5 0.045 4.723x10 
1 0.090 9.446x 10"6 
2 0.180 1.889x10'5 
5 0.450 9.723x10"5 
10 0.900 9.446x 10"5 
Table 8.33 - Variation of the deluge systems 
Tables 8.34 and 8.35 present the predictions for fractions of ignitions and fatalities from 
the base case for the separation and compression modules respectively. 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Jet Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Fires 
1.1085 1.0250 0.5109 0.1021 1.0022 
1.0356 1.0133 0.7439 0.5001 1.0008 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9440 0.9600 1.5092 1.9844 0.9855 
0.8632 0.8476 3.1034 4.9861 0.9124 
0.7799 0.6626 5.7590 9.9459 0.8375 
Table 8.34 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of an open 
platform due to variation in the deluge system. 
304 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Jet Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Fires 
0.9912 0.9987 0.9990 0.0000 0.9703 
0.9978 0.9972 0.9996 0.6667 0.9885 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0002 1.0044 1.0011 3.0000 1.1996 
1.0006 0.9968 1.0021 7.3333 1.5162 
1.0009 1.0044 1.0006 16.6667 1.8084 
Table 8.35 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of an 
open platform due to variation in the deluge system. 
Fatalities 
Walls strengthened 
Walls removed 
0.9994 
11.4059 
Table 8.36 - Fractions of fatalities within the separation module 
of an open platform due to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
Fatalities 
Walls strengthened 
Walls removed 
0.9855 
6.2862 
Table 8.37 - Fractions and fatalities within the compression module 
of an open platform due to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Separation Module 
Compression Module 
3.3885 33.3121 1.0000 1.0000 
2.6907 12.7720 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 8.38 - Fractions of fatalities generated by ignitions in both the separation and 
compression modules when fire and blast walls are removed from the module. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Separation Module 
Compression Module 
0.9994 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9855 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 8.39 - Fractions of fatalities generated by ignitions in both the separation and 
compression modules when fire and blast walls have infinite resistance. 
Fatalities 
Blast Walls strengthened 
Blast Walls removed 
Fire Walls strengthened 
Fire Walls removed 
0.9994 
2.7436 
1.0000 
10.2893 
Table 8.40 - Fractions of fatalities within the separation module of an open platform due 
to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
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Fatalities 
Blast Walls strengthened 
Blast Walls removed 
Fire Walls strengthened 
Fire Walls removed 
0.9855 
2.2452 
1.0000 
5.1813 
Table 8.41 - Fractions of fatalities within the compression module of an open platform 
due to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
Separation Module Compression Module 
Less than blast wall resistance 
Greater than blast wall resistance 
0.9973 0.9974 
0.0027 0.0026 
Table 8.42 - Fractions of explosions occurring with an overpressure less than or greater 
than the resistance of the blast walls in the base case model. 
Fatalities 
Separation Module 
Compression Module 
0.9233 
0.9451 
Table 8.43 - Fractions of fatalities occurring when the resistance of the blast walls is 
infinite and platform collapse due to overpressure cannot occur. 
Local fatalities Pre-muster Post-muster 
fatalities fatalities 
Separation Module 
Compression Module 
1.8319 2085.2955 1.0000 
1.2108 509.9569 1.0000 
Table 8.44 - Fractions of local, pre-muster and post-muster fatalities generated by 
explosions following removal of the blast walls from the module. 
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Local fatalities Pre-muster Post-muster 
fatalities fatalities 
Base Case 
Removal of firewalls 
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.1005 0.8995 0.0000 
Table 8.45 - Fractions of local, pre-muster and post-muster fatalities generated by 
immediate ignition jet fires following removal of the blast walls from the module in the 
separation module. 
Local fatalities Pre-muster Post-muster 
fatalities fatalities 
Base Case 
Removal of firewalls 
1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0783 0.9217 0.0000 
Table 8.46 - Fractions of local, pre-muster and post-muster fatalities generated by 
immediate ignition jet fires following removal of the blast walls from the module in the 
compression module. 
Factor Blast wall resistance (bar) Fire wall resistance (mins) 
0.1 0.06 1.5 
0.5 0.3 7.5 
1 0.6 15 
2 1.2 30 
5 3.0 75 
10 6.0 150 
Table 8.47 - Variation of the wall resistances (bar/mins) 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Fatalities 
5.7436 
1.2007 
1.0000 
0.9996 
0.9994 
0.9994 
Table 8.48 - Fractions of fatalities within the separation module of an open platform due 
to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Fatalities 
5.2452 
1.0017 
1.0000 
0.9995 
0.9919 
0.9880 
Table 8.49 - Fractions of fatalities within the compression module of an open platform 
due to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
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0.1 0.5 25 10 
Maximum wind speed 
Ignition frequency 
Leak frequency 
Isolation/ blowdown system 
Detection system 
Deluge system 
Fire/Blast walls 
1.6875 1.0785 0.9310 0.9135 0.9095 
0.1129 0.5125 1.8045 3.7079 4.7593 
0.1 0.5 25 10 
0.9650 0.9889 1.0100 1.0163 1.0362 
0.9565 0.9821 1.0932 1.4923 1.8645 
1.0022 1.0008 0.9855 0.9124 0.8375 
5.7436 1.2007 0.9996 0.9994 0.9994 
Table 8.50 - Overview of the fractions of fatalities for each parameter within the 
separation module of an open sided platform. 
0.1 0.5 25 10 
Maximum wind speed 
Ignition frequency 
Leak frequency 
Isolation/ blowdown system 
Detection system 
Deluge system 
Fire/Blast walls 
1.3441 1.0301 0.9624 0.9464 0.9409 
0.0966 0.4800 1.7607 3.5637 5.1408 
0.1 0.5 25 10 
0.9983 1.0028 0.9968 0.9997 1.0124 
0.9283 0.9684 1.1292 1.5105 1.9825 
0.9703 0.9885 1.1996 1.5162 1.8084 
5.2452 1.0017 0.9995 0.9919 0.9880 
Table 8.51 - Overview of the fractions of fatalities for each parameter within the 
compression module of an open sided platform. 
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0.1 0.5 25 10 
Ignition frequency 
Leak frequency 
Isolation/ blowdown 
system 
Detection system 
0.1129 2 0.5125 2 1.8045 2 3.7079 2 4.7593 2 
0.1 1 0.5 12151 10 1 
0.9650 4 0.9689 3 1.0100 4 1.0163 4 1.0362 4 
0.9565 3 0.9821 4 1.0932 3 1.4923 3 1.8645 3 
Table 8.52 - Fractions of fatalities and assigned order of importance within the separation 
module of an open sided platform. 
Maximum wind 
speed 
Deluge system 
Fire/Blast walls 
0.1 0.5 25 10 
1.6875 2 1.0785 2 0.9310 1 0.9135 2 0.9095 2 
1.0022 3 1.0008 3 0.9855 2 0.9124 1 0.8375 1 
5.7436 1 1.2007 1 0.9996 3 0.9994 3 0.9994 3 
Table 8.53 - Fractions of fatalities and assigned order of 
importance within the separation 
module of an open sided platform. 
2or0.5 10or0.1 
Isolation/ blowdown system 
Detection system 
Deluge system 
Fire/Blast walls 
0.9889 3 0.9650 3 
0.9821 1 0.9565 2 
0.9855 2 0.8375 1 
0.9996 4 0.9994 4 
Table 8.54 - Fractions of fatalities and assigned order of importance within the separation 
module of an open sided platform. 
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2or0.5 10or0.1 
Isolation/ blowdown system* 
Detection system 
Deluge system 
Fire/Blast walls 
1.0028 4 0.9983 4 
0.9684 1 0.9283 1 
0.9885 2 0.9703 2 
0.9995 3 0.9880 3 
Table 8.55 - Fractions of fatalities and assigned order of importance within the 
compression module of an open sided platform. 
* Variation of this system did not predict a consistent increase or decrease in the fractions 
of fatalities and it was assumed that the majority of variation was due to use of the Monte 
Carlo simulation method. 
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Appendix C- Tables for Sensitivity Analysis on Enclosed Modules 
Separation 
Compression 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
7.230 10,3 1.567 x10" 1.277 x10" 8.981 x10 2.64-8-x-10-'7 
1.554 x10"2 3.455 x10"2 1.505 x10"2 0 5.101 x10'2 
Table 9.1 - Frequencies of ignitions and fatalities within the base case 
separation and compression modules of a closed platform. 
Factor Ventilation Rate (acph) 
0.1 5 
0.5 25 
1 50 
2 100 
5 250 
10 500 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Table 9.2 - Variation in ventilation rate (acph) 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0354 1.0006 0.9936 1.0031 1.3773 
1.0042 0.9969 0.9990 0.9919 1.0574 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0007 1.0009 1.0028 0.9914 0.9264 
1.0076 1.0021 1.0111 0.9950 0.8182 
1.0076 1.0031 1.0142 0.9953 0.6233 
Table 9.3 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of a closed 
platform due to variation in the ventilation rate. 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
i 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0567 0.9971 0.9939 1.0000 1.0988 
0.9999 0.9985 0.9969 1.0000 1.0095 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0138 0.9979 1.0151 0.0494 0.9642 
1.0316 0.9989 1.0511 0.0987 0.7626 
1.0240 1.0009 1.0747 0.1481 0.3348 
Table 9.4 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of a closed 
platform due to variation in the ventilation rate. 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
i 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.4088 1.0039 0.2589 0.3372 
1.0623 1.0001 0.7038 0.8412 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9204 0.9972 1.4330 0.6219 
0.8006 1.0259 2.4024 1.2351 
0.5905 1.0124 2.9600 1.1567 
Table 9.5 - Fractions of fatalities occurring within the separation module of a closed 
platform due to variations in the ventilation rate. 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.1071 0.9980 0.2679 1.0000 
1.0107 0.9955 0.7413 1.0000 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9614 0.9984 1.6310 1.0000 
0.7445 0.9836 2.4688 1.0000 
0.2812 0.9909 3.4014 1.0000 
Table 9.6 - Fractions of fatalities occurring within the compression module 
of a closed platform due to variations in the ventilation rate. 
Factor 
Overpressure 
(bar) 
0-1 
1-2 
2-3 
3-4 
4-5 
5-6 
6-7 
7-8 
8+ 
0.1 0.5 125 10 
0.8996 0.9478 0.9570 0.9649 0.9738 0.9913 
0.0289 0.0212 0.0180 0.0169 0.0164 0.0077 
0.0088 0.0079 0.0073 0.0075 0.0051 0.0029 
0.0062 0.0056 0.0049 0.0031 0.0009 0.0002 
0.0018 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0001 0.0003 
0.0068 0.0017 0.0009 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 
0.0076 0.0015 0.0007 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0039 0.0008 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 
0.0200 0.0109 0.0104 0.0090 0.0088 0.0075 
Table 9.7 - Percentages of explosions occurring within the separation module 
due to variation in the ventilation rate. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0218 0.9951 1.0292 0.9743 0.2647 
Table 9.8 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities compared to the base case model 
when the ventilation rate is increased following detection of a leak 
within the separation module. 
Factor 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
i 
2 
5 
10 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Immediate Pre-Isolation Post-Isolation 
0.007 0.028 0.00028 
0.035 0.14 0.0014 
0.07 0.28 0.0028 
0.14 0.56 0.0056 
0.35 1.4 0.014 
0.7 2.8 0.028 
Table 9.9 - Variation in ignition (per hour) 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
0.1649 0.0998 0.4481 0.0964 0.1122 
0.5649 0.4984 0.7196 0.4967 0.5146 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.7124 1.9914 1.4589 1.9254 1.8507 
2.8459 4.9893 2.2171 4.4182 3.7417 
2.2938 9.9975 1.9607 7.5585 4.0959 
Table 9.10 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of a closed 
platform due to variation in the ignition frequency. 
316 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
0.1167 0.1008 0.1162 1.0000 0.1128 
0.5293 0.4976 0.5294 1.0000 0.5247 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.8046 2.0016 1.8014 1.0000 1.8612 
2.4913 4.9949 2.4530 1.0000* 3.4644 
3.0750 9.9888 3.0556 1.0000* 3.6137 
Table 9.11 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of a 
closed platform due to variation in the ignition frequency. 
* This factor resulted in a small number of pool fires 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
2 
5 
10 
All available 
All unavailable 
Table 9.12 - Factors used to vary the leak frequency 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0166 1.0041 1.0103 1.0034 0.9957 
0.8890 0.9974 0.8901 0.9864 1.0249 
Table 9.13 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of a closed 
platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown systems. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
All available 
All unavailable 
1.0440 0.9957 1.0487 1.0000 0.9883 
0.8612 0.9962 0.913 7 1.0000 1.0454 
Table 9.14 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of a 
closed platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown systems. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Jet Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Fires 
Separation module 
Compression module 
0.9147 0.0852 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
0.9283 0.0717 < 0.0001 0.0000 
Table 9.15 - Fraction of fatalities within the separation and compression modules of a 
closed platform due to removal of the isolation and blowdown systems. 
Explosions Immediate Jet Fires 
Separation module 
Compression module 
1.0166 1.1243 
1.0496 0.9940 
Table 9.16 - Fractions of fatalities due to explosions and immediate ignition jet fires due 
to removal of the isolation and blowdown systems. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Isolation valves 
Available 
Unavailable 
Blowdown valves 
Available 
Unavailable 
1.0083 1.0048 1.0056 1.0063 1.0039 
0.8896 1.0003 0.8904 0.9874 1.0242 
1.0075 0.9999 1.0038 0.9990 0.9963 
0.9355 1.0028 0.9487 0.9961 1.0127 
Table 9.17 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of a closed 
platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown valves. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Isolation valves 
Available 
Unavailable 
Blowdown valves 
Available 
Unavailable 
1.0320 0.9999 0.9632 1.0000 0.9920 
0.9715 0.9985 0.9632 1.0000 1.0331 
1.0095 0.9988 1.0107 1.0000 0.9981 
0.9870 1.0060 0.9771 1.0000 1.0214 
Table 9.18 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of a 
closed platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown valves. 
Explosions Immediate Jet Fires 
Isolation valves removed 
Blowdown valves removed 
1.0166 1.1243 
0.9556 1.0269 
Table 9.19 - Fraction of fatalities within the separation module of a closed platform 
due to removal of the isolation or blowdown systems. 
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Factor Valve unavailability 
0.1 0.0035 
0.5 0.0175 
1 0.035 
2 0.070 
5 0.175 
10 0.350 
Table 9.20- Variation in unavailability of the isolation and blowdown valves 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0066 1.0032 1.0030 0.9874 0.9953 
1.0068 0.9916 1.0031 1.0005 1.0104 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9915 0.9990 0.9941 1.0196 1.0285 
0.9709 1.0012 0.9738 1.0068 1.0040 
0.9582 0.9976 0.9547 1.0453 1.0275 
Table 9.21 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of a closed 
platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown valves. 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0402 0.9991 1.0451 1.0000 0.9799 
1.0266 0.9968 1.0268 1.0000 0.9986 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9731 1.0074 0.9716 1.0000 1.0053 
0.9074 1.0030 0.9008 1.0000 0.9975 
0.9118 0.9946 0.8960 1.0000 0.9852 
Table 9.22 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of a 
closed platform due to variation in the isolation and blowdown valves. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
All available 
All unavailable 
0.9994 1.0001 0.9992 0.9998 1.0003 
1.0378 1.0060 1.0110 0.9958 1.9759 
Table 9.23 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of a closed 
platform due to variation in the gas detection systems. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
All available 
All unavailable 
0.9997 1.0002 0.9998 1.0000 0.9945 
1.0910 1.0011 1.0436 1.0000 3.8601 
Table 9.24 - Fraction of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of a 
closed platform due to variation in the gas detection systems. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Separation 
Compression 
2.1620 1.0066 1.0048 0.9430 
5.0190 1.0078 0.8931 1.0000 
Table 9.25 - Fractions of fatalities due to ignitions within the separation 
and compression modules compared to the base case model. 
Local Pre-muster Post-muster 
Separation 
Compression 
1.1647 1.5030 3.7807 
1.5160 1.7468 9.1732 
Table 9.26 - Fractions of local, pre- and post-muster fatalities due to explosions within 
the separation and compression modules compared to the base case model. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Sonic Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
Beam Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
Point Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
0.9994 1.0001 0.9992 0.9982 1.0003 
1.0100 1.0033 1.0063 0.9950 1.0227 
0.9997 1.0000 0.9998 0.9997 0.9984 
0.9995 1.0003 0.9995 0.9979 1.0069 
0.9998 1.0001 0.9999 0.9992 0.9987 
1.0008 1.0000 1.0001 1.0018 1.0027 
Table 9.27 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of a closed 
platform due to variation in the gas detection systems. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Sonic Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
Beam Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
Point Detector 
Available 
Unavailable 
0.9996 1.0000 0.9995 1.0000 1.0001 
1.0105 1.0002 1.0124 1.0000 1.0350 
0.9998 0.9999 0.9997 1.0000 1.0001 
1.0002 1.0002 0.9994 1.0000 1.0084 
0.9998 1.0001 0.9998 1.0000 0.9997 
0.9995 1.0003 0.9999 1.0000 1.0055 
Table 9.28 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module of a 
closed platform due to variation in the gas detection systems. 
Factor Detection system failure 
probability 
0.1 0.007 
0.5 0.035 
1 0.070 
2 0.140 
5 0.350 
10 0.700 
Table 9.29 - Variation in failure probability of the detection systems 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
0.9994 1.0001 0.9993 0.9994 0.9967 
0.9991 1.0002 0.9991 0.9987 0.9998 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0009 1.0007 1.0004 1.0003 1.0086 
1.0076 1.0000 1.0025 0.9967 1.0627 
1.0087 1.0020 1.0029 0.9985 1.2875 
Table 9.30 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module 
of a closed platform due to variation in the gas detection systems. 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
0.9999 1.0002 1.0000 1.0000 0.9949 
0.9996 1.0000 0.9997 1.0000 0.9959 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0058 1.0005 1.0002 1.0000 1.0621 
1.0194 1.0003 0.9998 1.0000 1.8613 
1.0642 0.9999 1.0001 1.0000 2.2484 
Table 9.31 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module 
of a closed platform due to variation in the gas detection systems. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Available 
Unavailable 
0.9617 1.0000 0.9697 0.9995 0.9524 
1.0595 0.9985 0.9244 0.9896 1.3686 
Table 9.32 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities when the gas detection system is 
100% available and ventilation doubles following detection. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Deluge Available 
Deluge Unavailable 
1.0477 1.03 89 0.65 64 0.0000 1.0917 
0.7892 0.6257 6.6922 10.9940 1.1575 
Table 9.33 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module 
of a closed platform due to variation in the deluge system. 
Deluge Available 
Deluge Unavailable 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
0.9975 0.9982 0.9960 1.0000 1.0912 
1.0136 1.0048 1.0164 1.0000* 0.6951 
Table 9.34 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module 
of a closed platform due to variation in the deluge system. 
* This factor resulted in a small number of pool fires 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Base Case 
Deluge Available 
0.9223 0.0777 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
0.9451 0.0549 < 0.0001 0.0000 
Table 9.35 - Fractions of fatalities due to ignitions within the separation module of a 
closed platform due to variation in the deluge system. 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Base Case 
Deluge Unavailable 
0.9223 0.0777 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
0.6802 0.3194 < 0.0001 0.0003 
Table 9.36 - Fractions of fatalities due to ignitions within the separation module of a 
closed platform due to variation in the deluge system. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Base Case 
Deluge Unavailable 
0.9246 0.0754 < 0.0001 0.0000 
0.9196 0.0804 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
Table 9.37 - Fractions of fatalities due to ignitions within the compression module 
of a closed platform due to variation in the deluge system. 
Factor Initial unavailability prior to Frequency failure once 
activation activated 
0.1 0.009 9.446x 10'7 
0.5 0.045 4.723x 10'6 
1 0.090 9.446x10'6 
2 0.180 1.889x10'5 
5 0.450 9.723x10'5 
10 0.900 9.446x 10'5 
Table 9.38 - Variation in the deluge systems 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0429 1.0376 0.6164 0.0965 1.1237 
1.0213 1.0224 0.7851 0.5038 1.1121 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9623 0.9705 1.4386 2.0078 0.7058 
0.8849 0.8593 2.8656 4.8975 1.0249 
0.7905 0.6757 5.4131 9.8283 1.1879 
Table 9.39 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module 
of a closed platform due to variation in the deluge systems. 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
1.0084 0.9987 1.0057 1.0000 1.0642 
1.0038 0.9991 1.0026 1.0000 1.0246 
1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1.0438 0.9984 1.0092 1.0000* 0.9547 
1.0184 0.9966 1.0180 1.0000* 0.8771 
1.0164 1.0072 1.0173 1.0000* 0.5377 
Table 9.40 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the compression module 
of a closed platform due to variation in the deluge systems. 
* This factor resulted in a small number of pool fires 
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Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires Fatalities 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Deluge Available 
Deluge Unavailable 
0.9974 1.0359 0.6370 0.0000 0.7882 
0.7256 0.6309 6.4738 11.2435 1.6526 
Table 9.41 - Fractions of ignitions and fatalities within the separation module of a closed 
platform due to variation in the deluge system when ventilation is increased following 
detection. 
Fatalities 
Walls strengthened 
Walls removed 
0.9974 
3.2594 
Table 9.42 - Fractions of fatalities within the separation module of a closed platform 
due to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
Fatalities 
Walls strengthened 
Walls removed 
0.9881 
5.0051 
Table 9.43 - Fractions and fatalities within the compression module of a closed platform 
due to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
Separation Module 
Compression Module 
0.9974 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
0.9881 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 9.44 - Fractions of fatalities generated by ignitions in both the separation and 
compression modules when fire and blast walls are strengthened. 
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Separation Compression 
0.8717 0.8426 
Table 9.45 - Fraction of fatalities occurring when explosions 
cannot generate platform failure. 
Separation Module 
Compression Module 
Explosions Immediate Delayed Pool Fires 
Jet Fires Jet Fires 
2.318 8 17.6403 1.0000 1.0000 
2.5863 17.8169 1.0000 1.0000 
Table 9.46 - Fractions of fatalities generated by ignitions in both the separation and 
compression modules when fire and blast walls are removed. 
Fatalities 
Blast Walls strengthened 
Blast Walls removed 
Fire Walls strengthened 
Fire Walls removed 
0.9974 
2.2381 
1.0000 
2.0214 
Table 9.47 - Fractions of fatalities within the separation module of a closed platform due 
to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
Fatalities 
Blast Walls strengthened 
Blast Walls removed 
Fire Walls strengthened 
Fire Walls removed 
0.9981 
4.0592 
1.0000 
3.8435 
Table 9.48 - Fractions of fatalities within the compression module of a closed platform 
due to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
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Factor Blast wall resistance (bar) Fire wall resistance (mins) 
0.1 0.06 1.5 
0.5 0.3 7.5 
1 0.6 15 
2 1.2 30 
5 3.0 75 
10 6.0 150 
Table 9.49 - Variation of the wall resistances (bar/mins) 
Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Fatalities 
2.2381 
1.0021 
1.0000 
0.9991 
0.9974 
0.9974 
Table 9.50 - Fractions of fatalities within the separation module of an open platform due 
to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
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Factor 
0.1 
0.5 
1 
2 
5 
10 
Fatalities 
4.1238 
1.0135 
1.0000 
0.9910 
0.9881 
0.9881 
Table 9.51 - Fractions of fatalities within the compression module of an open platform 
due to variation in the blast and fire walls. 
0.1 0.5 25 10 
Ventilation rate 
Ignition frequency 
Leak frequency 
Isolation/ blowdown system 
Detection system 
Deluge system 
Fire/Blast walls 
1.3773 1.0574 0.9264 0.8182 0.6233 
0.1122 0.5146 1.8507 3.7417 4.0959 
0.1 0.5 25 10 
0.9953 1.0104 1.0285 1.0040 1.0275 
0.9967 0.9998 1.0086 1.0627 1.2875 
1.1237 1.1121 0.7058 1.0249 1.1879 
2.2381 1.0021 0.9991 0.9974 0.9974 
Table 9.52 - Overview of the fractions of fatalities for each parameter within the 
separation module of an enclosed sided platform. 
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0.1 0.5 25 10 
Ventilation rate 
Ignition frequency 
Leak frequency 
Isolation/ blowdown system 
Detection system 
Deluge system 
Fire/Blast walls 
1.0988 1.0095 0.9642 0.7626 0.3348 
0.1128 0.5247 1.8612 3.4644 3.6137 
0.1 0.5 25 10 
0.9799 0.9986 1.0053 0.9975 0.9852 
0.9949 0.9959 1.0621 1.8613 2.2484 
1.0642 1.0246 0.9547 0.8771 0.5377 
4.1238 1.0135 0.9910 0.9881 0.9881 
Table 9.53 - Overview of the fractions of fatalities for each parameter within the 
compression module of an enclosed sided platform. 
2 or 0.5 10 or 0.1 
Ventilation rate 
Detection system 
Deluge system 
Fire/Blast walls 
0.9264 2 0.6233 1 
0.9998 4 0.9967 2 
0.7058 1 1.1879 4 
0.9991 3 0.9974 3 
Table 9.54 - Fractions of fatalities and assigned order of importance within the separation 
module of an enclosed sided platform. 
2 or 0.5 
Ventilation rate 
Detection system 
Deluge system 
Fire/Blast walls 
10 or 0.1 
0.9642 2 0.3348 1 
0.9959 4 0.9949 4 
0.9547 1 0.5377 2 
0.9910 3 0.9881 3 
Table 9.55 - Fractions of fatalities and assigned order of 
importance within the 
compression module of an enclosed sided platform. 
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